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Sudan:

Cross-Border Humanitarian Access Analysis

22 November 2023



Acronyms

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
BAI	Bureaucratic and Administrative Impediments
BCP	Border Crossing Point
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CP	Child Protection
CRSV	Conflict Related Sexual Violence
CSM	Collective Site Monitoring
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FSLC	Food Security and Livelihood Cluster
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISW	Institute for the Study of War
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services
MSNA	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
NFI	Non-food item
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSAG	Non-State Armed Group
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PIN	People in Need
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PwD	People with Disability
REACH	REACH Initiative
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SCI	Save the Children
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SPLMN-AH	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (Abdulaziz al Hilu)
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
UNW	UN Women
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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Sudan:

Cross-Border Humanitarian Access Analysis

SUDAN | Political violence events and border crossing points

1 September - 10 November 2023

21 November 2023



Legend

- Border crossing points - Active
- Border crossing points - Potential
- Border crossing points - Other
- Administrative capital
- State capitals

ACLED conflict events



Political Violence Incidents

01 September - 10 November 2023

1.1K


ACLED

Fatalities

01 September - 10 November 2023

4.1K

ACLED



Sources: ACLED, Mapbox, UNOCHA

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Introduction

The conflict in Sudan has severely impeded humanitarian access at a time when 24.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Incessant conflict and multiple failed ceasefire agreements between the two major conflicting parties, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), have resulted in massive violence, civilian casualties, and a scarcity of medical service, shelter, and basic goods for those remaining in Sudan, as hospitals in conflict affected areas are no longer functional, thousands of homes have been destroyed, and the prices of essential goods have more than doubled. Destruction and looting of public infrastructure and humanitarian facilities have made it difficult for humanitarian organizations to access those in need or provide support.

The international humanitarian response faces significant challenges in delivering aid to people in Sudan amidst active conflict, with security, logistical, and bureaucratic impediments hindering cross-border operations. The fragmentation of armed groups is leading to heightened conflict and insecurity, fueling communal violence. These conditions are unsuitable for both in-country and cross-border humanitarian operations. Military and communal violence, particularly in border regions, impedes the delivery of humanitarian support to Sudan from neighboring countries such as Chad and South Sudan. The impact on humanitarian access highlights the need for adaptive strategies, focusing on coordination, dialogue, and conflict-sensitive approaches to navigate the complex conflict environment in Sudan.

This report provides an overview of the conflict dynamics around Chad–Sudan and South Sudan–Sudan Border Cross Points (BCPs) along with mapping the access routes into Sudan for humanitarian agencies. It also outlines the trajectory of the mentioned border areas.

Key Trends

Persistent insecurity, due to SAF/RSF conflict and their affiliate militia groups, continues to destabilize the county: Various militias aligned with both sides of the conflict are exploiting this insecurity to pursue their self-interests in various geographic areas. This is particularly pronounced in contested states such as North Darfur and West Kordofan. Culminating in further security breakdowns and disorder and adding to the mounting number of informal checkpoints along main supply routes around BCPs. Additionally, there have been several cases of robberies and looting of humanitarian cargo.

Shifting areas of control and new theatres of violence: Growing control of Greater Darfur by the RSF as well as other developments, are shifting the flash points of the conflict. The activities of the RSF, SAF and Sudan Liberation Movement–Abdulaziz Al Hilu (SPLMN-AH) in West Kordofan, the growing proximity of the RSF to Jebel Marrah and the growing tensions in North Darfur are all results of these shifts in the conflict as the conflict seems to be evolving into a new phase. This will lead to improved access in some previously hard to reach areas and deteriorating access in what were once relatively safer locations. Additionally, the shifting areas of control will complicate actor mapping, risk analysis, and scenario forecasting for humanitarian agencies. They also present new challenges in terms of dialogue and engagement.

Growing ethno-political and communal violence: Conflicts like those between the Salamat, Beni Halba and Habbaniya in South Darfur have constituted a trend in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. These incidents are noteworthy because of their ability to create a disproportionate response, where a seemingly minor incident can trigger a series of retaliatory attacks among the warring communities and aggravate wider ethno-political conflict across the border areas. The recent violence between the Salamat and Beni Halba tribes is a salient example, it is nevertheless a risk across Darfur and Kordofan. These conflicts are both a symptom and a catalyst, creating a potential loop, and as such is a worsening trend

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and a difficult to predict source of insecurity. Recurrent communal violence around border areas will continue to pose a risk to humanitarian staff, exposing them to collateral damage and further jeopardizing safe passage of humanitarian aid deliveries.

Ongoing financially motivated crimes: Incidents such as the attack on the 'Lifeline Convoy' to North Darfur are expected to persist in the current context. Available information and anecdotal reports indicate that criminal activity is on the rise amid worsening socioeconomic and living conditions, widespread proliferation of small arms among civilians, and inadequate or inexistent law enforcement. Looking at the current economic condition and lack of adequate viable livelihood, the threat of financially motivated crimes may continue to manifest and could potentially increase the risk levels for humanitarian staff and aid deliveries.

International Mediation: The recent announcement at the Jeddah mediation platform of a Joint Humanitarian Forum represents the first concrete commitment from both sides on humanitarian access. While it is not likely to lead to an immediate reduction in bureaucratic impediments, it nevertheless represents an opportunity for dialogue between the parties and the humanitarian sector, previously inexistant. While mediation efforts aimed at a ceasefire remain challenged on the ground, this dialogue may lead to improved coordination and access, particularly to safe areas under either party's control and potentially to conflict zones, primarily Khartoum.

Potential impact on humanitarian access

- As theatres of conflict shift, security-related access challenges are expected to improve in previously embattled locations, particularly in Darfur. However, complex and risky civil-military coordination will continue to pose challenges to access. Simultaneously, security-related access challenges will grow as fighting shifts to new zones or intensifies in others. Areas at high risk of emergent or intensifying conflict include North and East Darfur, North and West Kordofan, amongst others.
- The proliferation of checkpoints by various actors, including formal and informal ones mounted by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) as well as political and local militia is likely to continue. This trend is driven by security and governance vacuums, growing and unresolved humanitarian needs, and communal discontent with the impact of an extending conflict. Such check points frequently subject humanitarian personnel and cargo to severe scrutiny and, at times, lead to looting and aid diversion, compromising safety, causing delays, and obstructing humanitarian passage.
- As armed actors solidify areas of control, what were once complex battlefields will shift towards better defined battle lines. While civil-military coordination and access negotiations will still be necessary at local levels, the absence of one of the two main belligerents in an area will reduce this burden while easing coordination and improve access.

Situation Analysis

South Sudan

South Sudan remains the most dangerous context for aid workers ([AWSO 07/2023](#)). In South Sudan, the fragmentation of armed groups has been driving communal violence in various parts of the country. This trend affects Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Warrap and Unity states, which border East Darfur, West Kordofan and South Kordofan ([CFR 23/08/2023](#)). The contested Abyei PCA area is a hotspot for severe intercommunal violence. This includes conflicts both among different South Sudanese tribes and between South Sudanese tribes and Sudanese tribes. ([UNSC 27/10/2022](#)). Linked to migration patterns and the rainy

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season, intercommunal violence peaks just before and after the rainy season along and on both sides of the border, representing the most significant security concern.

Another concern surrounds South Sudan's oil exports which constitute 90 percent of South Sudan's revenue and depended on pipelines running through conflict zones in Sudan. Should those pipelines be damaged by conflict or closed due to a political decision in Sudan, this would have massive impacts beyond significant economic deterioration. Under this scenario, a further breakdown of authority in South Sudan and further fragmentation of the conflict landscape and growing cross-border conflict involving Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) and militias are likely to be seen ([Al Jazeera](#) 12/05/2023, [SAS](#) 05/2023). This situation could prompt the South Sudan government to secure this vital lifeline, increasing the risk of cross-border violence and the potential for border closures.

Chad

Violence in Chad, particularly near the Sudan border, remains limited. However, access from Chad mainly impeded by violence within Sudan. There is a growing trend of violence against refugees near the border, fueled by rising discontent among local communities and refugee populations due to limited resources and the subsequent competition over them. Although road conditions are generally good, they can become challenging during the rainy season.

The operating environment at the BCP witnesses sporadic and contained disputes between the Chadian border forces and the local community in Adikong border community in West Darfur. For example, in the first week of October, a member of Chadian border army fired shots at civilians suspected of ignoring instructions to stop at the army post for check while crossing the border. Three other similar incidents were also reported in September ([Radio Tamazuj](#) 15/10/2023). This incident did not lead to a deterioration of the relationship with the Sudanese authority. However, the border community on the Sudanese side staged a protest and tension mounted which prompted the Chadian authority to close the border for a few days. Compounding this worrying trend, are the growing numbers of attacks, including sexual violence, against Sudanese refugees by unknown armed groups ([Radio Dabanga](#) 23/10/2023).

Despite these tensions conflict in the regions of Ouaddaï, Sila and Wadi Fir bordering Sudan's Darfur region remain minimal. With access from Abéché and Gos Beida to the border points limited only by the infrastructure at those BCPs. While access beyond that is limited by conditions in Sudan. There is, however, a persistent risk of cross-border conflict driven by tribal ties that span the borders and their intersection with armed groups in Sudan. This risk applies to both nomadic tribes such as the Rizeigat, or settled tribes such as the Zaghawa or criminal enterprise such as those involved with cross-border smuggling ([ICG](#) 10/08/2023). Moreover, inadequate funding for the Chad Humanitarian Response Plan and the dire conditions of refugee camps are rising conflict sensitivity concerns. Tensions are likely to rise as both Chadian and Sudanese populations harbor resentment over aid flows into West Darfur. This is a particularly concerning in the department of Assongha in Ouaddaï region, where Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) reports competition over resources between refugees, returnees, and impoverished host households ([FEWSNET](#) 09/2023).

As of 8 November, a total of 1,367 metric tons of critical humanitarian supplies have been transported from Chad to West Darfur by UN agencies (OCHA update 15/11/2023). The first UN inter-agency cross-border mission was from Farchana, Chad to Kulbus, West Darfur, delivering non-food item (NFI) kits to 300 households (UNHCR 04/09/2023). However, this is not nearly enough. According to OCHA, almost 1,500,000 people are in need of humanitarian assistance in West Darfur, but only 35,000 people were reached by the end of September through both with in-country and cross-border operations ([OCHA](#) accessed 15/11/2023).

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Sudan

Cross-border access into Sudan is challenged by physical, bureaucratic and security-related access constraints, that vary across the country's vast geography. In Sudan's eastern and northern regions, which are primarily under SAF control, bureaucratic constraints are the main barriers to access. Whereas in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, the contexts are more complex, requiring a deeper local-level understanding:

The conflict landscape in North Darfur remains complicated by the large number of armed actors. Despite relatively muted violence in the state, numerous checkpoints exist from the At Tina BCP manned by the Sudan State Security Forces, the RSF and other active NSAGs, particularly the Juba Peace Agreement signatories. In Al Fasher, tensions remain high in the city, with sporadic clashes posing a major risk.

In West Darfur, violence between SAF and the RSF as well as by militias against civilian populations peaked between May and July, ending with the RSF claiming control over Ag Geneina, and much of West Darfur ([Radio Dabanga](#) 22/06/2023). The reduction of violence has allowed cross-border convoys to reach Ag Geneina from Abéché, keeping the BCP open. Access beyond the town, however, remains limited due to occasional flare-ups of violence involving the RSF and aligned militias along key roads ([Logistics Cluster](#) 18/09/2023). In Central Darfur, intense violence between the SAF and RSF in and around the state capital of Zalingei ended with the fall of Zalingei. However, reports violence against civilians continue (Washington Post 08/11/2023). Zalingei sits at a critical crossroads between Ag Geneina and Nyala. Across much of the state there is an unchallenged RSF presence including near the BCP at Um Dukhun.

In East Darfur, violence is relatively limited, with muted militia activity most often associated with looting. As a result, security-related challenges in East Darfur are less severe than in other states in the region despite growing levels of criminality. This has led to significant movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to the state, where aid actors have better access to populations in need, albeit with limited resources ([IOM](#) 11/10/2023, [OCHA](#) 15/08/2023). As of September 2023, 106% of targeted populations in East Darfur have been reached by humanitarian partners, This achievement reflects the accessible conditions for partners from West Kordofan and the significant displacement of populations from Greater Darfur into the state ([OCHA](#) 06/09/2023).

In West Kordofan, security-related access challenges are growing due to sporadic clashes between the SAF and RSF. These clashes, including those near key oil and gas infrastructure near the border with South Sudan. Conflict in the state remains at lower levels than in the rest of the region, which has led to growing displacements into the state by populations seeking safety ([IOM](#) 11/10/2023). The existing security situation in West Kordofan is further complicated by the emergence of the Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdulaziz Al Hilu (SPLMN-AH), along tribal mobilizations and hate speech driving increased violence across the state (IOM 26/10/2023,). This escalation has led to violence between the various militias, as well as between these militias and the main conflict actors. Such a trend expected to continue, increasing security related access challenges and complicating access negotiations.

Access within West Kordofan is mostly challenged by fighting between SAF and SPLMN-AH. The route from Bentiu through the Jau crossing goes through Buram locality, where the SPLMN-AH have made significant gains, and into the besieged state capital of Kadugli ([Sudan Tribune](#) 27/09/2023; [Save the Children](#) 01/09/2023). Attempts by RSF to move the conflict into the state have decreased in September, the intensity of the conflict between SPLMN-AH and SAF spiked. Meanwhile, militia violence remains mostly tied to looting attempts as part of the growing pattern of criminality that plagued the state before the start of the conflict.

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Sudan – Chad Crossings

The cross-border mission from Chad to Darfur, while effective in transporting essential humanitarian aid to Sudan, encounters various obstacles. These include difficulties in arranging suitable lodging for aid personnel, insufficient storage capacity for incoming goods at Farchana/Adre, uncertainties in customs procedures, and security issues for local staff operating in Darfur. According to the most recent update from the Logistics Cluster, cross-border operations have been suspended due to the worsening security conditions in the Darfur regions. Humanitarian organizations will be notified about the resumption of operations once the situation improves ([Logistics Cluster](#) 14/11/2023).

Abéché: Tina Border Crossing Point in North Darfur

Efforts are ongoing to secure official approval for Tina BCP as a potential cross-border point. International NGOs have conducted positive assessments, indicating its suitability for humanitarian operations.

Tina was first identified as a potential cross-border point to access North Darfur in September ([Logcluster](#) 19/09/2023). In mid-October, UN OCHA's Access/Coordination team collaborated with humanitarian partners and Chadian Local authorities to advocate for border crossing via Tina ([Logistics Cluster](#) 20/10/2023). While Tina has been added to potential cross-border points, official approval is still pending.

Abéché: Adre Border Crossing Point in West Darfur

The Adre BCP is used to access Sudan from Adre in Chad to El Geneina in West Darfur. It is the most used border crossing point for cross border operations.

The Sudanese Government provided written confirmation of the decision to allow for cross-border humanitarian assistance from Chad to West and East Darfur via this crossing. This includes the movement and housing of personnel, as well as the storage of humanitarian goods ([LogIE](#) accessed 13/11/2023). This route, despite being challenging to access and often prone to delays and postponements, have been essential in delivering aid to key areas ([UNHCR](#) 02/10/2023).

However, on October 8, an inter-agency mission faced obstacles crossing the Adre border from Chad into West Darfur, as Chadian forces closed the border, citing assumed security concerns linked to the killing of an Arab Sudanese boy on October 6th. On October 9th, the inter-agency mission was unable to advance to West Darfur due to logistical challenges from Farchana to Adre ([OCHA](#) 13/10/2023)

In addition to security constraints, organizations have been facing storage space issues in Adre, which makes cross border operations more expensive. Atlas Logistique has offered a free user storage service to partners in Adré ([Logistics Cluster](#) 10/11/2023), but it may not be sufficient. Organizations consider Adré as a transit hub to consolidate humanitarian organizations. Recent advisories have been recommended to use ground transportation for missions between Adre and Farchana as capacity in Adre Airport is very limited ([Logistics Cluster](#) 10/11/2023).

Goz Beïda: Um Dukhun Border Crossing Point in West Darfur

Though humanitarian organizations have been using Um Dukhun since August without challenges ([Logistics Cluster](#) 19/09/2023), 23, there has been a recent change. Authorities in Goz Beida, located Sila region of Chad, have strongly discouraged the use of Um Dukhun for cross-border operations under Humanitarian Information Sharing Mechanism (HISM) ([logistics Cluster](#) 10/11/2023). Currently, humanitarian organizations are not using this BCP.


The cautionary stance is due to increased insecurity in the region, marked by reported outbreaks of inter-communal violence between the Salamat and Bani Halba tribes in Um Dukhun. This violence is an extension of the conflict between these two tribes in South Darfur ([IOM](#) 02/11/2023). OCHA is actively

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exploring alternative routes, in collaboration with partners to access Um Dukhum from agreed-upon border points and through different roads within Sudan ([Logistics Cluster](#) 10/11/2023).

The UN cross-border mission from Chad to West and Central Darfur is currently in progress. The OCHA Sudan Access/Civil-Military Coordination team, in coordination with the OCHA Chad team, successfully identified and established two new humanitarian border crossings under the Humanitarian Information Sharing Mechanism (HISM) following discussions with Chadian regional authorities in the southeast region of Sila. The new routes will connect Ade in Chad with Beida in Sudan, and Mogororo in Chad with Foro Baranga in Sudan ([OCHA](#) 26/10/2023, [Logistics Cluster](#) 10/11/2023).

Sudan – South Sudan Crossings



Map of Border crossing points, key roads and South Sudan Maximum Flood Extents in 2022

Renk: Joda Border Crossing Point in White Nile

The Joda BCP land and river route is currently open and in use by humanitarian partners to reach Kosti city. World Food Program (WFP) has a Memorandum of Understanding in place with the governments of South Sudan and Sudan for cargo movement enabling the transfer of supplies to White Nile state ([Logistics Cluster](#) 16/10/2023).

According to the Logistics Cluster, the roads in Renk county to be 'Passable'. However, roads leading towards the remainder of the country are deemed to be 'Not Passable'. As a result, partners are flying personnel and supplies in through Renk airport ([Logistics Cluster](#) 09/11/2023, [MAF](#) 19/08/2023). While the expanding reaches of the Sudd Wetlands do not reach Renk, South Sudan's Upper Nile state and Sudan's White Nile state host the White Nile River and are at risk of significant riverine flooding that can impact access during the rainy season ([Andy Hardy et al](#) 13/07/2023).

Upper Nile state has been the epicenter of escalating intercommunal violence particularly in the counties of Malakal, Fashoda, Panyikang, Maiwut and Maban. Nevertheless, the security situation in Renk country, where the Joda BCP is located is relatively stable ([ACLED](#) 24/10/2023).

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Aweil: Kiir Adem Border Crossing Point in East Darfur, Majokynthu Border Crossing Point in West Kordofan, El Kuek Border Crossing Point in Abyei

The Kiir Adem and Majokinthu border crossings remain open, allowing for the passage of supplies. However, significant administrative efforts and civil-military coordination are required on both sides of the border. This includes coordination with local communities and the RSF.

The El Kuek border crossing into the Abyei PCA remains open. However, due to the divided control within the Abyei PCA between Sudan and South Sudan, bureaucratic constraints on access between the north and south parts have been high, with the situation seemingly worsening since the onset of the conflict ([UN](#) 06/11/2023).

The Logistics Cluster considers roads from Aweil to the BCP as well as towards Juba as 'Passable', with the caveat that access deteriorates due to flooding in the rainy season ([Logistics Cluster](#) 09/11/2023).

The security situation in Northern Bahr el Ghazal has improved over the past three years, with most of the violence is tied to seasonal conflict involving internal and cross-border militias ([ACLED](#) 24/10/2023). The influx of refugees and returnees may put pressure on already contested issues surrounding land-tenure and smuggling, risking spikes in militia violence in the state.

Despite the presence of both SAF and RSF forces in East Darfur the security situation is mostly calm, with occasional incidents of violence involving communal militias. This relative calm is attributed to local mediation efforts by tribal leaders ([ACLED](#) 31/10/2023, [Sudan Tribune](#) 18/10/2023). However, attacks on oil infrastructure in the state and growing tensions persist, indicating a continued risk of violent conflict between the SAF and RSF ([Radio Dabanga](#) 07/11/2023).

Bentiu: Panakuac Border Crossing Point in West and South Kordofan, Jau Border Crossing Point in South Kordofan

The Panakuac and Jau BCPs remain open, allowing for the passage of supplies. However, significant administrative and civil-military coordination is required on both sides of the border. This includes coordinating with local communities, the SPLMN-AH and the RSF, challenging access attempts even during periods of calm, or into more secure areas of Kordofan.

Roads from Bentiu towards the BCPs are in mixed conditions, with some considered 'Not Passable', a situation that is exacerbated during the rainy season ([Logistics Cluster](#) 09/11/2023). The Panakuac BCP, entering West Kordofan, provides access to Kadugli in South Kordofan through Lagawa locality. The Jau BCP provides access into South Kordofan's Buram locality.

The Humanitarian Access Snapshot by OCHA highlights a number of incidents in Rubkona county that hosts Bentiu and Pariang county where the BCPs into Sudan are located. These incidents include violence and threats by community members discontent with the reduction of humanitarian services in their areas ([OCHA](#) 25/10/2023, [WFP](#) 19/10/2023). This raises significant concerns around conflict sensitivity as communities are likely to be displeased with aid traveling across the border in a context of severely reduced humanitarian aid within South Sudan ([The Guardian](#) 07/02/2023). The high communal tensions, which led to significant inter-communal violence in Unity state in 2022 further exacerbate these concerns. ([UN](#) 25/04/2022).

Despite the presence of both SAF and RSF forces in West Kordofan, the security situation remained mostly calm, however, there are worrying indications of escalating conflict across multiple theatres. On 24 October 2023, the SPLMN-AH attacked Lagawa Town expanding their control past the border of South Kordofan and opening a new front for conflict between them and the SAF, SAF aligned political militias have engaged in conflict in Ghubaish locality with Misseriya communities deemed to be aligned with the SAF, while violence between the SAF and the RSF over control of oil and gas infrastructure has begun to

escalate ([IOM](#) 26/10/2023, [Al Taghyeer](#) 21/09/2023, [Radio Dabanga](#) 12/11/2023). As a result, there is a high risk of violent escalation across the state that includes the possibility of multi-actor battles for control.

Access in South Kordofan is mostly challenged by fighting between SAF and the SPLMN-AH. Access from Bentiu through the Jau crossing goes through Buram locality, where the SPLMN-AH have made significant gains, and into the besieged state capital of Kadugli ([Sudan Tribune](#) 27/09/2023; [Save the Children](#) 01/09/2023).

Risk Matrix

The Risk Matrix below broadly looks at the risks that may impact cross-border access to Sudan from Chad and South Sudan. Operational risk mitigation measures need to be taken keeping both broader national and local contexts in mind, and this matrix aims to be a starting point for those critical discussions.

Cross-Border Access Constraint	Risk	Risk Type (Static, Seasonal, Evolving)	Risk Level
Physical	Deterioration of road conditions (poor ordinance)	Evolving	Medium
	Flood related access disruptions	Seasonal	High
Security	Internal inter-communal conflict	Evolving/Seasonal	High
	Cross-border inter-communal conflict	Evolving/Seasonal	High
	Internal conflict between state and non-state Armed groups	Evolving	High
	Cross-border Conflict involving state and non-state Armed groups	Evolving	Medium
	Criminality and looting along routes	Evolving	Medium
	Community-led disruptions (protests, riots, blockades) of supplies delivered on routes going through or near them	Evolving	Low
Bureaucratic	Governments renegeing on commitments to existing Agreements or Memorandums of Understanding relating to cross-border delivery	Evolving	Low
	Increasing scrutiny of aid deliveries by state and non-state actors leading to delayed or cancelled supply missions	Evolving	Medium
	Aid-diversion by state and non-state armed actors	Evolving	High
	(Un-) Official fees imposed on the movement of supplies by state and non-state groups including community groups	Evolving	Medium

Conclusion

Overall, the current security situation and access present significant risks to humanitarian staff and the delivery of aid, impeding safe cross-border passage. The multifaceted nature of these challenges and the uncertainty surrounding their anticipated intensification suggest that humanitarian organizations may continue to face access issues and barriers to program implementation. Furthermore, the recent evolution of the conflict dynamics and the shifting of areas of control have not yet resulted in any clear improvement in humanitarian access. As such, the intricate access situation could have short to medium-term repercussions for cross-border access.

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