

SUDAN CRISIS

Situational Analysis

31 October 2023



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Introduction

The report covers developments in the time period of August-September 2023, but provides background information since the conflict outbreak in the conflict section. Where feasible, October data has been used to update the latest figures. DFS follows a rigorous Secondary Data Review (SDR) process where all publicly available data on the humanitarian situation is consolidated into a database using an analytical framework based on the [JIAF](#) (see details on the [DEEP](#) platform in the [Methodology Section](#)). A comprehensive overview of the sources used for the production of this report and **information gaps** is provided in [Annex 2: Information Sources and Gaps](#).

Executive Summary

Conflict

After six months into the conflict, over 9,000 fatalities have been recorded, three-quarters of them caused by bombings in Khartoum, highlighting their deadly nature and devastating impact on civilians. Between August and September, 650 battles, 261 remote violent events, and 169 violence events against civilians were reported, resulting in over 4,000 fatalities. Khartoum state is the site of the most intense fighting, while inter-ethnic violence escalated in South Darfur, which has witnessed increasing levels of violence since July. Both parties to the conflict have been intensifying their efforts to gain control of key military facilities and critical supply routes. Since September, military tactics have partially changed, with both sides increasing their reliance on bombings in Khartoum tri-city. SAF aerial superiority has been challenged by limited availability of fighter jets and the use of drone warfare by the RSF, which have acted as a partial aerial warfare equaliser, increasing the prospects for a continuation of conflict amidst military parity between the two sides. As this report was being finalised it was reported that RSF had taken control of the SAF HQ in Nyala. This has not been factored into the analysis presented in this report.

Displacement

Sudan is now host to the largest number of internally displaced persons worldwide, with over seven million IDPs. Prior to the conflict, there were over 3.7 million people internally displaced. An estimated 80% of IDPs were in the Greater Darfur region, which has seen recurrent waves of violence and attacks against civilians since the 2003 Darfur war. In addition, Sudan hosted an estimated one million refugees mainly from South Sudan (over 800,000), Eritrea (137,000), Syria (90,000), and Ethiopia (70,000), as well as the Central African Republic, Chad and Yemen. The majority of refugees lived in out-of-camp settlements and urban areas, with the largest number (over 300,000) in Khartoum, although some also lived in camps situated predominantly in White Nile and eastern Sudan. As of mid-October, over 4.6 million people have been newly internally displaced across Sudan, an increase of 7.6% compared to August. IDPs have been observed in over 4,600 locations (167/189 localities), across all 18 states. As of early October, the total number of IDPs continues to increase across all states with the exception of Sennar, with the highest increase recorded in River Nile state.

Humanitarian Access

Humanitarian Access constraints are multifaceted: access is constrained by conflict dynamics, by economic aspects –fuel shortages and inflation – and by bureaucratic impediments. In areas under SAF control in Sudan's east and north, access is primarily limited by growing bureaucratic constraints. The bureaucratic hurdles are particularly impacting attempts at humanitarian supply convoys meant to deliver aid to conflict-affected areas of Khartoum and Darfur. These impediments are further magnified when aid convoys are meant to reach people in need in RSF-controlled territories. With travel permissions difficult to obtain for both cross-line and cross-border transport due to the need to coordinate with multiple actors and seemingly arbitrary delays, aid convoys are often incapable of reaching those in dire need. This is further complicated by the proliferation of checkpoints manned by armed groups and militias. The conflict is also leading to increasing risks tied to unexploded ordnance, particularly in key routes contested by the SAF and RSF, while the security vacuum is driving criminality and banditry in roads across the country. Combined with poor infrastructure, particularly in border crossing points, it has become difficult and expensive to secure vehicles, drivers, and warehousing necessary to ensure consistent access to populations in need of assistance.

Humanitarian Conditions



Food Security and Livelihoods

The food security and livelihoods situation in Sudan is facing an unprecedented crisis, with over 20.3 million people (42% of the population) classified in IPC Phase 3 or above –out of which 6.3 million people are in phase 4 or Emergency – between July and September 2023. The ongoing conflict has disrupted the 2023 planting season, leading to a surge in the price of staple foods, with prices increasing up by 200%. This has resulted in the anticipation of the highest food insecurity in the post-harvest season ever recorded, affecting approximately 15 million people, with IDPs being among the most vulnerable groups. The livestock sector and agricultural production have been significantly impacted, disrupting livelihoods and access to water and pasture. The conflict has exacerbated an already weakened agricultural sector, due to damaged factories and farms, disrupted market places, scarce resources, and displacement. Rising food prices and a deteriorating economic environment have further eroded purchasing power, particularly in conflict-affected urban areas. Access to agricultural inputs and labor dynamics have been hampered by the ongoing conflict, leading to below-average cultivation. Moreover, the unavailability of livestock vaccines and drugs, along with

increased insecurity on animal migratory routes, is negatively affecting the crucial livestock sector. These multifaceted challenges pose an immense threat to food security and livelihoods in the country.

Nutrition



4.6 million people in Sudan are in need of nutrition support. Sudan had already recorded the highest malnutrition rates among children globally before the conflict, with 64 localities having a malnutrition prevalence equal to or exceeding 15%. Conflict-induced displacement has now elevated the risk of malnutrition, driven by inflation, food scarcity, lack of access to safe water, poor hygiene, and infectious diseases, resulting in a 30% surge in acute child malnutrition in hotspot areas. The ongoing violence threatens long-term consequences for children under 5, with up to a 300% increase in malnutrition cases in some clinics. The nutrition crisis is further compounded by the scarcity of functional nutrition centres, the suspension of nutrition services due to insecurity, and challenges in the supply of nutrition kits. The destruction of Khartoum's sole Plumpy Nut paste factory, the deliberate targeting of food stores and nutrition supplies, and the liquidity crisis have worsened the already dire nutrition context. The rising prices for basic needs combined with the ongoing liquidity crisis is making it difficult for nutrition actors to continue providing life-saving nutrition services. High malnutrition is also recorded among Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries resulting in children becoming more vulnerable to infectious diseases.

Health



Since the start of the conflict, almost 80% of hospitals in the conflict-affected areas have become non-operational, with the rest operating in limited capacity. On the one hand, the conflict resulted in injuries and an increased demand for access to healthcare. On the other hand, the looting, damaging, shelling, and occupation of health facilities meant that people were deprived of even basic healthcare services. The healthcare system in the country was inadequate before conflict erupted last April, but the persistent violence has caused shortages of medical supplies and equipment, power cuts, insecurity, and attacks on healthcare workers: 11 million people (including pregnant women and children) are now in need of urgent healthcare support. Attacks on healthcare workers and unpaid salaries have driven away many healthcare workers, leaving health facilities understaffed. The health crisis has also been exacerbated by the rainy season, resulting in water and vector-borne disease outbreaks, compromised sanitation, and difficulties in disease surveillance and vaccination efforts. Diseases like cholera, malaria, measles, and diarrhoea have been on the rise in many parts of the country. Some of the most vulnerable groups, including women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities, face disproportionate health risks throughout the country and particularly in overcrowded refugee and IDP camps.

Protection



Protection concerns have magnified since April, particularly in Khartoum, Greater Kordofan, and Greater Darfur regions, where civilians endure relentless fighting, heavy bombardments, urban clashes, and indiscriminate attacks on essential infrastructure. In conflict-affected areas, there are no safe areas left for civilians escaping violence. Reports further reveal widespread abductions, torture, inhumane treatment, denial of resources and aid, and the recruitment and abuse of children, who are at elevated risk due to their absence from school. Attacks on civilian infrastructure, including homes, markets, and hospitals, have resulted in over 9,000 civilian fatalities since the onset of the conflict. Violence and attacks on hospitals and public spaces, indiscriminate shelling, and ethnic violence have caused significant displacement. People have been forced to be displaced both within and outside the country, leading to family separation and increased protection risks, particularly for women, adolescent girls, children out of school, and people with disabilities. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable, with a reported increase in sexual violence. In relatively stable areas, there is an increase in displaced populations and heightened community tensions.

Shelter



Since the onset of the conflict, more than 4.6 million individuals have been displaced and are in need of shelter and NFI. Heavy rains and flooding have affected over 13,000 houses and 72,000 people in various provinces, including Khartoum, Darfur, River Nile, and Northern State. Villages have been burned in Darfur, leaving thousands of people without shelter. Even before the conflict, there were acute shelter and NFI needs due to underfunding, rising prices, and reduced purchasing power, all of which have been exacerbated since April.

Conflict induced displacements led to overcrowded shelters and the use of public buildings as alternative shelter options. The use of schools as interim shelters disrupts education and poses safeguarding concerns. The haphazard nature of clashes is causing widespread damage to housing and infrastructure and explosive remnants of war are further hindering safe return to homes. Essential utilities have been disrupted in conflict-affected areas, exacerbating vulnerabilities among internally displaced persons. Erratic electricity supply and affordability issues with non-food items have become prevalent. Environmental factors, including flooding,

have added complexity to the existing displacement issues, further straining shelter capacities and living conditions for both existing IDPs and communities previously unaffected by conflict.



WASH

Over 17 million people lack access to safe drinking water, while 24 million lack proper sanitation facilities. The combination of conflict and displacement has intensified pressure on host communities, primarily in Khartoum, Darfur, and Kordofan states, straining already scarce resources, and leaving people without proper water and sanitation facilities. Overcrowding in these areas has led to unsanitary latrines and open defecation, increasing associated health risks, and disproportionately affecting women and children.

Conflict, deliberate attacks, and flooding have damaged WASH infrastructure, leading to water disruptions and hampering repair efforts. Spare parts are scarce, and spare facilities partially operate. The water scarcity disproportionately affects women who are traditionally responsible for water procurement, leading to longer wait times and increased safety risks, including gender-based violence. This issue is most acute for women in IDP camps, exacerbating their already extended waiting times. Communities have been resorting to unsafe water sources, intensifying health risks and waterborne diseases. A spike in water prices has forced households to divert funds from hygiene to other necessities, compounding health risks. The crisis has led to a notable surge in diseases, making it difficult to monitor and control outbreaks. Improper water, hygiene, and sanitation practices are also contributing to child mortality and impacting the well-being of households with chronic illnesses.



Education

19 million children are out of school and may remain out of school for an indefinite time. The conflict has directly impacted educational facilities, leading to the closure of over 10,000 schools and the repurposing of 171 schools as emergency shelters. Additionally, internal displacement and the cross-border displacement have resulted in a shortage of both educational resources and teaching staff. Consistent underfunding and unpaid salaries have amplified the challenges faced by the education system, leading to a three-month teachers' strike and the cancellation of final examinations. Economic challenges, including the imposition of fees in state schools, have further restricted access to education, while overcrowded classrooms and limited resources have jeopardized the quality of learning for the five million school-aged children in conflict zones.

Crisis Timeline

- **April 15:** Armed clashes erupted between SAF and RSF in southern part of Khartoum and escalated to other parts of the country
- **April 17:** Transitional Sovereignty Council declared RSF a “rebel” group and ordered dissolution
- **May 11:** Saudi Arabia offered to broker peace. Representatives of SAF and RSF met in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) to sign an agreement “Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”
- **May 20:** SAF and RSF representatives sign an agreement for a seven-day ceasefire in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
- **May 26:** Local tribal militia allied to RSF clashed with Masalit ethnic group in El Geneina, West Darfur. At least 50 people were reportedly killed
- **May 31:** SAF announced to have suspended participation in the ceasefire, alleging lack of commitment on the side of RSF
- **June 14:** Clashes between RSF and SAF in Sheikan, North Kordofan, with artillery shelling and airstrikes being reported. At least 225 people were reportedly killed and several other civilians were displaced
- **June 15:** West Darfur Governor was killed. It was alleged that RSF was responsible
- **June 25:** Airstrikes destroyed the headquarters of the National Fund for Medical Supplies in Khartoum
- **June 29:** Al Burhan called on youths to join the SAF ranks
- **July 17:** For the fifth consecutive day SPLM-N Abdelaziz clashed with SAF at the 14th Infantry division in Belnji and Al Rosieris area southeast Kadugli, South Kordofan, with artillery shelling being reported. Residents in Tuko, Al Salamat, Al Battah, Al Mukhimat, and Al Saraf neighborhoods were displaced and several others killed
- **August 4:** Clashes between Salamat and Beni Halba tribes took place in villages in South Darfur. Several houses were set on fire and civilians displaced.
- **August 4:** SAF establishes a committee to probe war crimes by Rapid Support Forces
- **August 8:** Armed clashes between SAF and RSF with airstrikes and shelling are being reported in various areas in Khartoum, Central Darfur. Several civilians were reportedly killed as a result of crossfire
- **August 19:** RSF launched an attack against a SAF base in Nyala, South Darfur, prompting SAF to respond and carry out airstrikes. Several fatalities were reported, including civilians casualties
- **August 20:** Sudan cancels diplomatic passports of RSF Leaders and political figures
- **August 29:** Al Burhan commenced foreign trips to discuss Sudan conflict – Marking his first trip since the start of the conflict in mid-April
- **September 17:** Massive fires engulfs vital government buildings. The SAF accused the RSF of setting fire to the buildings, as well as looted and burning the Khartoum Sahel and Sahara Bank tower
- **September 18:** Report of armed clashes between local tribal militia and SAF in Port Sudan – marking the first instance since the start of the conflict in mid-April

Context

Political

On April 15, 2023, fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). SAF General Abel-Fattah Al Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, jointly overthrew Omar al Bashir in 2019, supported by popular protests. They ruled in an unstable alliance with civilian partners before working together to overthrow the partnership in October 2021 when they joined forces in a military coup. Their uneasy coexistence mostly broke over the timeline and modalities of the dissolution of RSF troops and their integration into the army, as was foreseen in the December 2022 Framework Agreement. The additional key sticking point was the disagreement over which party would get control over which sector of the Sudanese economy, as the SAF has invested in large-scale agricultural, weapon, and ammunition production and banking, while the RSF has diversified from their primary income source of gold mining and smuggling, encroaching on SAF dominant sectors such as banking and security services. Rather than merely a conflict between the capital and the peripheries, this outbreak of violence is linked to two parallel coercive networks vying to control the key levers of political and economic power in the country, with RSF reacting against a political establishment that it feared was about to marginalize its network ([De Waal](#) 24/08/2023, [C4ADS](#) 19/07/2022).

Fighting initially concentrated on Khartoum tri-city metropolitan area (Khartoum at the southeast, Omdurman to the west and Khartoum Bahri to the northeast), destroying much of the capital. Heavy airstrikes and artillery used by the SAF against the RSF, who had taken up positions in key locations and across residential areas. Widespread violence almost simultaneously erupted in West Darfur, with RSF and Arab fighters targeting non-Arab communities. Shortly afterwards, clashes between the SAF and RSF were also reported in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan states. In Darfur the concern remains the ethnicization of the conflict, in light of the 2003-2005 peak of the civil war, where over 300,000 civilians were killed. Darfur's complex social fabric includes at least a dozen indigenous groups and 40% Arab tribes, with recurring tensions between Arab nomadic pastoralist and non-Arab communities, including Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa. The social fabric has been strained since the 1980s, as tensions between the communities were heightened by the political machinations of successive Sudanese governments ([De Waal](#) 18/09/2023).

Mediation efforts mostly concentrated on ending the fighting in the capital, overlooking the situation in Darfur ([De Waal](#) 18/09/2023). In early summer, several ceasefires, brokered with the mediation of international actors, were not adhered to. As of late September, mediation attempts have been put on hold as neither side feels the competing party has the upperhand militarily and incentives to fight in a zero-sum game. With the ongoing military confrontation, recruitment efforts have been amped up. The SAF portrays itself as the protector against RSF troops, who have been widely reported to pillage, loot, plunder and use sexual violence ([Al Jazeera](#) 7/05/2023). The RSF, in turn, claims to protect civilians against the SAF and Islamist elements within it, and portrays itself as a guarantor of the civilian efforts laid down in the 2019 revolution. In other regions, additional conflict dynamics are ongoing - including fighting between the SPLM-N Al-Hilu against the SAF in the two areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In addition, the RSF and SAF have also engaged in clashes in South Kordofan, particularly around Kadugli. Each of the three parties is said to control different areas of the state ([Insecurity Insight](#) 21/09/2023).

Negative spillover effects from conflict deterioration and from the grave humanitarian crisis are due to the fact that Sudan has 4,200 miles of land borders with seven other African countries, most already grappling with conflict or drought. Regional and international actors' mediating actions or their support to one of the parties to the conflict, on the other hand, is also linked to the fact that although poor by global standards, Sudan has rich reserves of gold, water and oil, and overlooks one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, located on the Red Sea ([New York Times](#) 18/05/2023).

Economic

Already reeling from the economic impact of the 2021 coup, the ongoing conflict has severely disrupted economic activities in Sudan ([Al Jazeera](#) 25/10/2022). It has resulted in limitations on trade and production and disrupted people's ability to access basic services, financial resources, and markets, leading to a substantial shortage of goods and services ([IFPRI](#) 08/2023). While the local food basket cost increased by 23% in the past year, employment levels have currency crunch kept decreasing ([WFP](#) 20/09/2023; [United Nations](#) 31/08/2023). Following the outbreak of the conflict, exports through Port Sudan were halted for over a month. While some goods were still transported via land borders, especially to Egypt, exports to neighbouring trade partners in the South, East, and West of the country suffered adverse effects due to the logistical challenges associated with moving goods to or from areas affected by the conflict. During the first two months, imports, particularly through Port Sudan, saw significant decreases as well. Several container shipping

companies stopped accepting new reservations for shipping goods to Sudan ([IFPRI 08/2023](#)). This reduction in economic activities disrupted cash flows and triggered a cash crunch ([IPC 02/08/2023](#)). The discrepancy between the official exchange rate and the black market rate has been a feature of Sudan's economic crisis prior to the conflict, leading to the currency being floated in 2022, improving its stability ([The New Arab 07/03/2022](#), [WFP 14/02/2023](#)). Since the start of the conflict the official exchange rate of the Sudanese pound to USD has been kept relatively stable, while the absence of regulatory oversight by the Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) has led to unregulated and increasingly volatile exchange rates in the country. Currently, the exchange rates are determined by private entities involved in transfer assistance services, as well as various markets and service providers. This lack of regulation has created opportunities for exploitation ([ACAPS 11/08/2023](#)). As the demand for local currency to access essential services and goods has risen, the value of the Sudanese pound is now determined by whoever is exchanging US dollars ([Monitor 28/04/2023](#)). Vital economic infrastructure has been destroyed, particularly in the capital city, Khartoum, which serves as the primary business centre of the country. As a consequence, most economic activities have come to a halt ([FAO 14/08/2023](#)). The targeted attack of commercial bank branches and the subsequent looting of banks resulted in significant financial losses and a loss of confidence in the banking sector ([Dabanga Sudan 12/09/2023](#)). The centralised nature of Sudan's manufacturing and financial sector in Khartoum has meant that Sudan's ability to generate goods and services has been severely undermined. The destruction, theft, and ruin of vital infrastructure, the financial industry, private assets, food production facilities, and marketplaces have all disrupted production and economic operations, causing widespread unemployment. This situation has left people in urgent need of short-term financial assistance and medium-term employment prospects. The impact has been particularly harsh on households led by women, who usually rely on manufacturing or informal service roles to sustain their livelihoods ([United Nations 31/08/2023](#)). The outbreak of the conflict shortly before the planting season disrupted the ability of households and larger agricultural schemes to access key inputs and financing, along with reports of disruptions in food trade and marketing, the looting of food stocks, and significant impediments to the delivery of humanitarian aid, the disruption to livelihoods has been considerable ([FEWSNET 07/2023](#), [FEWSNET 09/2023](#)). The resulting pervasive and severe insecurity has forced over 4.5 million people to flee their homes ([FAO 14/08/2023](#)). The increased number of displaced people has created demands on local markets and essential services in host communities. The conflict and insecurity have interrupted the supply routes from both North and South Darfur, causing shortages and higher prices for vital goods and medical supplies ([CRS 11/09/2023](#)). The conflict has already led to a reduced supply of critical food items in local markets, resulting in a significant increase in food prices ([IFPRI 05/2023](#)). This, combined with local currency crunch, fuel shortages and transportation disruptions contribute to a high inflation rate. Reduced economic opportunities combined with high prices of goods and services significantly reduce the purchasing power of citizens. Across the country, and especially in urban regions, people's purchasing power is diminishing quickly as the conflict has had a detrimental impact on the typical sources of income. This includes both the government and private sector's inability to pay regular salaries to employees for the past five consecutive months and the overall unfavourable economic conditions currently prevailing in Sudan ([FEWSNET 08/2023](#)). While the general public in the country struggle making ends meet, the conflict continues as the SAF and the RSF can rely on the vast amount of resources accumulated over the past decades through extensive networks of companies – which approximately make up to 80% of economic activity in Sudan.

Infrastructure and Environment

Several communication infrastructures have been damaged since the start of the conflict, compounding humanitarian challenges. It has been estimated that damage to infrastructure in Khartoum, and Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan regions could be worth \$60 billion USD, or 10% of its total value ([Reuters 26/09/2023](#)). Critical infrastructure, damaged in both deliberate attacks and indiscriminate shelling, includes electricity networks, telecommunications, water supply networks, and WASH and healthcare facilities, as well as secondary infrastructure such as schools, police posts, and humanitarian assets ([GOAL 07/09/2023](#); [UNHCR 28/08/2023](#)). As a result, critical services, including state orphanages, remaining hospitals, and NGO-run nutrition centres, are rapidly running out of food and supplies, inhibiting their ability to operate as needed. Roads have also been damaged, and explosive remnants of war (ERWs) have been left behind in many areas, posing access challenges and threatening future infrastructure damage if not properly cleared ([UNHCR 14/09/2023](#)). Shelling and airstrikes damaged communications infrastructure and telecommunications masts, and the rapid deterioration of the national power grid exacerbates their functionality. Coverage from two out of the country's three main Mobile Network Operators has been reduced in various conflict areas, while the remaining functional network has seen increased congestion due to the concentration of internally displaced people (IDPs) in safer areas away from active fighting ([ETC 05/2023](#)). The destruction of water supply infrastructure and electrical infrastructure hampers the provision of WASH services. The fighting has partially destroyed several water treatment plants and affected water pumping stations ([ACAPS 11/09/2023](#)). For example, in Omdurman and Um Bada in Khartoum state, the destruction of two electric transformers has put all water pumping stations out of service ([ACAPS 11/09/2023](#)). Moreover, the damage to water treatment plants and constant power outages also affect the continuous drinking water supply, as pumps rely on

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electricity. These power outages result from infrastructure damage and a lack of workers due to conflict-related displacement ([ACAPS](#) 11/09/2023). Workers at critical infrastructure have also been targeted, leading to strikes and interrupted work schedules. For example, on 6 August the Al Fasher Water Department in North Darfur interrupted power services as electricity workers were on strike after the RSF detained one of its workers. ([Radio Dabanga](#) 06/08/2023). As of 30 August, water stations in Bahri and El Shajara were not in operation due to electricity and fuel shortages ([ACAPS](#) 11/09/2023). The number of attacks on healthcare has been increasing, with 56 verified attacks since April. When not damaged or destroyed, facilities have been occupied for military purposes. This was the case with the National Public Health Laboratory, the Federal Ministry of Health's National Medical Supply Funds Warehouse in Khartoum and the Central Blood Bank ([OCHA](#) 09/08/2023). The impact of extreme climate events further worsened the situation: Unusually heavy rains and flooding have affected about 60,000 people in six localities since July ([OCHA](#) 14/09/2023) and have also given way to the worst desert locust infestation seen across the Horn of Africa in decades ([IRC](#) 04/17/2023).

Conflict

Overall situation

Six months into the conflict, over 9,000 fatalities have been recorded, three-quarters of them resulting from bombings in Khartoum, highlighting their deadly nature and devastating impact on civilians ([ACLED](#) 06/10/2023). Between August 1st. and September 30th, 650 battles, 261 remote violent events, and 169 violence events against civilians were reported, resulting in over 4,000 fatalities. Khartoum state is the site of the most intense fighting ([ACLED](#) 06/10/2023), while inter-ethnic violence escalated in South Darfur, which has witnessed increasing levels of violence since July ([ACLED](#) 08/09/2023). Both parties to the conflict have been intensifying their efforts to gain control of key military facilities and critical supply routes. Since September, military tactics have partially changed, with both sides increasing their reliance on bombings in Khartoum ([ACLED](#) 06/10/2023). SAF's aerial superiority has been challenged by the limited availability of fighter jets and the use of drone warfare by the RSF, which have acted as a partial aerial warfare equalizer, increasing the prospects for a continuation of conflict amidst military parity between the two sides.

Sub-national situation

Khartoum

Since April 15, Khartoum has borne the brunt of the escalation of the struggle for the domination of key positions within the country. In August and September, Khartoum state became a battleground, witnessing an increase in airstrikes, combat drones and artillery shelling- as the SAF and RSF vied for control over critical military bases and supply routes. The fierce competition for control over key installations and strategic assets resulted in sustained clashes, causing extensive damage to the city ([ACLED](#) 08/09/2023). While the RSF managed to take control of substantial portions of Khartoum, the SAF relied on bombardment from entrenched positions and airstrikes that inflicted significant damage on RSF facilities and weapon warehouses ([ACLED](#) 08/09/2023). Clashes centred around the SAF's Armored Corps base and increasingly around the General Command Headquarters. The conflict escalated significantly on August 20 when the RSF successfully breached the SAF's defences surrounding the Armored Corps base ([ACLED](#) 08/09/2023). The SAF concentrated its bombings in areas surrounding military bases, key bridges, and RSF-occupied neighbourhoods, especially in the southern Khartoum areas, where RSF territorial control aims at ensuring the continuity of its supply lines ([ACLED](#) 06/10/2023). The proliferation of political militias siding with either the SAF or RSF, as well as communal self defence militias is further contributing to the uptick of violence ([Al Araby](#) 17/07/2023 [The Arab Weekly](#) 07/07/2023).

Greater Darfur

The conflict in the greater Darfur region is complex and multifaceted, with SAF and RSF battling for key towns- such as Nyala and Zalingei- amidst pre-existing inter-communal and inter-ethnic tensions-. Since the conflict outbreak, ethnic militias have become increasingly embroiled in disputes over looting and allegiance to the RSF, and an increasing number of armed groups have become actively engaged in the conflict. In late September, the al-Nur faction of the SLM/A expanded its control over vast territories in North, South, and Central Darfur states ([ACLED](#) 06/10/2023). In South Darfur, the city of Nyala witnessed nearly daily clashes between the SAF and RSF. In the second week of August, violent clashes involving Arab militias, such as Salamat, Beni Halba, and Habbaniya groups, erupted outside Nyala. Since then, the violence between the Salamat and Beni Halba tribes -both of which have affiliations with RSF- has expanded outside of Nyala, across large swathes of the state. As local mediation efforts appear to have failed, a risk of renewed clashes and inter-communal violence remains high ([Genocide Watch](#) 02/10/2023, [Darfur24](#) 05/10/2023). In Central Darfur, the battle for the state capital Zalingei is ongoing between the SAF and the RSF, driving displacement from the locality even as many in the IDP camps surrounding the city remain trapped by the fighting ([Radio](#)

[Dabanga](#) 15/10/2023). Simultaneously, SLM-AW have taken advantage of the fighting to expand their territorial control with few clashes, with many of the displaced populations heading to the relatively safe territories under their control ([Sudan Tribune](#) 23/09/2023). In the remainder of Central Darfur, the situation remains relatively stable with most of the violence tied to attempts at looting by various militias, bringing them into conflict with SAF, RSF and the SLM-AW. Given the state's location -between West and South Darfur-Central Darfur remains at high risk of suffering fall out from the intercommunal tensions in those states. In North Darfur, local ceasefires mediated by community leaders and armed actors have led to a slight reduction in the violence in and around El Fasher ([Washington Post](#) 25/04/2023). On August 18, the Joint Forces of the Juba Peace Agreement signatories intervened and clashed with RSF units that had violated the ceasefire agreement in El Fasher, showing a willingness of those groups to maintain these local ceasefires despite the sporadic clashes ([ACLED](#) 08/09/2023). However, the variety of armed actors and competing interests is resulting in growing violence against civilians in other localities particularly Tawila and Kutum ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023), while militias are setting up armed checkpoints on critical routes particularly in Um Kadadah bringing them into conflict with other armed actors including those providing security for aid convoys ([Radio Dabanga](#) 02/10/2023). In West Darfur, the severe violence between SAF and the RSF as well as by militias against civilian populations peaked between May and July as RSF cemented their control over most of the state ([Radio Dabanga](#) 22/06/2023, [ACLED](#) 12/10/2023). Despite the reduction of the violence, the RSF has expanded their control outward from Ag Geniena locality, triggering conflict between the RSF and aligned militias against civilian populations and aligned communal militias and self defence groups, continuing to drive displacement across the state and into Chad ([Radio Dabanga](#) 01/08/2023).

Greater Kordofan

Violence in Kordofan has seen a notable surge since June, when the al-Hilu faction initiated the takeover of SAF camps in South Kordofan. The confrontations have primarily focused on the towns of Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan, while El Obeid and Rehid al-Nuba were the primary areas of conflict in North Kordofan ([ACLED](#) 11/08/2023). Conflict in South Kordofan State involves three main actors: SAF, the RSF, and the al-Hilu faction of the SPLM-N. The al-Hilu faction controls annsignificant areas in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and recently expanded their control over various locations in South Kordofan. The RSF also attempted to extend its reach, clashing with SAF forces but later withdrawing, allowing the al-Hilu faction to take over ([ACLED](#) 11/08/2023). Following a temporary ceasefire from 7-27 September, hostilities between the SAF and SPLM-N Al Hilu flared up once more ([ACLED](#) 06/10/2023) In North Kordofan, ongoing conflict between the RSF and SAF near the capital, El Obeid, has prompted the mobilisation of various armed groups, including the Kababish people, responding to RSF's assaults against civilians along the Omdurman-Bara road. Clashes between RSF soldiers and Kababish militias in Rehid al-Nuba resulted in the Kababish seizing 10 military vehicles from the RSF, leading to escalated tensions and further violence in the area ([ACLED](#) 11/08/2023). In September, RSF intercepted a truck in North Kordofan, abducting over 100 Dar Hamid community miners in al-Jamama, exacerbating conflict in the area ([ACLED](#) 06/10/2023).

Rest of Sudan

The situation in Gedaref, Kassala and Red Sea states, collectively known as Eastern Sudan, remains calm. There are however worrying indications of growing inter-communal tensions that have previously led to violence ([Sudan Tribune](#) 26/08/2019). These tensions predate the current conflict but are currently being fuelled by incendiary rhetoric from communal leaders, tensions over land and resources, historic grievances with the state and an incredible rise in the rate of arms proliferation amongst communities there ([Africa Defense Forum](#) 19/09/2023, [Al Jazeera](#) 21/09/2023, [Radio Dabanga](#) 01/10/2023). So far these tensions have led to short lived clashes between local communities and the SAF, with successful mediation efforts preventing more serious clashes both between communities as well as between communities and the state security forces, but the risk of violence in these areas remains elevated and of grave concern given its potential impact on aid operations that are now centred in Port Sudan the capital of Red Sea state ([Sudan War Monitor](#) 24/09/2023, [Radio Dabanga](#) 13/10/2023, [Al Jazeera](#) 09/07/2023).

Displacement

Internal displacement overview

Sudan is now host to the largest number of internally displaced persons worldwide, with over seven million IDPs. Prior to the conflict, there were already over 3.7 million people internally displaced in Sudan. An estimated 80% of IDPs were in the Greater Darfur region, which has seen recurrent waves of violence and attacks against civilians since the 2003 Darfur war. In addition, Sudan hosted an estimated one million refugees mainly from South Sudan (over 800,000), Eritrea (137,000), Syria (90,000), and Ethiopia (70,000), as well as the Central African Republic, Chad and Yemen ([UNHCR](#) 02/05/2023; [OCHA](#) 14/12/2022; [IDMC](#) 07/2023). The majority of refugees lived in out-of-camp settlements and urban areas, with the largest number (over 300,000) in Khartoum, although some also lived in camps situated predominantly in White Nile and eastern Sudan.

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As of early October, an estimated 4.6 million people have been newly internally displaced across Sudan, an increase of 7.6% compared to August. IDPs have been observed in over 4,600 locations (167/189 localities), across all 18 states. As of early October, the total number of IDPs continues to increase across all states with the exception of Sennar, with the highest increase recorded in River Nile state ([IOM 05/10/2023](#)).

Figure 1: Sudan Internal Displacement (Source: [IOM 28/09/2023](#)).




Figure 2: Displacement trends in Sudan since April 2023 (Source: [IOM 12/10/2023](#)).



The states of River Nile (12.62%), South Darfur (11.23%), East Darfur (10.97%), Aj Jazirah (8.03%), Northern (7.92%), and North Darfur (7.37%) are host to the highest proportions of IDPs. The vast majority (68.44%, a total of 3,127,888 IDPs) have reportedly been displaced from Khartoum state, with other significant displacement being from the Darfur region (South Darfur (14.63%), North Darfur (7.94%), Central Darfur (4.01%) and West Darfur (3.75%). Of the IDP population, DTM estimates that approximately 2.63% of the IDPs are non-Sudanese nationals ([IOM 12/10/2023](#), [IOM 05/10/2023](#)).

Tribal, ethnic and familial social ties are a primary pull factor, with IDPs preferring to shelter where there are groups with similar ethnic and tribal backgrounds, or with relatives. As a result, the majority (67%) of displaced households' shelter within host communities, especially in Darfur and Kordofan. Proximity and the relative safety of locations are also two of the pull factors identified for IDPs, especially those from Khartoum moving to states such as Northern, Kasala and North Kordofan. 59% of the IDP population are located in urban areas, where services are expected to be more easily available. As of late September, an estimated 39% of displaced households intend to remain in the current location; only 16% declared the intention to move to a third location and 18% to return to their place of origin ([IOM 28/09/2023](#)).


Refugees

Despite the ongoing conflict, refugees from neighbouring countries still enter Sudan. As of September, UNHCR registered over 114,000 Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees, who are mostly located in Kassala, Gedaref and Blue Nile. ([UNHCR 10/10/2023](#), [UNHCR accessed 22/09/2023](#)). The number of refugees and returnees fleeing Sudan is expected to increase as fighting continues, exacerbating the humanitarian situation in

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
neighbouring countries. As of early October, an estimated 1.1 million people have fled into neighbouring countries since the start of the conflict ([UNHCR](#) accessed on 22/10/2023), an increase of 28% percent compared to August. According to UNHCR, more than 1.8 million people are expected to flee by the end of 2023, amounting to a twofold increase on what was initially estimated in May ([The Guardian](#) 06/09/2023; [UNHCR](#) 06/09/2023). As demonstrated in the graph below, the largest refugee population of over 431,197 people, has arrived in Chad, followed by 317,230 refugees in Egypt and smaller numbers in South Sudan (37,078), Ethiopia (35,677) and CAR (15,476). These are predominantly Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers. In addition South Sudan has seen a large number of refugee returnees (280,401), with much smaller numbers returning to CAR and Ethiopia ([UNHCR](#) accessed 22/10/2023).

Figure 3: Composition of Sudanese refugees in hosting countries (Source: [UNHCR](#) accessed 22/10/2023)



Sub-national situation

Figure 4: Displacement and cross border displacement map (Source: [IOM](#) 12/10/2023; [UNHCR](#) accessed 22/09/2023).



Sub-national situation

Khartoum


Khartoum, across its seven localities, hosts over 62,500 IDPs as of early October. They are primarily settled on the fringes of the metropolitan area where fighting is reportedly less intense, and services are more accessible. In late September, 65% of IDPs reside in host communities, while 31% are in rented accommodation. Their priorities are NFIs (87%), food (86%) and health (86%) ([IOM](#) 28/09/2023).

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Figure 5: Khartoum Conflict and Displacement (Source: [IOM 28/09/2023](#)).

KHARTOUM | Conflict & Displacement

1 August - 30 September 2023



Sources: ACLED, DTM, Mapbox, UNOCHA, UNHCR

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Greater Darfur

The Greater Darfur region hosts over 1.7 million IDPs (accounting for almost 40% of the total IDPs caseload). Most internally displaced hail from conflict hotspots in South Darfur, particularly Nyala, North Darfur, particularly El Fasher, and West and Central Darfur. East Darfur is considered a safe haven, due to its relative stability and distance from the conflict, and hosts over 500,500 IDPs. Those seeking refuge in East Darfur are with tribal kin in rural locations across the region ([IOM 28/09/2023](#)). Across the five states, an average of 56% of IDPs found shelter with the host communities, yet other shelter arrangements are also present. Central Darfur, North Darfur and South Darfur together account for nearly 89% of all IDPs living in informal settlements, as well as 69% of IDPs in camps ([IOM 05/10/2023](#)). In late September, the priority needs reported by IDPs in Greater Darfur are food (the average percentage of IDPs reporting this across the five states being 72%¹) and health (average % across the five states: 40%) ([IOM 28/09/2023](#)).


¹ This is the average percentage of the priority needs identified across the concerned Sudanese states.

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Figure 6: Greater Darfur Conflict and Displacement (Source: [IOM 28/09/2023](#)).

GREATER DARFUR | Conflict & Displacement

1 August - 30 September 2023



Sources: ACLED, DTM, Mapbox, UNOCHA, UNHCR

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Greater Kordofan


As of early October, Greater Kordofan hosts over 304,000 IDPs. The majority of IDPs (average % across the three states: 95%) in Greater Kordofan found shelter with the host communities ([IOM 05/10/2023](#)). In September, their reported priority need was food (average % across the three states: 54%).

Due to the widespread insecurity, West Kordofan only accounts for 53,900 IDPs who mostly hail from Khartoum state, the Darfur regions and other Kordofan states. The volatile security situation in the state has also caused the restriction of movements to certain locations of most pastoralists. South Kordofan recorded 92,600 IDPs, many of whom are reportedly arriving from Khartoum. Strong tribal ties largely influenced the distribution of IDPs within this state. Further, fighting between SAF and SPLM-N drives displacement inside South Kordofan and to other states. Given its proximity with Khartoum, North Kordofan is witnessing a notable influx of IDPs from the Sudanese capital, making up most of the displacement with over 100,000 people recorded across the region. IDPs originating from North Kordofan, tend to remain where their relatives/tribes reside. ([IOM 05/10/2023](#); [IOM 28/09/2023](#)).

Figure 7: Greater Kordofan Conflict and Displacement (Source: [IOM 28/09/2023](#)).

GREATER KORDOFAN | Conflict & Displacement

1 August - 30 September 2023



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Rest of Sudan

The remaining Sudanese states registered an estimated 2.5 million IDPs (accounting for 55% of the total IDPs caseload). The state with the most IDPs is River Nile, with over 576,000 people as of October. Northern, Al Jazirah, Sennar, and White Nile states all host over 300,000 IDPs. Priority needs for IDPs in the rest of Sudan are food security (average % across the nine states: 85%), health (58%) and NFI (55%). An estimated 190,000 IDPs are from non-Sudanese origins, the majority of whom are in White Nile and Red Sea State. Self-relocating refugees mainly moved out of Khartoum towards 11 locations ([IOM 28/09/2023](#)).

Most of the IDPs in **Northern** state have been observed in Ad Dabbah and Merowe localities (about 330 km north of the capital city Khartoum) and expressed their intention to move to Egypt. The Sudanese-Egyptian border stretches around 1,280 km and has two official crossing points at Argeen and Ashkeet/Qustal. Due to the high refugee influx, Egypt increased restrictions including imposing the need for official visas (instead of temporary travel documents), and no longer allowing access for children added to their parents' passports. As a result, many Sudanese are stranded in the city of Wadi Halfa, where an estimated 5,000 people queue daily in front of the Egyptian consulate. Some refugees from Ethiopia and South Sudan have also been re-displaced because of the recent conflict and are in Wadi Halfa waiting for resettlement or aid. ([ACAPS 29/08/2023](#)).

Humanitarian Access

Overall situation

Humanitarian Access constraints are multifaceted: access is constrained by conflict dynamics, by economic aspects- fuel shortages and inflation-, and by bureaucratic impediments. Bureaucratic constraints affect both SAF-controlled areas in Sudan's east and north, as well as RSF controlled areas. With travel permissions difficult to obtain for both cross-line and cross-border transport due to the need to coordinate with multiple actors and seemingly arbitrary delays, aid convoys are often incapable of reaching those in dire need. This is further complicated by the proliferation of checkpoints manned by armed groups and militias. The conflict is also leading to increasing risks tied to unexploded ordnance, particularly in key routes contested by the SAF and RSF, while the security vacuum is driving criminality and banditry in roads across the country. Combined with poor infrastructure, particularly in border crossing points, it has become difficult and expensive to secure

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vehicles, drivers, and warehousing necessary to ensure consistent access to populations in need of assistance.

Bureaucratic impediments

In areas under SAF control in Sudan's east and north, access is primarily limited by growing bureaucratic impediments. Challenges around the registrations of I/NGOs by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), acquisition of travel permits, passage through government checkpoints, and delays in the acquisition of visas for international staff all represent a return to more restrictive measures and a reflection of both entrenched mistrust of international actors as well as the rent-seeking behaviour of administrators at different levels ([OCHA 22/09/2023](#); [The New Humanitarian 29/07/2023](#)). This is further complicated by a lack of uniformity between various federal and state level government organs, as this shift towards a more restrictive bureaucratic system occurs in the midst of the political and financial fallout of the conflict on an already fragmented governance system, leaving aid actors navigating shifting, increasingly restrictive and dissonant directives.

The bureaucratic hurdles are particularly impacting attempts at humanitarian supply convoys meant to deliver aid to conflict affected areas of Khartoum and Darfur - WFP succeeded in arranging only three convoys from Chad by 30 September 2023 ([WFP 09/10/2023](#)). These impediments are further magnified when aid convoys are meant to reach people in need in RSF controlled territories, as the consolidation of administrative control and aid structures in Port Sudan has allowed SAF to restrict access to RSF controlled areas ([Al Jazeera 20/10/2023](#)). With travel permissions difficult to obtain for both cross-line and cross-border transport due to the need to coordinate with multiple actors and seemingly arbitrary delays, aid convoys are often incapable of reaching those in dire need. This is further complicated by the proliferation of checkpoints manned by armed groups and militias, such that even when aid actors secure the required passes and permits there is no guarantee that they will be allowed to pass by armed actors on the ground ([Sudan Tribune 09/11/2023](#)). This poses significant security and aid diversion risks as some armed actors engage in rent-seeking behaviour promising the security of convoys while others seek to loot humanitarian supplies -as was the case with the recent attack on an aid convoy to Darfur protected by Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements ([Radio Dabanga 01/10/2023](#)). As the conflict in Khartoum and North Kordofan spills over, growing access concerns rise in bordering localities of River Nile, Aj Jazirah and White Nile.

Civil Society and Front Line Responders

Local actors continue to be primary humanitarian relief actors especially in Khartoum and other conflict hotspots ([The New Humanitarian 02/08/2023](#)). Local actors -such as Emergency Response Rooms- have secured significant access to impacted populations but continue to face significant challenges. Civil society actors providing aid are often targeted by the RSF, SAF and other state security organs, as well as local or state authorities who place bureaucratic and access hurdles in the path of their work both in and out of conflict zones. Local actors are also facing administrative and financial challenges as their agile nature makes it difficult to access funds and supplies while meeting the compliance regulations of NGOs and international donors, despite efforts to facilitate the shift towards the localisation of assistance ([The New Humanitarian 19/10/2023](#)), there are sign of overstretch and aid fatigue by those local organisations, leaving the field altogether ([Al Jazeera 20/10/2023](#)). The politically sensitive nature of these groups also means that INGOs providing limited support are not willing to do so publicly. The resulting lack of advocacy and poor engagement is hampering attempts to integrate these groups into the international response and creates a protection void that is easily exploited by state and armed actors, limiting the ability of civil society to access populations in need ([The New Humanitarian 02/08/2023](#), [Humanitarian Practice Network 11/10/2023](#)).

Targeting of Humanitarian Actors

As of 06 October, 27 events targeting aid actors since the outbreak of the conflict were reported ([ACLED 12/10/2023](#)). The most common event is the looting of aid supplies and vehicles, prominent at the start of the conflict, the reduced presence of traditional humanitarian actors in conflict zones has reduced the opportunities for armed actors to target aid supplies. As a result armed actors have pivoted to targeted Emergency Response Rooms, starting in July, including attacks, abductions and sexual violence targeting local responders as well as medical staff, including MSF staff members ([MSF 21/07/2023](#)). This trend is likely to continue particularly in Khartoum state, where SAF and RSF will seek to divert aid, as well as in South and West Darfur where increased militia activity represents a direct threat to local aid actors.

Sub-national situation

Khartoum

Humanitarian access in Khartoum is impeded by ongoing violence, bureaucratic issues, denial of access and aid diversion by both sides ([BBC 21/07/2023](#), [OCHA 13/10/2023](#)). Khartoum state remains the epicentre of the conflict between SAF and the RSF with the violence spread across the entirety of the state. Temporary sieges hampering access by RSF or local militias have also been reported: around mid-August, RSF and allied

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militias reportedly besieged several neighbourhoods in Omdurman, prohibiting entry of food supplies to trapped civilians. Similar incidents were reported from other neighbourhoods, such as in southwestern Khartoum, where resistance committees issued a distress call regarding food supply shortages, following the siege of several neighbourhoods ([Dabanga Sudan](#) 07/09/2023; [Conflict Observatory](#) 25/09/2023). Humanitarian actors have managed to deliver a limited amount of assistance primarily to those living in or displaced to Um Bada and Jebel Awlia localities that border River Nile and Aj Jazirah states ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023). This is further complicated by the proliferation of political militias siding with either the SAF and RSF as well communal self-defense militias within the state ([Al Araby](#) 17/07/2023, [The Arab Weekly](#) 07/07/2023). Humanitarian Access in Khartoum is significantly hampered by the violence, bureaucratic impediments, denial of access and aid diversion by both sides of the conflict, with the rare delivery of aid supplies into the state during periods of calm facilitated by local actors and significant Civil-Military negotiations ([BBC](#) 21/07/2023, [OCHA](#) 13/10/2023).

Greater Darfur

In Central Darfur, due to the intense violence between the SAF and RSF centred around the state capital of Zalingei, access remains complicated, as Zalingei sits at a critical crossroad between Ag Geneina and Nyala. Moreover, SLM-AW increasing territorial control increases the need for Civil-Military coordination in order to access populations in the Jebel Marrah localities in the state. On the other hand, due to limited militia violence, populations have been able to flee the violence, seeking refuge in other parts of the state including areas under the control of SLM-AW ([ACLED](#) 01/10/2023, [Sudan Tribune](#) 17/09/2023).

In South Darfur, while Nyala remains the epicentre of the conflict between SAF and the RSF, violence has spilled over in other areas of the state as a large number of communal militias mobilise for or against the RSF and SAF. In the midst of the security vacuum there is little security response and limited mediation opportunities between the various communities from which these militias draw their membership ([Al Jazeera](#) 05/09/2023), leading to violence across a number of localities including those with critical roadways -such as Kubum, Beleil, Buram and Mershing- creating significant access challenges and driving the second largest displacement crisis after Khartoum ([IOM](#) 11/10/2023). In West Darfur violence between SAF and the RSF as well as by militias against civilian populations peaked between May and July. Since then, a limited number of cross-border convoys reached Ag Geneina from Chad, although access beyond the town remains elusive, due to occasional flare ups of violence involving the RSF and aligned militias along key roads. Thus despite written permission provided by the Government of Sudan to deliver cross-border aid ([Logistics Cluster](#) 18/09/2023), the delivery of supplies to aid actors and people in need in the state as well as onwards to Central and South Darfur remains challenged by security issues and the need to negotiate with RSF commanders and communal leadership to secure safe passage. The conflict landscape in North Darfur remains complicated by the large number of armed actors. Tensions remain high in the city and sporadic clashes remain a major risk, however, the variety of armed actors and competing interests results in growing violence against civilians in other localities particularly Tawila and Kutum ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023). This violence drives displacement and complicates the ability of aid actors to deliver aid to and through these localities. In East Darfur, violence remains limited with muted militia activity most often tied to looting, as a result security related challenges within East Darfur are less pronounced than in other states in the region despite growing levels of criminality, leading to large IDP movements to the state where aid actors are more able to access populations with the limited resources that have reached the state ([IOM](#) 11/10/2023).

Greater Kordofan

North Kordofan represents a key logistical bottleneck, with critical routes from both Khartoum and Kosti going through the state and its capital El Obeid and leading to Darfur, South and West Kordofan. Access is incredibly challenging in the state, due to insecurity and the unpredictable activity of militias, with consequences for access to the southern and western regions of the country. Violence is concentrated along key routes, namely the Khartoum-Bara-El Obeid and the Kosti-Um Rawaba-Ar Rahad-El Obeid routes. While conflict is primarily between the SAF and RSF, militias have also been involved in the fighting, primarily mobilising against the RSF, and setting up checkpoints, demanding fees from commercial vehicles and engaging in looting ([ACLED](#) 11/08/2023). The multi-actor fight over the strategically important state has meant that the intensity of the conflict has been relatively consistent but has spread across the geography of the state, reaching the border between White Nile and North Kordofan, endangering a once relatively safer route that bypassed Khartoum ([Radio Dabanga](#) 02/10/2023). As a result, access is incredibly challenging in the state, due to insecurity and the unpredictable activity of militias, with consequences for access to the southern and western regions of the country. In South Kordofan, the situation is particularly concerning for the population of the state capital Kadugli, where roadblocks have created a siege-like situation, with food stocks fully depleted and attempts to bring in more supplies failing ([Sudan Tribune](#) 27/09/2023; [Save the Children](#) 01/09/2023). Access within the state is mostly challenged by fighting between SAF and SPLMN-AH, both engaged in civil-military access negotiations, with convoys reaching the second large town of Abu Jubayha ([Logistics Cluster](#) 05/10/2023).

The more critical challenge is access to and from the state, as violence around El Obeid, Bara and Um Rawaba in North Kordofan are disrupting critical supply routes for commercial and aid actors, while difficult terrain, poor infrastructure and insecurity south of the border make cross-border access from South Sudan incredibly difficult. Attempts by RSF to move the conflict into the state have decreased considerably with the growing intensity of the conflict between SPLMN-AH and SAF, likely refocusing their efforts in North Kordofan. Meanwhile, militia violence remains mostly tied to looting attempts as part of the growing pattern of criminality that plagued the state before the start of the conflict. In West Kordofan, there is an increase in terms of security related access challenges and access negotiations are expected to get more complicated. Clashes around the towns of An Nuhud, Abu Zabad, and the state capital El Fula have the greatest impact on access within the state. Sporadic clashes between the SAF and RSF continue, although at lower levels than in the rest of the region, which has led to growing displacements into the state by populations seeking safety ([IOM 11/10/2023](#)). However, as a result of tribal mobilisations and hate speech we are seeing increasing violence across the state involving both communal militias with varying allegiances and new political militias formed and armed by the SAF. This is leading to violence between the various militias, as well as between militias and the two main conflict actors. This trend is likely to continue, increasing security related access challenges and complicating access negotiations.

Blue Nile

Most of Blue Nile state is under control of SAF and SPLMN-Malik Agar (SPLMN-MA) forces, a reflection of the fragmented governance structures that have existed pre-conflict it suffers from the same growing bureaucratic impediments and difficulties as other states firmly under SAF control. From June to August the southern end of the state in Kurmuk locality was the site of conflict involving the SPLMN-AH against SAF, SPLMN-MA and aligned militias, this fighting has subsided in September even as violence in South Kordofan has escalated ([Radio Dabanga 11/07/2023](#)). The state is also the centre of heightened communal tensions that spill over into neighbouring states ([AP 10/05/2023](#)), the most visceral example of this is the recurrent violence that began in July 2022 and displaced 127,961 individuals by November 2022 ([IOM 17/11/2022](#)). As a result access into and through the state is primarily limited by bureaucratic impediments, this is tempered by the high risk of renewed clashes that may involve Government aligned forces, Non-state Armed Groups and various militias.


Humanitarian Conditions

Cross Sectoral

Since the conflict outbreak in April 2023, Sudan’s growing humanitarian crisis has continued to deteriorate. An estimated third of the population was already in need of humanitarian assistance, but since the eruption of the conflict this has increased by 57%, from 15.8 million to 24.7 million people in Need (PIN) in the May 2023 Revised HRP. The compounded effect of conflict-led displacement, destroyed or severely damaged critical infrastructures and livelihoods’ assets, spiralling macroeconomic and financial deterioration have impacted in particular the populations in conflict-affected areas, including the Khartoum state, the Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, but worsening humanitarian conditions have been registered nation-wide, with high-IDPs density areas struggling to cope with providing basic services.


1. People in Need and Severity

Figure 8: PiN by Severity: HNO 2023 (Source: [OCHA 07/11/2022](#)) vs HRP Revised Version (Source: [OCHA 17/05/2023](#)).




In dissecting the severity of needs, the shift is gravely pronounced at the extreme end of the spectrum. Notably, individuals experiencing 'catastrophic' conditions have spiked to 5.22 million from only 100,000, signalling critical and life-threatening deprivation among the population in Sudan. This drastic uptick suggests an urgent crisis of access to fundamental human necessities, compounded by the escalated conflict that has ravaged, among others, safety, health, and food security.

Figure 9: PIN by affected groups: HNO 2023 (Source: [OCHA 07/11/2022](#)) vs HRP Revised Version (Source: [OCHA 17/05/2023](#)).



Regarding affected groups, the data reveals a sharp 188% increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs) in need, with the count rising sharply in the wake of ongoing hostilities. It's critical to note that this figure has been vastly revised, as more recent data from IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) on 17 October 2023 indicate a higher displacement reality, with 4,570,541 individuals (911,531 households) reported as internally displaced. This discrepancy suggests the magnitude of the impact of the intensification of fighting since May 2023.

Figure 10: PIN across sectors: HNO 2023 (Source: [OCHA 07/11/2022](#)) vs HRP Revised Version ([OCHA 17/05/2023](#)).



By May 2023, the Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) sector was already notably strained, with a 64% increase in people in need, highlighting the conflict's devastating blow to agriculture and local market systems, essential for the sustenance of approximately 19.9 million individuals. This disruption exacerbates food insecurity, making basic nutrition inaccessible to many, particularly in conflict-affected regions. Simultaneously, the Shelter sector's needs have soared by 93%, underscoring the widespread displacement and the dire living

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conditions facing millions. The substantial demand for Non-Food Items (NFIs) mirrors the grim reality of citizens having lost essential daily survival resources amidst upheaval.

Furthermore, the Education sector reveals a worrying 131% surge in need, indicating more than the destruction of infrastructure. It reflects a generation at risk of educational and psychological deficit, with the dismantling of learning environments and the inherent trauma of conflict disrupting the academic progress and mental well-being of Sudanese children. These statistics signify not just immediate distress but predict severe, enduring impacts on the societal fabric and future human capital of Sudan.

Figure 11: PIN by macro regions HNO 2023 (Source: OCHA 07/11/2022) vs HRP Revised Version (Source: OCHA 17/05/2023).





Figure 12: HNO 2023 (Source: OCHA 07/11/2022) vs HRP Revised Version (Source: OCHA 17/05/2023).



Khartoum has seen the most significant rise in People in Need, with a 41% increase, largely attributed to intensified clashes since April. In Greater Darfur, South Darfur has a notable PIN of 2.3M, while North Darfur

has experienced a 78% surge. Within the Greater Kordofan region, South Kordofan records a PIN of 1.1M, a 16% ascent. Elsewhere in Sudan, the White Nile region's PIN has spiked by an alarming 106% to 1.9M. This increase in the White Nile can be linked to its role as a primary destination for those seeking refuge from conflict, its proximity to Khartoum, and the influx of over 144,000 refugees, mainly South Sudanese, from Khartoum since the conflict began.

2. Priority needs by affected groups

Cross-Sudan needs of refugee youth


As of August 2023, there are an estimated 122,000 refugee youth from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, and South Sudan living in refugee camps and other shelters across Sudan ([Mixed Migration Centre](#) 08/07/2023). Priority needs identified by refugee youth include resettlement assistance (53%), access to work (52%), legal assistance (52%), medical assistance (48%), shelter (38%) and cash (35%). Many respondents noted the need for income to finance onward movement as they no longer wish to settle in Sudan due to ongoing conflict ([Mixed Migration Centre](#) 08/07/2023). In refugee camps in White Nile, mental health and psychosocial support services are nonexistent and listed as a key need, as well as a health care response to children dying of measles and malnutrition ([UNHCR](#) 08/08/2023; [OCHA](#) 22/09/2023).

Cross-Sudan needs for returnees

Returnees across Sudan are often living with host families in cases where their homes or previous shelters are either overcrowded or have been destroyed until they are able to secure housing. Their main needs (and that of the host communities) are food, access to WASH, health, shelter and non-food items (S/NFIs) and protection. In some cases, they also need assistance with clearing explosive remnants of war to be able to re-settle safely in areas affected by conflict ([OCHA](#) 14/09/2023).

Cross-Sudan needs of IDP households

Figure 13: Priority needs of IDPs by household across Sudan (Source: [DTM](#) 26/09/2023).



DTM findings indicate that Food, Health, and Non-Food Items remain the three highest priority needs for households across the IDP caseload. Disruptions to federal government services, destroyed and damaged infrastructure and housing, and unaffordability of goods, services, and shelter are key challenges across the sectors and states, all of which affect living conditions ([DTM](#) 26/09/2023).

Figure 14: Top 3 priority needs of IDPs by household— Khartoum State (Source: [DTM](#) 26/09/2023).

	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Khartoum	NFIs 87%, 10,803	Food Security 86%, 10,631	Health 86%, 10,603

In terms of health, only a small proportion of hospitals remain operational. Key needs include medications and other supplies, improved access to trauma and emergency care, vaccination resumption and early detection of outbreaks, access to mental health support, and treatment for Severe Acute Malnutrition ([WHO 16/10/2023](#)). To respond to the increase in gender-based violence, rape kits, dignity kits, and female hygiene are also needed. In terms of food security, 56% of the population of Khartoum are in IPC Phase 3 or above and cases of malnutrition have been reported, and affordability of food and NFIs is contributing to deteriorating living conditions. Emergency food assistance and cash to support farmers for the new planting season are key needs ([Ayin 17/09/2023](#)).

Figure 15: Top 3 priority needs of IDPs by household— Greater Darfur (Source: [DTM 26/09/2023](#)).

	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Central Darfur	Food Security 68%, 39,277	NFIs 39%, 22,170	Health 34%, 19,650
East Darfur	Food Security 56%, 55,914	Water 24%, 23,854	Health 23%, 23,368
West Darfur	Food Security 92%, 18,537	Water 83%, 16,752	Health 81%, 16,337
North Darfur	Food Security 69%, 45,366	NFIs 34%, 22,241	Health 10%, 6880
South Darfur	Food Security 76%, 74,708	Health 55%, 53,802	NFIs 23%, 23,015
Overall priority needs across Darfur: Food Security, Health, NFIs, Water.			

In terms of food security, across the five states, almost 52% of the population is in IPC Phase 3 and above, and the increase in food costs and disruption of supply routes and farming further exacerbate the situation, causing people to adopt negative coping mechanisms such as reducing meals ([IPC 02/08/2023](#); mechanisms ([REACH 07/08/2023](#); [Dabanga Sudan 06/09/2023](#)). Provision of food assistance is needed. In terms of health care, the greatest needs are increased response capability for outbreaks of infectious diseases, medical staff to address shortages, and medications and other supplies ([Health Cluster 02/08/2023](#); [Sudan Tribune 19/09/2023](#); [Dabanga Sudan 19/09/2023](#)). In terms of access to non-food items (NFIs), clashes causing destruction of infrastructure and shelters, and overcrowding caused by growing numbers of IDPs have increased the need for basic NFIs. There is an urgent need for reinforced housing solutions and amenities ([OCHA 19/10/2023](#), [Conflict Observatory 31/08/2023](#)). While water is accessible in East Darfur, West Darfur struggles with security challenges and deliberate attacks on water points, and other parts of the state are grappling with hour-long travel distances to reach potable water ([ProtectionCluster 10/08/2023](#); [CARE 01/10/2023](#)). The greatest needs in this regard are supplies of closer-by potable water.

Figure 16: Top 3 priority needs of IDPs by household— Greater Kordofan (Source: [DTM 26/09/2023](#)).

	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
North Kordofan	Food Security 75%, 13,241	Health 7%, 1171	Livelihoods 5%, 832
South Kordofan	Food Security 44%, 7,372	Health 12%, 1965	NFIs 8%, 1329
West Kordofan	Food Security 44%, 3,904	NFIs 17%, 1501	Shelter 10%, 880
Overall priority needs across Kordofan: Food Security, Health, NFIs, Shelter, Livelihoods.			

In terms of food security, conflict has pushed South Kordofan to the point of near famine, and like in other states, accessible food is increasingly unaffordable. Emergency food assistance is needed ([IPC 02/08/2023](#)).

In the future, support to farmers to re-plant will be needed, however this is currently hampered by ongoing conflict. In terms of health, in greater Kordofan, less than one-third of health facilities are entirely functional ([Sudan Tribune](#) 24/08/2023). The greatest needs are response to increased malaria and dengue cases, in addition to medical supplies and re-stocking of medications ([USAID](#) 29/09/2023). In terms of shelter and NFIs, Greater Kordofan is hosting IDPs in overcrowded shelters and homes. The greatest needs are increased shelter support, consistent utility services, and NFI provisions to address the increased needs ([ACLED](#) 11/08/2023, [IOM](#) 06/10/2023). Water access is disrupted by frequent power outages and restriction to water points, forcing residents to travel long distances on donkeys to access water ([Dabanga Sudan](#), 08/08/2023). Core needs include nearby access to potable water and sanitation facilities, including provision of bottled water.

Protection

Key Figures

- An estimated 5.4 million people are in need of protection according to the revised HRP, an increase of 24% compared to the 2023 year estimate ([OCHA](#), Revised HRP 2023; [OCHA](#) 2023).
- The current conflict has led to the displacement of 4.5 million IDPs, predominantly from Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan regions. A further one million refugees were already hosted in Sudan prior to conflict, nearly 200,000 of whom have had to relocate to other communities. The increase in IDPs puts further strain on host communities and increases societal tensions.
- There have been a myriad of attacks on civilian infrastructure, including homes, markets, and hospitals with over 9,000 civilian fatalities recorded since the beginning of the conflict ([ACLED](#) 06/10/2023).

Overall Situation

Widespread violation of humanitarian law and human rights abuse, and increased protection risk across the country, leaves no safe place across conflict-affected areas

Prior to conflict, the protection situation in Sudan was precarious, as a shaky political alliance did not provide prospects for social and political stability. Within an overall peaceful context, political protests in Khartoum were ongoing, with a number of violent crackdowns on peaceful demonstrations. Over 3.7 million people were already displaced, the majority as a result of the Darfur war, with attacks on IDPs continuing throughout 2022 and early 2023. In the Kordofan region, conflict between the SAF and SPLM-N gave rise to a myriad of protection issues ([OCHA](#) 2023). Yet, as the conflict is characterized by widespread abuse of international humanitarian law, deliberate targeting of civilians, ethnic violence, widespread sexual violence, and grave violations against children, the protection situation has markedly deteriorated since April. This is especially the case in conflict-affected areas in Khartoum, Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions, where civilians face fighting between (predominantly) SAF and RSF leading to heavy bombardments, clashes in urban and residential areas, and indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure. Further reports include widespread abduction, torture and other inhuman treatment, denial of resources and aid to civilians, and child recruitment, with children at high risk of recruitment and abuse as they are out of school ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023). Due to a proliferation of weapons, criminality spikes and armed militias' activities, safe havens are getting more difficult to find. The already weak rule of law has further broken down, with no access to justice, leaving any violation of international humanitarian law or any human rights abuse unpunished. The rise in food prices, lack of available food, water, and lack of access to healthcare, have compounded the dire situation for the most vulnerable, including people with disabilities, refugees, and other groups. This deteriorating security and socioeconomic situation has led to the forcible displacement of over 4.5 million IDPs, in addition to one million refugees. Displacement adds to the separation of families, putting an already vulnerable population further at risk. Negative coping mechanisms, both due to conflict and lack of basic needs, are likely to increase, further augmenting protection risks for women, adolescent girls, children out of school, and people with disabilities. The civilian population is suffering from high levels of psychological and emotional distress, yet their needs are unlikely to be cared for due to a lack of humanitarian access and few available services.

Sub-national situation

Khartoum State

The civilian population is bearing the brunt of the conflict, leading to mass displacement from the capital

There are continuous attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. In Khartoum, SAF airstrikes remain concentrated on RSF forces/buildings/key logistical infrastructures, particularly in Omdurman. Yet, as noted by Volker Perthes, former head of UNITAMS, indiscriminate bombing also impacts civilians as their homes get destroyed ([UN](#) 13/09/2023). Airstrikes intensified in September, and within the first two weeks of September

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120 people were killed ([Al Jazeera](#) 13/09/2023; [Conflict Observatory](#) 25/09/2023). Indiscriminate shelling has damaged civilian infrastructure mostly in Omdurman and South Khartoum ([UN](#) 13/09/2023; [Al Jazeera](#) 13/09/2023). Over 50 attacks on healthcare have been reported as of September, including on facilities, personnel, transportation, patients, and supplies ([Protection Cluster](#) 01/10/2023; [Sudan Tribune](#) 30/09/2023; [Insecurity Insight](#) 21/09/2023). UN and INGOs repeatedly stated that RSF commits most targeted attacks against civilians, with the RSF reportedly continuing to unlawfully kill civilians, and occupy and loot civilian homes in areas under their control ([UN](#) 13/09/2023; [ACLED](#) 12/09/2023; [Amnesty International](#) 03/08/2023). The fighting has displaced at least 2.8 million people from Khartoum State, largely from the tri-city area. The remaining civilians have little means to escape. Exiting Khartoum has become expensive, and bribes need to be paid at various points to gain passage. As rents have increased in the city's safer areas, civilians have few options to stay safe from the fighting. In mid-August, the several neighbourhoods in Omdurman were besieged, leading to blockades imposed on civilians, including the obstruction of medical supplies and closure of markets. Similar actions have been reported in other areas ([Conflict Observatory](#) 25/09/2023).

Women and girls in particular are an at risk group. Since the start of the conflict, the number of sexual violence cases increased drastically, according to reports of Sudanese civilians, IDPs and refugees. As of late September, there had been 136 reported rape cases, of which 68 in Khartoum State. However, due to fear of stigmatization, reprisals, and the lack of functioning state and accountability systems, the number of actual cases is estimated to be much higher. Armed actors have been implicated as perpetrators in all attacks ([Sudan Tribune](#) 26/09/2023; [OHCHR](#) 14/09/2023). The RSF in particular has also been accused of committing widespread rape in the capital. These include reports of gang rape, sexual violence inflicted upon women in front of family members, and acts that amount to sexual slavery. The patterns in sexual violence against women appear to be part of systematic policy of inflicting terror and punishment upon the civilian population ([Radio Tamazuj](#) 23/09/2023; [REDRESS](#) 09/2023; [Amnesty International](#) 03/08/2023). The trauma for survivors, who are unable to access adequate help, has led to suicides and self-harm ([UNWOMEN](#) 26/09/2023).

Greater Darfur

Darfuri civilians are targeted or caught in clashes, putting them at high risk

Ongoing violence in Central and South Darfur, particularly in Nyala, poses a serious threat to civilian protection, with indiscriminate attacks and casualties among various tribal groups. Civilian infrastructure, including hospitals are deliberately targeted or become collateral damage ([Insecurity Insight](#) 28/09/2023). Roads into and out of Nyala are cut off, practically trapping civilians inside the city ([MSF](#) 24/08/2023). As of early October, RSF attacks are ongoing. The SAF in turn, responds with bombardments, which also damages markets and other public civilian areas ([Sudan Tribune](#) 04/10/2023). Ethnic and tribal fighting is also intensifying: fighting between the Beni Halba and Salamat (both Arab) tribes that first broke out in May in Kubum has caused significant displacement and continued in September. In Zalingei, Central Darfur, similar circumstances are reported concerning clashes between SAF and RSF. The RSF have taken control over many public areas and are accused of effectively targeting non-Arab citizens, while holding civilians who are trying to flee hostage ([Radio Dabanga](#) 13/09/2023). Clashes between the SAF and RSF often impact IDPs and take place near IDP camps, from which IDPs are reportedly often unable to escape. Both Nyala and Zalingei have been described as 'ghost towns', and there are genuine fears that these areas may witness massacres as reported in El Geneina ([MEE](#) 06/09/2023; [Radio Dabanga](#) 01/09/2023).

In North Darfur, the living situation in and around the capital El-Fasher, is deteriorating. Major IDP camps are located around the capital, such as Zamzam hosting 450,000 people. Attacks between SAF and RSF often take place in or around IDP camps, harming the civilian character of IDP sites and resulting in many civilian casualties ([ACLED](#) 07/10/2023). Next to clashes, there are further reports of deliberate and targeted attacks on civilians, including IDPs, by RSF and allied local Arab tribes. In West Darfur, this resulted in widespread ethnic violence, mostly against Masalit populations, which included the killing of the (Masalit) governor of West Darfur, the April-June siege of El Geneina resulting in the displacement of 50,000 people and killing of at least 4,000 people, and the discovery of at least 13 mass graves. At least seven villages in West Darfur have been burned or destroyed since April, in addition to 20 villages in the other Darfur states. The majority of IDPs from West Darfur fled across the border into Chad ([Reuters](#) 22/09/2023; [HRW](#) 04/08/2023).

Fighting, sieges, and targeted violence cause forced displacement

Civilians who fled the violence in West Darfur, particularly Masalit communities, recounted stories of the dangerous journey to Chad. The road to Adré, right across the West Darfur border where many refugees reside, is littered with RSF checkpoints. Survivors recounted stories of killing, rape, torture and beatings on the way to find safety ([Avin](#) 15/08/2023). In other cases, there have been reports of civilians who were denied access to Chad, and instead had to relocate to other locations in West Darfur ([HRW](#) 04/08/2023; [UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023). Similar stories emerge from South and Central Darfur, where those who can escape, find roads

full of checkpoints, where they can be subject to death, torture, and other abuse. The majority of civilians fleeing South and Central Darfur are unable to seek safety in another country and as a result often flee to other urban areas in the interior, including other localities in South and Central Darfur. IDPs fleeing to North Darfur are often sheltering around El Fasher and surrounding localities, yet are hindered in doing so due to the establishment of toll gates by local militias on roads to El Fasher ([ACLEDD 07/10/2023](#)). In addition to forced displacement, people remain trapped in cities and villages under attack, as they cannot afford to flee or are deliberately trapped by the RSF, severing communication, and putting them at high risk ([Radio Dabanga 20/09/2023](#)).

Conflict-related sexual violence and other forms of gender-based violence are used to terrorize communities

Following the trajectory of the Darfur war, in which the Janjaweed used rape as a weapon of war, the now RSF soldiers and allied Arab militia continue to use sexual violence to terrorize communities. While the total number of incidents is - and will remain - unknown, civilians recount numerous incidents of sexual violence. This includes acts of violence against women, children, and in some instances men ([The Guardian 29/08/2023](#)). In the Darfur region, at least 60 cases have been reported, which again is likely to only be a very small proportion of the actual number of women who are subjected to sexual violence ([ICRC 29/09/2023](#)). The majority of perpetrators are thought to be RSF soldiers, though in Central Darfur, local leaders have noted that rape has been committed by both sides to the conflict ([Sudan Tribune 21/09/2023](#)).

With the escalation of ethnic violence in West, Central, and South Darfur, as well as pockets of North Darfur, sexual violence inflicted on women is widespread. There have been numerous reports of rape from Darfuri civilians who fled into Chad as well as from IDPs arriving in other locations. These include incidents of women who were abducted for ransom, trafficked into Chad, kept as sex slaves, or women sold on markets for sexual slavery ([UN 10/04/2023](#); [Sudan Tribune 22/09/2023](#); [UN SRSG 01/08/2023](#)). With the absence of safe places, and adequate services, most survivors are left to suffer in silence. In South, Central, and North Darfur, similar attacks have been reported, including the deliberate targeting of female IDPs, who are raped either as they flee violence or in and near IDP camps ([Radio Dabanga 26/09/2023](#)).

Greater Kordofan

Attacks on civilians and unlawful impediments on freedom of movements, as well as increased tribal dynamics, put civilians at risk

Fighting between SAF and RSF continues in the region, with frequent attacks on civilians and on civilian infrastructure, lack of security and forced displacement, all contributing to a deteriorating protection situation ([ACLEDD 07/10/2023](#)). This worsened due to the proliferation of checkpoints all along the Greater Kordofan area -used by the RSF to guarantee its supply lines to Khartoum- which severely restricted freedom of movement for civilians. Numerous reports documented abuse, abduction, looting, armed robbery, and torture, at random or planned stops along the roads ([Radio Dabanga 26/09/2023](#); [UNHCR 29/09/2023](#)). Since September, when additional armed groups in the Greater Kordofan regions joined the RSF, the increased tribal and ethnic nature of the conflict heightened protection risks for civilians, with more reports of clashes in West Kordofan. Further, in North Kordofan, the city of Obeid was under siege in June 2023 and has since been under heavy attack ([Radio Dabanga 19/09/2023](#); [Radio Dabanga 13/06/2023](#)), leading to closures of the Obeid market and civilian casualties ([Radio Dabanga 08/10/2023](#)). The RSF imposed heavy road taxes from all goods procured from Obeid, further challenging the civilian population's access to basic commodities.

In South Kordofan, due to fighting between SAF and SPLM-N Al Hilu, as well as between SAF and RSF around Kadugli, the Kadugli-Dilling road was often closed by SPLM-N, while the city of Kadugli was practically under siege, with supplies being prevented from entering the town. Over 50,000 people fled the fighting in mid-August, and those who remained in the city rapidly ran out of supplies to provide for their basic needs ([OCHA 10/02/2023](#); [Save the Children 01/09/2023](#)).

Rest of Sudan

Relatively stable areas see increase in displaced populations, heightening community tensions

Northern, River Nile, Sennar, and White Nile states host the highest percentage of newly displaced, as they are relatively stable compared to other parts of the country. Other areas that are relatively stable include Aj Jazirah, Kassala, Gedaref, and Red Sea. Yet, fighting is also inching closer to these areas, as exemplified by skirmishes recorded in Aj Jazirah ([Sudan Tribune 07/10/2023](#)).

Even in fleeing, IDPs and refugees report the dangers of rape, torture, and other abuse in their search to safety. Refugees also face dangers as they relocate to safer areas within Sudan, or are in transit to return to their home countries. An estimated 190,000 refugees have relocated to safer areas within Sudan, mostly to White and River Nile. In these areas, there have been particularly reports on harassment of South Sudanese

refugees, who pass through these states on their way back to South Sudan ([OCHA 07/10/2023](#)). Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees -to whom access is often denied due to the fears of the spread of cholera- reportedly mostly relocate towards eastern states, closest to their national borders. In August 2023, the Gedaref border was temporarily closed for a week, which heightened the risk of human trafficking and human rights abuse by smugglers as refugees sought for other ways to pass the border ([UNHCR 10/10/2023](#); [UNHCR 29/09/2023](#)).

After six months of conflict, increasing tensions are reported in stable areas between host, IDP, and refugee communities. This has led to instances of relocated refugees who prematurely returned to Khartoum in the hope of sheltering in places with less community tensions, despite the active conflict in the city ([UNHCR 10/10/2023](#); [UNHCR 29/09/2023](#)).

Also in relatively stable areas, the risk of GBV remains heightened, particularly for IDPs and returning refugees who flee conflict areas. During their flight, there have been reports of GBV at checkpoints and other stops along the way ([Sudan Tribune 14/09/2023](#)). The separation of families increases the risk for women to opportunistic attacks and assaults ([UNWOMEN 26/09/2023](#)). In camps, conditions are often unsanitary and basic needs are unmet. The overcrowding and lack of access to safe and quality services put women at additional risk of GBV. This situation also affects children who are out of school with no prospects of returning ([IFRC 10/04/2023](#)). The proliferation of armed weapons following the increase in illicit trade since the conflict, adds another risk factor to women and girls, as GBV becomes even more normalised and widespread ([ICRC 29/09/2023](#)). There have been reports of IDP women and girls being attacked when sourcing food or firewood in overcrowded spaces used as shelter for rains and floods, or when using sanitation facilities ([OCHA 22/09/2023](#); [UNWOMEN 26/09/2023](#)). Intimate partner violence cases are also increasing ([UNWOMEN 26/09/2023](#)).

Food Security and Livelihoods

Key Figures

- 20.3 million people (42% of the population) classified in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse) between July and September 2023 ([IPC 02/08/2023](#))
- With the 2023 planting season disrupted due to the conflict and the price of staple foods increasing by up to 200%, it is anticipated that from October the number of food-insecure people will be the highest ever recorded for a post-harvest season in Sudan (15 million people projected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above as of October) ([CARE 19/09/2023](#); [IPC 2/08/2023](#)).


Overall Situation

In just six months of conflict, the number of food insecure people, concentrated in conflict-affected areas, has increased from 16.2 to 20.3 million people amidst ongoing economic deterioration

Prior to the conflict, 16.2 million people (34% of the population) were already food insecure. This represented a worsening trend as compared to the previous four years, when IPC identified over 15% of the population in Phase 3 or above ([FSL 17/08/2023](#)). The pre-conflict deterioration in food security is explained by the compounding shocks of increasing food and non-food inflation, intercommunal localised violence, dry spells, flooding, and disease outbreaks, amidst one of the lowest agricultural productivities worldwide.

Six months into the conflict, the socio-economic impact of the conflict continues to deepen ([IOM 06/09/2023](#)). During the lean season of July and September, the protracted fighting and consequent economic decline have driven about 20.3 million people across Sudan (over 42% of the population) into high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) ([IPC 02/08/2023](#)). This is a 27% increase since the start of the conflict and nearly double the number of food-insecure people compared to May 2022 ([FSL 17/08/2023](#)). The most highly food insecure population are in conflict areas, including West Darfur (62% of the population), Khartoum and South Kordofan (56%), as well as Central, East, and South Darfur and West Kordofan (53%) ([IPC 02/08/2023](#)).

Figure 17: IPC Food Insecurity Phase Classification July-September 2023 (Source: [IPC](#) June 2023).



Populations in urban areas are of high concern, particularly in Khartoum, El Geneina, Nyala, and Kadugli as conflict has significantly disrupted household mobility and humanitarian access ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). Additionally, the damage and destruction of critical infrastructure, trade, banking, markets and services, as well as the interruption of livelihood and economic activities, undermine household access to food and income sources in affected areas ([Conflict Observatory](#) 25/09/2023; [FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023; [OCHA](#) 02/09/2023).

Conflict-related displacement and disruption to agricultural activities will severely impact the post-harvest season, leading to the world's highest levels of food insecurity.

As conflict disrupted the 2023 planting season and price of staple foods is up by up to 200%, it is anticipated that from October the number of food-insecure people will be the highest ever recorded for a post-harvest season in Sudan, with 15 million people projected to be in IPC Phase 3 and above, out of which 3.8 million people projected to be in phase 4. No other country in the world currently faces this level of acute food insecurity ([CARE](#) 19/09/2023; [IPC](#) 02/08/2023). Agriculture, which occupies over two-thirds of the country's population, and makes up nearly half the country's gross domestic product is in disarray ([FAO](#) 11/09/2023; [Ayin](#) 17/09/2023). Despite its high potential, agricultural productivity was already below regional and global averages prior to the current conflict. Main challenges include, but are not limited to: overdependence on rainfed production systems in areas suitable for irrigation, inadequate rural infrastructure including irrigation, weak market linkages, and limited access to credit and investment capital ([FAO](#) 11/09/2023).

The combination of skyrocketing food prices, conflict led reduction of food availability in markets, reduced household stocks and unprecedented concentration of IDPs with host communities, severely limits food access in conflict areas.

In areas affected by direct fighting between SAF and RSF, most households forced to flee the combat zones had to abandon their food stocks; pillages were reported especially in Khartoum and the Greater Darfur region, and food relief stocks were looted ([IPC](#) 02/08/2023). With 52% of displaced populations living within host communities, the pressure on available food and income resources is growing. Many households have their stocks, and their dependence on market purchases has risen just as food prices have reached their seasonal peak. ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). The availability of food in markets deteriorated through the lean season in August and September due to reduced supply flow to functional markets and closure of other markets. In the main crop producing areas in the south and east (Gedaref, Sennar, Aj Jazirah, Blue Nile, White Nile, and Kassala), access to fields is mostly unimpeded. Yet, farmers' lack of purchasing power for agricultural inputs, including fuel, seeds, and agrochemicals, has impacted the preparation of the [agricultural season](#). Farmers warned that this harvest's yields are lower ([FAO](#) 11/09/2023; [FSC](#) 24/09/2023; [FAO](#) 14/08/2023; [FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). Moreover, insecurity is a main constraint to agricultural operations in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan where impeding access to fields lead to decreased crop production ([FAO](#) 14/08/2023; [FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023).

Agricultural labour dynamics have been widely disrupted by conflict, with livestock farming negatively impacted through both a lack of access to livestock vaccines and drugs, as well as increased insecurity on animal migratory routes


Typically, the agricultural season in Sudan attracts labourers from western Sudan as well as from across the borders in South Sudan and Ethiopia. However, these flows have been reduced this year, coinciding with reduced demand in some areas attributed to below-average cultivation. In eastern agricultural areas, the agricultural labour demand is being met in part by displaced persons from Khartoum ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023) where the conflict has severely disrupted the population's formal and informal livelihood opportunities ([IPC](#) 02/08/2023).

Additionally, Sudan is experiencing wide scale unavailability of livestock vaccines and drugs due to the destruction of the Central Veterinary Research Laboratory in Khartoum, as well as damaged facilities owned by private drug suppliers and manufacturing companies ([FAO](#) 11/09/2023). This will have a negative impact on pastoralists' livelihoods ([FSL](#) 17/08/2023). Insecurity negatively affected animal migratory routes in the Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan regions, limiting seasonal migration to the wet season grazing areas up north. As a result, livestock are concentrated in relatively secure areas of Gedaref, Kassala, White Nile, Blue Nile, and some areas of South Kordofan. This can lead to overgrazing and increase the chances of clashes between farmers and herders. In addition, over concentration and shortage of vaccines, increase the possibility of disease outbreaks ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023).

Increasing food prices are limiting access to food for civilians whose purchasing power has deteriorated due to reduced income opportunities.

The trends in prices for key staple goods continue to vary given the different implications the conflict has had on trade flows of imported and domestic cereals (between 175-240% higher compared to the five-year average) ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). The greatest increases are seen in Sennar, Khartoum, and Kadugli markets where as of September prices have more than doubled compared to April ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). Moreover, as of September, the cost of a local food basket was 17% higher compared to September 2022 ([WFP](#) 20/09/2023; [WFP](#) 18/10/2023). As food prices rise and income opportunities deteriorate, Sudanese face a decline in purchasing power. This is particularly true for poor households in conflict-affected urban areas ([IPC](#) 02/08/2023; [FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). Additionally, people in rural areas face more insecurity along trade routes, which reduces trade flows and causes prices to rise above already seasonally high levels, thereby negatively affecting their access to food at a time when reliance on market purchases is typically high ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). In many conflict-affected areas, markets are disrupted, while in others, such as El Fasher and Kadugli, are barely functioning. Two of the main terminal markets, El Obeid in North Kordofan and Mowelih in Omdurman, are also not operating due to conflict ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023).

Figure 18: Local Food Basket Cost versus Labour Wage, Inflation, Exchange Rate and Wheat Prices (Source: [WFP 18/10/2023](#)).




Sub-national situation

Khartoum

Figure 19: Percentage of the population in IPC Phase 3+ by state (Source: [IPC 02/08/ 2023](#)).

Khartoum people facing high acute food insecurity (IPC phase 3 or above)
 Acute Food Insecurity Period: June-September, 2023




The food security situation in Khartoum with 56% of the population in IPC Phase 3 or above is further exacerbated by the destruction of critical infrastructure and markets leading to an increased shortage of essential food items ([Conflict Observatory 25/09/2023](#)). Prices of cereals, already at very high levels in March, surged after the start of the conflict due to trade flow disruption and the physical destruction of markets. Prices of sorghum and millet increased by about 60% between March and June, while prices of wheat more than doubled over the same period ([FAO 14/08/2023](#)). An August assessment showed that the production of new commodities was halted in Khartoum leading to a shortage of basic goods, such as oil, sugar and flour ([CRS 11/09/2023](#)). Reports from Omdurman on the other hand show that while basic goods are available, people cannot afford them because of increasing prices and unpaid salaries ([Dabanga Sudan 05/09/2023](#)). In Khartoum’s metropolitan and industrial state, the conflict severely disrupted formal and informal livelihood opportunities and casual labour in the agriculture and construction sectors ([FSC 02/08/2023](#)). Many farmers, whether small or large producers, lack viable markets to sell their products ([Ayin 17/09/2023](#)). As a result, farmers’ access to cash for planting is severely compromised as the majority of them depend on the sale of previous harvests to buy agricultural inputs for the new planting season ([ACAPS 11/08/2023](#)). Farmers are thus resorting to subsistence farming to avoid production expenditures ([Ayin 17/09/2023](#)).

Greater Kordofan


Almost 48% of the population across the region is in IPC Phase 3 and above ([IPC 2/08/ 2023](#)).

Figure 20: Percentage of the population in IPC Phase 3+ by state (Source: ([IPC 02/08/ 2023](#))).



South Kordofan is at risk of famine having witnessed repeated clashes during the last months ([IPC 02/08/2023](#)). Due to the deteriorating security situation and the intensification of battles, citizens were unable to farm, and the percentage of cultivated areas is expected to only reach 3% ([Ayin 17/09/2023](#)). Also, the combination of heavy rains and intense fighting has deeply compromised humanitarian access ([FSL 17/08/2023](#)). Food insecurity is particularly concerning for the population of Kadugli, the state’s capital, due to a siege-like situation, ([Sudan Tribune 27/09/2023](#); [Save the Children 01/09/2023](#)). Additionally, the persistent insecurity in the state is causing bank closures, accelerating the severe liquidity crisis, rendering it impossible to buy basic goods, especially sorghum. There has been an increase in the use of South Sudanese currency to trade ([Dabanga Sudan 22/09/2023](#); [WFP 20/09/2023](#)). As a result, the highest price for a local food basket across Sudan have been reported in the state (near SDG 790/unit), as well as in West Kordofan, where post-harvesting services are reportedly needed ([FSL 06/10/2023](#); [WFP 20/09/2023](#); [WFP 18/10/2023](#)).

Figure 21: WFP local food basket cost by State (Source: [WFP 18/10/2023](#)).




Greater Darfur

Conflict continues to negatively impact food security in the region. Across the five states, almost 52% of the population is in IPC Phase 3 and above ([IPC 02/08/2023](#)). Similar to other regions across Sudan, the food security deterioration in Darfur is further exacerbated by the increase of price of staple goods, the disruption to the planting season and the disruption of normal supply routes.

Disclaimer: The boundaries, names and designations used in this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by iMMAP Inc.

Figure 22: Percentage of the population in IPC phase 3+ by state (Source: (IPC 02/08/ 2023)).
 Greater Darfur people facing high acute food insecurity (IPC phase 3 or above)




As most of Darfur’s agricultural lands are currently out of production due to conflict, food insecurity is expected to worsen ([Dabanga Sudan 24/08/2023](#)). Few farmers are cultivating their land because of ongoing violence ([Dabanga Sudan 25/08/2023](#)). In East Darfur, the agricultural season is additionally threatened by agricultural pests and locusts spreading among peanut farms ([RT 30/09/2023](#)). In Central and West Darfur, reports showed a 10% decline in cultivated areas due to the ravages of war, pest infestations, and insufficient rainfall ([Dabanga Sudan 19/09/2023](#)). Additionally, criminality hinders agriculture and cattle raising, as cows are stolen and food supplies plundered ([Dabanga Sudan 19/09/2023](#)). Farmers in Mershing, South Darfur, are anticipating famine as the agricultural season threatens to collapse ([Dabanga Sudan 26/09/2023](#)). Due to the high cost of food, people in South, West, North, and Central Darfur have reportedly resorted to negative coping mechanisms. This includes the reduction of meal frequency and size, and the consumption of next seasons’ stocks. This is particularly the case in areas experiencing high displacement, where pressure on scarce resources is mounting and reliance on social networks will likely steadily decrease, leading to an increased dependence on irreversible coping mechanisms ([UN Women 24/09/2023](#); [REACH 07/08/2023](#); [Dabanga Sudan 06/09/2023](#))

Rest of Sudan

Around 30% of the population of the remaining nine states of Sudan is in IPC phase 3 or above, with Kassala recording the highest percentage of food insecure people ([IPC 02/08/2023](#)). In Kassala, AJ Jazirah, Gedaref, Red Sea, and River Nile, food insecurity is mostly impacted by increasing prices due to the conflict and displacement. IDPs are reportedly among the most food insecure in these states ([FSL 6/10/2023](#); [Sudan Tribune 20/09/2023](#); [UN Women 24/09/2023](#)). Over 300,000 IDPs in Northern state are stranded in border cities, lacking sufficient food ([Dabanga Sudan 15/09/2023](#)). The situation is further exacerbated by a reduced purchasing power resulting from continuous price shocks, accompanied by the impact of a lack of fuel, fertilisers, and agricultural credit ([FSL 06/10/2023](#)). Additionally, heavy rains have affected localities across the state, leading to damage and destruction of homes and farms ([OCHA 17/08/2023](#)). In Sennar State, the agriculturally productive area has reduced by around 60% due to the absence of funding for farmers ([Ayin 17/09/2023](#)).

Figure 23: Percentage of the population in IPC phase 3+ by state (Source: (IPC 02/08/ 2023). Rest of Sudan people facing high acute food insecurity (IPC phase 3 or above)

Acute Food Insecurity Period: June-September, 2023



Data Source: IPC

Nutrition

Key Figures

- 4.6 million people are in need of nutrition support in Sudan. Conflict-driven displacement, inflation, food scarcity, poor hygiene, and infectious diseases has increased vulnerability to malnutrition. This has led to a 30% rise in acute child malnutrition in hotspot areas, with a 15% increase in localities hosting IDPs, and a 10% increase in other regions (OCHA 17/05/2023).
- More than 690,000 children under 5 are severely malnourished, and an additional 2.7 million are moderately malnourished. Over one million pregnant and lactating women are suffering from acute malnutrition (Global Nutrition Cluster accessed 01/10/2023)
- IRC is warning of long term consequences of malnutrition amongst children under 5 if violence continues. They recorded a 300% surge in malnutrition cases in clinics in Hantoub, Aj Jazirah State; and a 165% increase in severe malnutrition cases in clinics in Banet, River Nile since the conflict started, underlining the rising rates (IRC 15/08/2023)

Overall Situation

The ongoing conflict is leading to a further deterioration of the nutrition situation in Sudan, impacting the already inadequate dietary intake, care and feeding practices. This is exacerbated by sub-optimal health and WASH services, all driving an increase in disease outbreaks

Prior to the conflict, Sudan was already recording one of the highest malnutrition rates among children globally. About four million children under five and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) were estimated to be acutely malnourished and in need of humanitarian lifesaving nutrition services as of late February 2023. Of these, 611,000 were reportedly facing severe acute malnutrition (SAM). In February 2023, global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence was 13.6%, whereas in Sudan, 64 localities had a prevalence equal to or exceeding 15%, the threshold for IPC 4 (critical levels of food insecurity) (OCHA 26/02/2023; UNICEF accessed 01/10/2023; IPC 15/04/2019).

Due to the outbreak of the conflict in April, current malnutrition rates are unavailable but thought to be critical, particularly in Khartoum, White Nile, River Nile, Central Darfur, West Darfur, Gedaref, Aj Jazirah, Northern and Kassala. Hotspot areas in Khartoum, Darfur, and Kordofan states have seen a 30% increase in acute

malnutrition cases ([Health Cluster](#) 22/08/2023). In August, the health cluster reported that SAM cases increased by 13% across the country while Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) cases increased by 13.3% ([Health Cluster](#) 22/08/2023). As of August, WHO estimates that more than 100,000 children under five facing SAM are in need of specialised inpatient care ([WHO](#) 16/08/2023).

The continuous influx of IDPs is further constraining the available resources, negatively impacting food security and nutrition, while increasing the risk of disease outbreaks ([IPC](#) 02/08/2023). For example, the measles outbreak reported in refugee camps in White Nile particularly puts malnourished children at high risk of death ([WHO](#) 19/09/2023). In Gedaref and Khartoum, there have been alarming reports of child mortality linked to malnutrition. The heightened food insecurity, with 20.3 million people facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), further exacerbates the nutrition situation. The situation of the population arriving at remote border areas is also alarming, as they find themselves in desperate circumstances due to inadequate services, poor infrastructure and limited access. In the countries hosting refugees from Sudan, elevated malnutrition rates, disease outbreaks like cholera and measles, and associated fatalities are becoming increasingly prevalent. There are reports of children succumbing to diseases that could have been averted with adequate resources ([UNICEF](#) 20/09/2023, [OCHA](#) 07/09/2023).

The nutrition crisis in Sudan is dire and has been exacerbated by ongoing conflict and insecurity that impede supply, staffing, and monitoring of nutrition response

Functional nutrition centres are scarce, with less than 1 in 50 functioning in Khartoum and 1 in 10 in West Darfur ([Reuters](#) 19/09/2023). The suspension of nutrition services due to insecurity in hotspot areas has led to the interruption of life-saving health and nutrition monitoring, disrupting treatment programmes for 50,000 children suffering severe acute malnutrition ([OCHA, HRP](#) 17/05/2023)

Additionally, the increasing insecurity is challenging the supply of nutrition kits with agencies running out of stock ([Nutrition Sector](#) 09/10/2023). Stocks of ready-to-use-therapeutic food for children were already low before the conflict started and could not be resupplied due to funding shortages ([OCHA](#) 23/08/2023). In May, Khartoum's sole Plumpy Nut paste factory was destroyed, which was producing vital supplies for the treatment of malnourished children in Sudan ([Radio Dabanga](#) 13/08/2023; [Revised HRP Sudan](#) 17/05/2023). This is further exacerbated by the deliberate targeting of food stores and nutrition supplies, leading to shortages, even in areas where stocks were strategically prepositioned ([OCHA](#) 15/08/2023). Due to the limited availability of cash, nutrition partners face challenges to support ongoing activities and have reported difficulties in paying staff salaries/incentives ([OCHA](#) 31/08/2023). Moreover, the hiking of prices for basic needs is increasing the operational costs of ongoing and new life saving nutrition services ([OCHA](#) 31/08/2023).

Sub-national situation

Khartoum

In September, several children were admitted to the Turkish Hospital in Khartoum diagnosed with severe malnutrition, resulting from the lack of food or from other diseases. Additionally, at least 50 children, including around 24 infants, died due to starvation and associated illnesses in a state-run orphanage in Khartoum because ongoing conflict hindered staff in providing care ([Save the Children](#) 22/08/2023).

Greater Darfur

While current malnutrition rates are unavailable, the high rates of malnutrition recorded in new refugees in Chad, point to a concerning situation. Nearly 13,000 displaced children under five were found to be acutely malnourished in one screening assessment. The number of children with malnutrition being admitted to hospitals has increased by 56% across the province of Ouaddai, host to more than 80% of refugees since the beginning of the conflict in Sudan ([UNHCR](#) 19/09/2023). UNHCR data in Chad also shows very high proxy acute malnutrition rates in Sudanese refugees ([UNHCR](#) 09/2023). In Adré, right across the border of West Darfur, there have been reports of child refugees arriving severely malnourished and dying shortly after arrival ([UNHCR](#) 23/08/2023). Newly arrived refugees came to Chad at a time when malaria, measles, and malnutrition are reaching extremely high levels in the region driven by the onset of the rainy season and the annual hunger gap ([MSF](#) 07/08/2023). The prevalence of acute malnutrition in Central and West Darfur is expected to be high during the peak of the rainy season, due to limited access to safe drinking water and an increased risk of flooding, along with limited to no access to health and nutrition services and widening food consumption gaps. According to UNICEF, more than 14,800 children under five are expected to be severely malnourished in West Darfur in 2023 ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). In a screening of over 3,200 children conducted in July by UNICEF in the two states, close to 500 children were identified as severely acutely malnourished ([UNICEF](#) 03/08/2023). Similar examples of high malnutrition are also observed in North and Central Darfur. For example, 6% of newly displaced children in Shamal Jabal Marrah locality, screened in one exercise, were diagnosed with SAM, well over critical levels ([OCHA](#) 14/09/2023; [UNICEF](#) 29/08/2023).

Greater Kordofan

The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in South Kordofan reported a dire shortage of food and nutrition supplies as stocks have been depleted and attempts at re-supply have failed due to insecurity on the Dilling-Kadugli road in the state capital Kadugli ([Sudan Tribune](#) 22/08/2023, [OCHA](#) 23/08/2023)). The last food distribution was conducted in May, leading to concerns of increased malnutrition.

Rest of Sudan

As in other areas, prevalence data on nutrition is unavailable, however humanitarian partners share concerns about the malnutrition situation. This worrisome trend is also a result of poor living conditions and lack of adequate access to food among vulnerable displaced populations ([OCHA](#) 14/09/2023). Further concerning reports on nutrition, including child mortality, have come from Gedaref, Kassala, Northern, Blue Nile and Red Sea ([Save the Children](#) 22/08/2023; [Nutrition Sector](#) 9/10/2023; [OCHA](#) 22/09/2023; [Dabanga Sudan](#) 15/08/2023). The nutrition situation is reported to be especially critical in White Nile, where by late September over 1,700 child deaths linked to measles and malnutrition were recorded in refugee camps over the course of four months ([WHO](#) 16/09/2023, [UNHCR](#) 19/09/2023). UNHCR data from August showed that SAM reached extremely critical conditions across at least five camps in White Nile ([UNHCR](#) 14/08/2023). The criticality of the nutrition situation in White Nile is further reflected in the high numbers of malnourished children returning to South Sudan. In Renk, South Sudan, humanitarian partners reported increasing cases of children mainly arriving from White Nile, with measles and high rates of malnutrition. On average, 103 children per month were admitted to health facilities for moderate or severe malnutrition between May-July, up from 14 total admissions before the conflict ([UNHCR](#) 19/09/2023). According to UNHCR, the GAM rate in Renk is 31% among children under five, well above emergency standards of 15% ([UNHCR](#) 19/09/2023).

Health

Key Figures

- Out of 89 main hospitals in the capital of Khartoum and Sudan's states, 71 are out of service, with the remainder operating at partial capacity ([OCHA](#) 17/08/2023). 70%-80% of hospitals in conflict states are out of service ([Reuters](#) 19/09/2023; [AP](#) 19/09/2023).
- As of September, 58 verified attacks on healthcare have been recorded in Sudan since the war began, causing 11 deaths and 38 injuries ([WHO](#) 16/10/2023; [Reuters](#) 19/09/2023; [AP](#) 19/09/2023).
- 6,200 deaths attributed to conflict-related disease outbreaks and deterioration in the health system ([UNICEF](#) 29/08/2023).
- Almost 700,000 children with severe acute malnutrition are at high risk of not surviving without treatment, 1.7 million children under-one risk missing critical lifesaving vaccinations to protect them from disease outbreaks ([UNICEF](#) 29/08/2023).
- 11 million people in need of urgent health assistance, out of which 2.6 million are women and girls of reproductive age. Some 262,880 of them are pregnant and over 90,000 will give birth in the next three months and need access to critical reproductive health services ([WHO](#) 16/10/2023; [OCHA](#) 09/08/2023).

Overall Situation

Even before the conflict began, Sudan's health system was under strain. In 2021, the WHO scored Sudan at 44 on the Universal Health Coverage (UHC) index, placing Sudan at 162 of 188 countries ranked. The health system has further collapsed since the onset of the crisis, especially as most facilities (more than 70%) in the conflict regions have ceased operations ([CARE](#) 01/10/2023). Since the start of the conflict, there has been a significant increase in the number of people seeking healthcare services. Analysis of data covering April to June 2023 showed an increase of 32% from 12,450 in March 2023 to 20,916 by the end of June 2023. This increase is attributed to mass displacement ([Islamic Relief](#) 05/10/2023).

Amidst conflict, Sudan's healthcare infrastructure struggles with diminished resources and escalating mortality

Sudan has one Primary Healthcare facility per 38,000 people starkly deviating from the WHO-Sphere standard of 10,000, underscoring a systemic crisis in healthcare staffing and facilities ([UNHCR](#) 08/08/2023). Conflict, especially in Khartoum State and Kordofan, has heightened traumatic injuries. Yet, regions like South Darfur remain devoid of trauma care support ([Health Cluster](#) 05/09/2023). Fuel shortages, supply chain disruptions, and competition for logistical space, particularly at the crucial logistical hub and bottleneck of Port Sudan, are severely restricting healthcare delivery, ambulance services and the restocking of essential medicines ([MSF](#) 01/09/2023, [Logcluster](#) 05/09/2023).

Approximately 65% of Sudan's population remains without health services ([WHO](#) 16/10/2023; ([OCHA](#) 14/09/2023). Among IDPs, only 4% are able to access health services without further complications according to the latest DTM data ([IOM](#) 26/09/2023). Patients confront hazardous journeys to medical centres, with many arriving too late, and accessibility to regular medications being limited. According to an RI assessment, in El-Fasher, North Darfur, 59% couldn't obtain prescribed drugs primarily due to their unavailability in facilities ([RI](#) 05/09/2023, [MSF](#) 17/08/2023). Essential services such as prenatal care are absent in conflict zones, elevating maternal and perinatal fatalities, with the conflict also disrupting maternal surveillance systems ([MSF](#) 01/09/2023, [UNFPA](#) 11/08/2023, [UNFPA](#) 18/09/2023). Economic challenges, strikes, violence, and unpaid salaries have driven healthcare providers to emigrate, driving staffing shortages ([Health Cluster](#) 24/08/2023, [UNHCR](#) 13/09/2023). Critical equipment and medications are scarce, with blood transfusions dwindling due to energy outages ([HOPE](#) 24/08/2023, [MSF](#) 01/09/2023). Women's activist groups have highlighted the dire need for rape kits, dignity kits, and female hygiene supplies amidst the rise in gender-based violence, which also necessitates comprehensive services like mental health support and aid for GBV survivors ([OCHA](#) 09/08/2023, [UNFPA](#) 11/08/2023).

Overall, the WHO has identified core health needs as unimpeded delivery of supplies, access to trauma and emergency care, early detection and response to outbreaks, mental health and psychosocial support, treatment of chronic diseases, and establishment of stabilization centres to treat medical complications with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) ([WHO](#) 16/10/2023).

Health facilities have been looted, damaged, and occupied, limiting and in some cases restricting access to health facilities and services.

Since April, parties to the conflict have launched intentional attacks on health facilities and medical units. The RSF has also occupied civilian buildings including hospitals, using many of them for military purposes. Since the outbreak of the conflict, there have been 58 verified attacks on healthcare facilities, resulting in 11 fatalities and 38 injuries ([Reuters](#) 19/09/2023, [AP](#) 19/09/2023). WHO has reported an increase in the number of attacks on health care in Sudan and the occupation of health facilities such as the National Public Health Laboratory, the Federal Ministry of Health's National Medical Supply Funds Warehouse in Khartoum, and the Central Blood Bank ([OCHA](#) 09/08/2023). Widespread looting and vandalism have impacted closed hospitals as well as pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies ([Sudan Tribune](#) 26/09/2023, [Amnesty International](#) 03/08/2023).

Rainy season and the aftermath of the conflict have compromised sanitation, and hampered disease surveillance and vaccination efforts driving outbreaks of both water- and vector-borne diseases.

Since the start of the rainy season in June/July, many houses have been destroyed by floods, increasing the risk of water and vector-borne disease as stagnant pools of water and flooded areas became breeding grounds for cholera, dengue fever, rift valley fever and chikungunya ([OCHA](#) 15/08/2023). Infrastructure damage from the floods and conflict and the rapid increase of displaced people in host communities has resulted in increasing use of non-potable water sources, such as river water ([ACAPS](#) 11/09/2023). 3.4 million children under five are at high risk of diarrhoeal diseases and cholera ([OCHA](#) 31/08/2023). Risk of disease is even greater for children in SPLM-N areas, who have not received any vaccinations since 2011 due to inaccessibility and conflict ([OCHA](#) 15/08/2023). Since April, the total number of reported measles cases rose from 3,300 to 4,300 in just one week by mid-September. On 22 September, the UN recorded approximately 127 measles-related deaths. Notably, nearly 80% of these cases were from White Nile State ([USAID](#) 29/09/2023).

In Khartoum State, as of August there were thousands of corpses decomposing on the streets, with morgues at breaking point due to power outages and insufficient capacity to store the bodies. However this data has yet to be updated as of October 2023 ([Sudan Tribune](#) 07/08/2023). Displacement, insecurity and lack of resources has also disrupted Sudan's disease surveillance system, making it more difficult to track outbreaks ([WHO](#) 24/08/2023).

With the lack of available health services and increased risk of disease, vulnerable groups include women, children, older people, people with disabilities, youth, and those living in poor conditions such as overcrowded refugee and IDP camps.

Across all locations, women and children were most frequently cited as vulnerable groups, followed by older people, people with disabilities and youth ([CRS](#) 11/09/2023). In addition to children being more vulnerable to disease outbreaks, children's malnutrition will increase due to poor feeding practices and poor hygiene caused by water scarcity and the long distance to clean water sources in the urban and rural areas ([FSC](#) 02/08/2023).

In IDP camps, overcrowding, shortages of food and water, lack of sanitation and poor hygiene put the displaced at high risk of malnutrition and disease outbreaks. Children in these camps are already dying from malnutrition and vaccine-preventable diseases, like measles and rubella ([WHO](#) 21/09/2023). Refugee camps in White Nile State are among the worst hit, with over 1,200 children under-5 dying of suspected measles and malnutrition between 15 May and 14 September ([OCHA](#) 22/09/2023). Due to this overcrowding and its consequences, girls

preferred to stay outside in the yard under the trees, exposing themselves to health risks. The rains have also led to the deterioration of the hygiene and sanitation situation, with reports of open defecation and high rates of diarrhoea and infections among IDPs ([OCHA 17/08/2023](#)).


As of the end of September, 49% of surveyed IDPs have no access to health care at all, while 18% said health services were available but not good quality, 17% said it was available but not affordable, and only 4% have access to healthcare with no complications ([DTM 26/09/2023](#)).

Sub-national situation

Khartoum

Attacks against the health facilities throughout Khartoum, but in South Khartoum in particular (Elshik Wad Hamad) and in Elfashir City (Aboshok Clinic) have destroyed the infrastructure of the facilities, injured patients and staff, and interrupted the delivery of health services ([IPPF 11/09/2023](#)). As of May, 61% of health facilities in Khartoum were closed and just 16% remained fully operational, whereas by August, only two hospitals remained operational ([CARE 01/10/2023](#)). MSF announced on 18 October that it would have to suspend support to surgeries at Bashair Teaching Hospital in south Khartoum as the hospital has run out of surgical supplies and medicines needed for surgeries. Since 8 September, the RSF have refused permission for MSF to bring new supplies from warehouses in Wad Madani to hospitals in south Khartoum ([MSF 18/10/2023](#)). Cases of waterborne diseases that were under control before the start of the conflict (such as malaria, measles, dengue fever, and acute watery diarrhoea) are on the rise, with almost total disruption of health services aggravating these outbreaks ([ACAPS 11/09/2023](#)).

Figure 24: Proportion of fully functioning primary health centres in Khartoum (Source: [WHO 4/10/2023](#)).



Greater Darfur

In North Darfur, there are 35 health facilities in the state that are not functioning due to security concerns. The scarcity of medicines and medical supplies remains an issue and is affecting the quality of healthcare services in different health facilities in the state ([Health Cluster 02/08/2023](#)). In South Darfur, one of the biggest PHCs in Kass, was looted during the clashes, but other sites remain operational, allowing for transfer of patients to other facilities ([Health Cluster 31/08/2023](#)). In El-Fasher, 85.1% of household members who had recently visited health facilities were diagnosed with infectious diseases and non-communicable diseases ([RI 05/09/2023](#)). East Darfur remains relatively calm compared to the surrounding areas, however, it is accommodating IDPs from other Darfur States and Khartoum, which risks overstressing the health system ([Health Cluster 31/08/2023](#)). In Central Darfur, repeated attacks on medical professionals at Zalingei Hospital by the RSF and militias have resulted in many healthcare workers fleeing the city ([Sudan Tribune 19/09/2023](#)). The Hospital operates at only 3% of its maximum capacity due to the shortage of medical staff, medicines, and ongoing security concerns ([Dabanga Sudan 19/09/2023](#)).

Disclaimer: The boundaries, names and designations used in this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by iMMAP Inc.

Greater Kordofan

In greater Kordofan, less than one-third of health facilities are fully functional, and insecurity and displacement are preventing patients and health workers from reaching hospitals, with many facilities reportedly being attacked and destroyed ([Sudan Tribune](#) 24/08/2023). Insecurity and the interception of medicine and other essential goods by armed groups are also factors undermining the functioning of health services. ([Dabanga Sudan](#) 15/08/2023). Health actors in Um Ruwaba also reported an increase in malaria and dengue fever cases, with patients noting costly treatments and medicine shortages at Um Rawaba Hospital hinder their ability to access care ([USAID](#) 29/09/2023).

Rest of Sudan

A lack of essential medicines, staff and supplies is severely hampering health and nutrition services in all 10 refugee camps in White Nile, where over 144,000 newly displaced refugees from Khartoum have arrived since the conflict started, joining thousands of South Sudanese refugees and the local communities who access the same clinics. Mental health and psychosocial support services are virtually nonexistent ([UNHCR](#) 08/08/2023). Eighty eight shelters in Kosti are facing a health crisis with the outbreak of malaria and watery diarrhoea due to deteriorating sanitary conditions ([Dabanga Sudan](#) 22/08/2023). Between 15 May and 14 September in White Nile alone, over 3,100 suspected cases of cholera were reported. As of October, between Khartoum, Gadaref and South Kordofan there have been 1072 infected by cholera and 52 people have died ([WHO](#) 16/10/2023). Additionally, more than 500 suspected cases of cholera were identified in other parts of the country. This comes alongside outbreaks of dengue and malaria (750,944 clinical cases and 22 deaths as of October), emphasising an elevated epidemic risk and the challenges associated with disease control ([UNHCR](#) 19/09/2023).

Port Sudan became a refuge from the conflict occurring to the west, but its health system is in near collapse due to power cuts and scarce supplies, and staff shortages exacerbated by striking doctors in August ([Reuters](#) 27/08/2023).

Shelter

Key Figures

- IOM DTM reports consistently list Shelter/NFI among the top three humanitarian needs of the population, with almost 4.6 million people newly displaced between 15 April and 17 October in need of shelter and NFI ([OCHA](#) 02/09/2023).
- HRP estimates people in need of shelter and NFI assistance will rise to 5.7 million by the end of 2023, while the numbers targeted for humanitarian assistance will see a more modest increase from 1.5 million to 1.9 million due to challenges with access, fuel, market functionality and banking services ([Shelter & NFI Cluster](#) 05/23/2023).
- Over 13,000 houses in seven provinces and across 16 localities and 72, 000 people have been affected by heavy rains and flooding ([WHO](#) 04/10/2023).

Overall Situation


Prior to the conflict, Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI) needs were already acute, caused in part by the significant underfunding of the sector. In 2022, there was already a sharp rise in prices, reducing families' purchasing power and their ability to afford basic household items and make investments in shelter repair and maintenance ([HNO](#) 07/11/2022). Since the conflict, disrupted supply chains have driven price hikes and shortages of NFIs. As of September 2023, 4.6 million people have been newly displaced, putting further pressure on already overcrowded shelters and causing many to turn to other forms of shelter such as schools and other public buildings ([OCHA](#) 24/09/2023).

Escalating internal displacement in Sudan strains housing, as IDPs primarily rely on host communities or improvised shelters, as many face financial hardship and precarious living conditions.

Sudan's shelter infrastructure is under significant strain due to the dynamics of internal displacement and conflict. States like Khartoum and South Darfur emerge as primary origins of displacement, underscoring the absence of safe and dignified housing options in these conflict-affected areas. In contrast, states such as River Nile, Al Jazirah, and various regions within Darfur, including South Darfur itself, face the challenges of accommodating a substantial influx of IDPs, collectively hosting half of the nation's displaced individuals. Notably, South Darfur is in a unique position, serving as both a source and sanctuary for IDPs. This role places immense pressure on its scarce shelter resources, highlighting the urgent need for specialised housing strategies tailored to these complex circumstances ([IOM](#) 11/10/2023). Current data indicates that 66% of IDPs

are residing within host communities, highlighting a reliance on local resources and indicating a gap in formal housing provision ([IOM 11/10/2023](#)).

Figure 25: Proportion of IDP with Host Community Population (Source: [DTM 26/09/2023](#)).



Economic factors contribute to this trend, with an observable shift from rented accommodations to alternative arrangements, suggesting financial constraints among these populations ([OCHA 17/08/2023](#)). Community initiatives, such as the ad hoc “emergency response rooms” by volunteers, provide temporary relief but are not widespread or sustainable on a larger scale ([Ayin Network 03/08/2023](#)).

An additional concern is the use of educational facilities as interim shelters, a measure that, while providing immediate respite, disrupts educational services and presents potential safeguarding issues. Recent reports cite the use of 171 schools for this purpose, a situation that necessitates careful management to balance educational and housing needs ([Reuters 10/08/2023](#), [Education Cluster 05/09/2023](#)).

Shelters damaged by flooding in 2022, and now conflict further damaging shelters.

In 2022, rains were the main driver of shelter damage, accounting for 71% of damaged homes (though only 4% experienced total structural collapse) ([REACH 2022](#)). The intensity of new clashes and their indiscriminate nature is causing widespread damage to housing, household assets and public infrastructure, prompting many to leave their homes. The conflicting parties have used heavy artillery particularly in densely populated urban areas ([NRC 24/07/2023](#)). In addition to direct and indiscriminate attacks, across Sudan, Explosive Remnants of War have been left behind, preventing people from safely returning to their homes ([UNHCR 14/09/2023](#)).

Utility disruptions in conflict-ridden Sudan hinder daily life, worsening shelter and NFI access for IDPs, increasing their vulnerability.

Sudan's Shelter & NFI sector is under severe strain, especially in conflict-affected areas such as Khartoum State ([IOM 26/09/2023](#)). Erratic electricity supply hampers daily survival for IDPs, with 48% lacking access, complicating essential tasks like cooking and water purification. Additionally, 68% of IDPs confront affordability issues with crucial non-food items (NFIs), undercutting living standards and well-being for a population already exposed to deep vulnerabilities ([IOM 26/09/2023](#)). The influx into host communities exacerbates these conditions, resulting in overcrowded makeshift shelters deficient in basic safety and sanitation, heightening risks, particularly for vulnerable demographics such as women, children, refugees, IDPs and persons with disabilities ([OCHA 02/09/2023](#)).

Environmental factors, notably flooding, are further straining shelter capacities, compounding the hardship of displacement whether due to conflict or natural hazards, and underscoring the need for comprehensive shelter solutions

Amplifying Sudan's ongoing humanitarian crisis, recent severe flooding has disrupted communities, with between 8,000 and 13,000 houses damaged and 88,000 people affected as of 8 October ([OCHA](#) 19/10/2023). Environmental hazards poses a dual hardship: it initiates displacement among communities previously unaffected by conflict (e.g. Northern State, with more than 34,000 people affected) and severely degrades living conditions for existing IDPs, already grappling with insufficient shelter, hygiene, and essential non-food items (NFIs) ([OCHA](#) 19/09/2022, [OCHA](#) 02/09/2023, [WHO](#) 04/10/2023, [OCHA](#) 19/10/2023).

Sub-national situation

Khartoum

Khartoum currently hosts over 63,365 IDPs across seven localities, with many residential areas in Khartoum nearly empty ([OCHA](#) 07/11/2022). The military occupation of civilian homes and the subsequent targeting of these areas have escalated the shelter crisis ([Radio Tamazuj](#) 11/09/2023). While most IDPs have reportedly left the state, many of the remaining IDPs within Khartoum state have primarily settled on the fringes of the metropolitan area in host communities (65%) and rented accommodations (31%), meaning that few are in more informal shelters like gathering spaces or camps. However, many IDPs have no access to basic NFIs and are in very poor living conditions due to destroyed infrastructure ([DTM](#) 26/09/2023).

Specific areas like Al-Sagai struggle with the aftermath of flooding, where structural collapses have left many without shelter, highlighting the need for urgent housing solutions and infrastructure rehabilitation. The area was inundated with water and dozens of houses collapsed. UNHCR has received reports that over 2,593 shelters have collapsed in the Bantiu open area in Khartoum ([Global Shelter Cluster](#) 21/08/2023, [UNHCR](#) 14/09/2023).

Greater Darfur

Escalating conflict in Darfur has resulted in the displacement of over 1.7 million people ([DTM](#) 26/09/2023), with acute instances of violence leading to the destruction of numerous villages and the displacement of tens of thousands, as seen with the complete annihilation of the Kassab IDP camp and the burning of 86 sites in Ag Geneina. As of 04 August 2023, seven villages or towns had been nearly destroyed or burned completely in West Darfur alone since mid-April ([Insecurity Insight](#) 01/09/2023, [UN Women](#) 24/09/2023, [UNHCR](#) 16/07/2023). On 26 September, 2,300 people were left homeless after their shelters were burnt during clashes near Hasahisa camp, Sudan's Central Darfur State ([Radio Tamazuj](#) 05/10/2023).

South and North Darfur, particularly in localities like Beliel and Al-Fasher, experienced significant disruptions in 2023 due to flooding, affecting close to 30,000 individuals, adding to the strain on available shelter. Specifically, El-Fasher's surrounding IDP camps endured particularly heavy rains on 4 and 5 August 2023, leading to the partial or total destruction of at least 1,414 houses and 830 latrines, impacting at least 10,000 people in Zamzam and Al Salam IDP camps. These environmental adversities have severely compounded the shelter and NFI needs within these regions, highlighting the fragility of existing infrastructure and the urgent need for reinforced housing solutions and amenities ([OCHA](#) 19/10/2023, [Conflict Observatory](#) 31/08/2023).

Greater Kordofan

Greater Kordofan faces a dual challenge: hosting displaced populations from neighbouring conflict zones and maintaining stability for its current residents. Despite active violence in North Kordofan, the state has experienced an influx of displaced people from neighbouring states fleeing the clashes, and is serving as a destination or transit point for these people. The majority of IDPs (101,503 IDPs in North Kordofan, 84,899 in South Kordofan, and 57,267 in West Kordofan) have sought refuge within host communities, and are living in overcrowded conditions and under strained resources ([IOM](#) 26/09/2023). Compounded by frequent utility service disruptions, the region requires enhanced shelter support, consistent utility services, and NFI provisions to alleviate the growing tension and improve living standards ([ACLED](#) 11/08/2023, [IOM](#) 06/10/2023).

Rest of Sudan

Northern State currently hosts a total of 362,058 IDPs, originating from Khartoum. More recently, field teams have observed the arrival of IDP households from River Nile due to the relatively cheaper living expenses in Northern state ([DTM](#) 26/09/2023). In urban areas, there have been increases in the prices of rent, food, and non-food items, impacting living conditions for residents. This is further exacerbated by a lack of electricity, with 100% of surveyed IDPs stating that it is available but of poor quality. DTM data as of end of September shows that NFIs are a significant priority in this state for IDPs, with 61% of households and 44,893 in need. All surveyed IDPs noted that NFIs are available but not affordable. Northern state has also been heavily impacted

by rainy season flooding, with 34,000 people affected. The most affected locality is Merwae with 1,313 houses destroyed and 3,088 damaged; other areas affected include Al Golid, Ad Dabbah, Dongola and Halfa ([OCHA 19/10/2023](#)).

Field teams have reported that over 500,000 IDPs in River Nile state, accommodating one of the highest new IDP caseloads across Sudan. Living conditions are impacted by poor service provision due to increased pressure on existing infrastructure, including public utilities such as electricity, water, and markets. Forty-five percent of surveyed IDPs stated that electricity is available but of poor quality, however 42% report no access issues. Residents also grapple with a sharp surge in the prices of rented accommodation, food supplies, and non-food items. Of surveyed IDPs, 100% noted that NFIs are available but not affordable. DTM data as of the end of September shows that NFIs are a significant priority in this state for IDPs, with 70% of households (71,435 in total) in need of NFI support ([DTM 26/09/2023](#)). In River Nile State, 19,000 people have been affected by flooding. The most impacted localities include Ad Damar with 2,614 houses destroyed and 300 damaged. Barber, Shendi and Atbara have also been affected ([OCHA 19/10/2023](#)). People also fear a possible environmental catastrophe, limiting their inability to return to their homes as the floods have spread large quantities of toxic mining waste throughout the area ([Dabanga Sudan 29/09/2023](#)).

Over 300,000 IDPs have been displaced to White Nile state. In White Nile there are also IDPs and locals living on the streets because the shelter centres are overcrowded ([Dabanga Sudan 22/09/2023](#)). One camp, designed to host about 30,000 people now houses over 70,000 with huge and growing needs ([Sudan Tribune 27/07/2023](#)). DTM data as of the end of September shows that NFIs are a significant priority in this state for IDPs, with 65% of households (37,370 in total) in need ([DTM 26/09/2023](#)). As of October, 2000 people have been affected by the rainy season flooding, with the most affected locality Aj Jabalain seeing 90 houses destroyed and 310 damaged.

WASH

Key Figures

- Over 17 million individuals in the country lack basic safe drinking water, and nearly half the population, around 24 million people, do not have adequate sanitation facilities ([UNICEF 11/09/2023](#)).
- According to the HRP 2023 revised figures, a total of 14.9 million people are in need of WASH services with only 6.1 million targeted ([HRP 17/05/2023](#)).
- More than 9.4 million children lack access to safe drinking water in Sudan, and 3.4 million children under five years of age are at high risk of diarrhoeal diseases and cholera ([OCHA 31/08/2023](#)).

Overall Situation

Sudan's WASH sector has been confronting escalating challenges since the 2021 coup with an estimated 17 million individuals deprived of reliable water access by early 2023. The crisis has broadened in scope post-April 2023, affecting areas previously deemed stable, such as Khartoum ([IOM 11/10/2023](#)).

Since April 2023, displacement in Sudan has intensified pressure on host communities, severely straining WASH resources, heightening health risks, and disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations, especially women, in IDP settings.

Displacement has placed substantial pressure on Sudan's host communities, exacerbating already scarce water and sanitation resources due to rapid population influxes. These displaced populations, primarily in Khartoum, Darfur, and Kordofan states, face increased health risks, especially during the rainy season, owing to inadequate WASH facilities in their makeshift accommodations ([ACAPS 11/09/2023](#), [OCHA 25/09/2023](#)).

Within shelter settings, there are typically separate latrines for women, children and men, however, with severe overcrowding from increased numbers of IDPs sheltering in small schools and other public buildings, latrines tend to be dirty, and displaced persons are forced to resort to open defecation instead, further exposing them to health risks ([OCHA 17/08/2023](#); [UN Women 26/09/2023](#)).

As of the end of September, 22% and 13% of IDP households respectively listed water and sanitation as priority needs ([DTM 26/09/2023](#)). Water scarcity particularly burdens women, traditionally tasked with water procurement, subjecting them to longer wait times and increased protection risks, including gender-based violence. As a result, women in IDP camps experience longer waiting times on average and are most affected by water shortages ([CARE 01/10/2023](#)). UN Women highlights a disturbing trend: 55% of IDPs only sporadically access water, complicating hygiene practices and increasing health risks ([UN Women 26/09/2023](#)).

Conflict and flooding have critically damaged Sudan's WASH infrastructure, causing widespread water disruptions and hindering repair efforts, escalating the demand for essential water services.

Ongoing clashes, along with aerial bombardment and explosive ordinances, have caused significant damage to water infrastructure, including water pipes, water treatment facilities, and pumping stations. Across Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Khartoum, there have been water cuts due to damaged infrastructure as well as frequent power outages from the ongoing conflict and strikes by electricity workers ([ACAPS](#) 11/09/2023). In July, RSF also took control of several water supply stations in Khartoum and blocked engineers from accessing water stations to repair damage done ([GCR2P](#) 16/08/2023). Repairs have also been difficult because spare parts are scarce, repair conditions are unsafe for workers, and some staff have been displaced ([OCHA](#) 15/08/2023). As a result, even stations that have not been taken over by armed groups are only partially operating. As of September water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure is expected to face more severe impacts, leading to increased demand for drinking water and other WASH services ([IOM](#) 05/09/2023).

Widespread infrastructural damage in Sudan has escalated WASH crises, particularly affecting IDPs and revealing stark gender-specific challenges in hygiene needs and latrine access amidst the ongoing conflict.

Amid the conflict and subsequent rainy season, significant damage to water and sanitation infrastructure has exacerbated open defecation practices. The deteriorating facilities critically affect IDPs, particularly women, who often lack nighttime access. Moreover, 61% of women indicate their menstrual hygiene requirements remain unaddressed, highlighting gender-specific challenges. Conversely, more men (17%) report latrine access issues, often due to non-availability or destroyed infrastructure in regions like East and South Darfur and Khartoum, compounded by potential social hindrances in seeking alternatives ([CARE](#) 01/10/2023).

Amid infrastructural decay and conflict, Sudanese communities are resorting to unsafe water, driven by accessibility and economic hardships, significantly impacting public health and disproportionately burdening women and girls. In addition waterborne diseases and gastrointestinal infections are putting infants and young children at severe risk.

Residents across various regions in Sudan face acute drinking water shortages due to compromised infrastructure, leading to widespread reliance on unsafe sources. According to a study, 77% of participants lack access to domestic water sources, with 66% resorting to unsecured supplies. Key barriers include the absence of community water sources (38%), undisclosed locations (19%), inaccessibility (21%), distant water points (62%), and transport challenges (59%) ([Islamic Relief](#) 05/10/2023). The crisis in Khartoum, Darfur, and Kordofan, sees communities exhausting bottled supplies, prompting traditional, riskier procurement methods, notably in conflict zones ([Protection Cluster](#) 10/08/2023, [OCHA](#) 15/08/2023). By August, conflict and financial turmoil had spiked water prices to SDG 3,000 (around USD 5.10) in places like North Kordofan, West Darfur, and the White Nile. Financial challenges are causing households to divert funds from hygiene and water to food, adopting harmful coping strategies like consuming contaminated water, thus heightening health risks. These factors elevate susceptibility to waterborne diseases and gastrointestinal infections.

Since the onset of conflict there has been a notable surge in cases of malaria, measles, dengue fever, and acute watery diarrhoea ([ACAPS](#) 11/09/2023). The disruption of health services has worsened the situation making it difficult to identify and monitor outbreaks. Improper water, hygiene, and sanitation practices are also emerging as a significant driver of mortality among children under five, along with the closure of some health and nutrition facilities which has far-reaching consequences on the overall well-being of children and households with chronic illnesses, leaving 3.4 million children at high risk of diarrheal diseases and cholera ([ACAPS](#) 11/09/2023, [USAID](#) 18/08/2023, [REACH](#) 07/08/2023, [FSC](#) 02/08/2023, [OCHA](#) 25/09/2023).

Sub-national situation

Khartoum

As a result of ongoing clashes, WASH infrastructure has continued to be severely impacted in Khartoum State. As of May 2023, more than 300,000 people in Khartoum did not have access to tap water. Infrastructure damage from aerial bombardment and explosive ordnance has affected water pipes and water treatment plants, making service intermittent. Without safe drinking water, civilians used unsafe sources such as untreated water from the Nile River, driving a notable surge in cases of acute watery diarrhoea ([ACAPS](#) 11/09/2023, [VOA](#) 26/05/2023, [BBC](#) 20/04/2023).

Greater Darfur

Across Darfur, different challenges have hampered safe access to water. In West Darfur, the main issue has been security, as there have been deliberate attacks on water points, including in Ag Geneina ([Protection Cluster](#) 10/08/2023). In South Darfur, most communities (90%) severely lack access to nearby clean water, and have to travel up to one hour to reach water sources. In East Darfur, communities have a relative plethora of modalities to access water -including using boreholes, water tanks, purchases from the store, from the tap-

but, as was the case before the conflict, require at least one hour travel to reach water points, which poses additional protection risks for women ([CARE](#) 01/10/2023).

Greater Kordofan

Across the Kordofans, but particularly in North Kordofan, challenges in accessing clean water persist with the breakdown of water infrastructure and services. Tap water availability is dependent on a stable electricity supply pumping water to homes, which was disrupted when electricity workers held a month-long strike in August, challenging water supply access ([Radio Dabanga](#) 08/08/2023, [MEE](#) 30/06/2023). In areas under RSF control, access to water points has been restricted, leaving residents the option of relying on water from a dug-out reservoir unsuitable for drinking -leading to an increased risk of waterborne illnesses- ([Dabanga Sudan](#), 08/08/2023) or forcing residents to seek water from Bara and other villages ([MEE](#) 30/06/2023). There is little information regarding the current WASH situation in North Kordofan and on the state of water connection there. Since August, communities in South Kordofan have become significantly reliant on traditional water-fetching methods, including using donkey carts to secure their drinking water supply ([Dabanga Sudan](#), 08/08/2023).

Rest of Sudan

DTM data as of the end of September shows that water and sanitation are significant priorities for IDPs in White Nile, with 48,145 households in need of water and 48,264 households in need of sanitation ([DTM](#) 26/09/2023). Access to WASH facilities is low and varies between camps. As of August 2023, water demand in IDP sites in White Nile state had risen from 15m³ before the conflict to more than 300m³ per day. Only 6–15% of refugee households have access to soap. While 71–90% of refugee households are defecating in toilets, the available sewer installation in many IDP camps, including White Nile IDP sites have been exceeded, exacerbating risks of waterborne illness ([UNHCR](#) et al. 06/08/2023; [WASH Cluster](#) 24/08/2023).

Water and sanitation are priorities for IDP in Northern, with 447 households in need of water and 669 households in need of sanitation ([DTM](#) 26/09/2023). Northern state has also been the most affected by rainy season flooding, with 34,000 people affected ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023). The heavy rainfall in early August in particular caused the destruction of 4,672 latrines across the state and further exacerbated the risk of waterborne illnesses from non potable drinking water [Conflict Observatory](#) 31/08/2023; [OCHA](#) 17/08/2023).

Education

Key Figures

- 6.4 million children in Khartoum, Kordofan and Darfur regions, enrolled in schools before April 2023, have abandoned their learning indefinitely due to school closures, adding to the more than 6.9 million children that were out of school before the violence outbreak ([Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023). In total 82% (19 million) children remain out of school as October began ([UNICEF](#) 09/10/2023).
- Out of 19,302 schools, 10,400 (54%) were directly affected by the conflict and forcibly closed for the last two months of the school year before the summer break, while latest reports estimate that 171 schools are being used as emergency shelters ([Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023).
- The number of children in need of life-saving education interventions has increased by 132% in the last HRP update, rising from 3.7 million to 8.6 million ([OCHA](#) 17/05/2023). A significant proportion of these children are part of the IDP population, with an estimated 1.71 million school-aged children remaining displaced as of 30 September ([IOM](#) 30/09/2023).
- Khartoum remains the state with the largest number of schools closed (3,796) and children impacted by these closures (2.4 million), followed by North Kordofan (882k), North and South Darfur (849k and 824k children respectively affected) ([Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023).

Overall situation


Despite an initial improvement in school attendance after COVID-19, the rates declined again following the outbreak of conflict, with the latest UNICEF data revealing a stark 82% of children out of the education system, representing the highest number recorded to date. ([UNICEF](#) 09/10/2023).

Forced displacement, the use of schools as shelters, and attacks on educational facilities, have profound ramifications on the nation's education system on children in conflict-affected states and those in states where education has not yet been resumed, with Khartoum alone hosting more than 2.4 million unschooled children and with more than 3,700 education facilities inoperative ([Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023, [UNICEF](#) 09/10/2023).

The conflict's direct assault on education is evident in the figures: of 19,302 schools in the states affected by violence, 54% were forcibly shuttered during the last two months of the school year before summer break due to conflict ([Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023), 171 schools are now repurposed as emergency shelters, and by the end of August more than 100 higher education facilities had been vandalised according to the Ministry of

Education ([Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023, [Ministry of Education](#) 31/08/2023). In addition to internal displacement, the turmoil has displaced 1.2 million refugees to neighbouring countries ([IOM](#) 30/09/2023). The convergence of conflict-driven displacement, targeted violence against educational institutions and staff, and the direct use of schools as emergency shelters paints a grim picture for education in Sudan ([Protection Cluster](#) 10/08/2023).

Figure 26: Education Overview in the Sudan Crisis (fragment) (Source: [Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023).



Behind the direct impact of conflict, consistent underfunding and unpaid salaries have deeply disrupted Sudan's education infrastructure and administrative coherence.

The educational crisis in Sudan has been exacerbated by consistent underfunding that drove a three months' strike before the outbreak of violence that had more than 300,000 teachers protesting against the Government ([Asharq-Al-Awsat](#) 10/08/2023). The escalating conflict, combined with an ongoing lack of funds, has led to the non-disbursement of salaries for educators and administrative personnel, amplifying challenges faced by officials and teachers ([OCHA](#) 09/08/2023, [ACAPS](#) 11/08/2023). Confronted with both conflict and unpaid wages, many have abandoned their roles in afflicted states. These drivers, among others, contributed to the decision of the Ministry of Education to cancel final examinations across affected states, disrupting the academic progression from primary to secondary education sectors ([Dabanga Sudan](#) 10/08/2023).

Limited resources, social tensions, economic hardships, and overcrowded classrooms compound the barriers children face, jeopardising both their access to and quality of education.

The conflict in Sudan impacts children's access to education, but additional hurdles such as the lack of access to educational services, limited resources, social tensions, and persisting insecurity are also hampering children's education ([OCHA](#) 09/08/2023). Economic challenges have manifested in state schools imposing fees, deterring a third of Sudanese children from enrollment ([Dabanga Sudan](#) 10/08/2023, [ACAPS](#) 11/08/2023). In conflict zones, 5 million school-aged children are at heightened risk of missing out on education, while the few open education facilities in these areas host up to 100 pupils per class, jeopardising not only their access to education but the quality of their learning ([BBC](#) 14/09/2023, [UNICEF](#) 09/10/2023).

Disclaimer: The boundaries, names and designations used in this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by iMMAP Inc.

These barriers, coupled with the broader economic implications of the conflict pose significant obstacles to education access ([UNHCR](#) 13/09/2023, [OCHA](#) 09/08/2023).

Sub-national situation

Khartoum

Since the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023, over 2.4 million children in Khartoum are enrolled in schools that remain closed due to conflict, showing a sharp decrease compared to 2022 data, when Khartoum had a 90% school attendance rate among non-displaced children and approximately 70% for refugees ([REACH](#) 2022, [Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023, [UNICEF](#) 09/10/2023). Additionally, 477,039 minors in Khartoum are in need of education services as of the 2023 Revised HRP.

Greater Darfur

Displacement in Greater Darfur profoundly influences access to education, with 3,872 schools non-operational ([Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023). In 2022, disparities in education were evident across Darfur's states. Non-displaced children in North Darfur generally had better attendance, starkly contrasting with the significantly lower attendance in South Darfur. Similarly, among IDPs, West Darfur generally fared better, but refugees in particular areas, notably North and East Darfur, grappled with notably low attendance levels, close to 36%, underscoring the complexities of the educational crisis ([REACH](#) 2022). The situation has further intensified with 1.2 million individuals across Darfur requiring educational services and the severe classroom overcrowding affecting learning quality ([BBC](#) 14/09/2023, [UNICEF](#) 09/10/2023).

Greater Kordofan

Kordofan's challenged educational landscape has further deteriorated. Around 1,750 schools have now closed due to violence, affecting nearly 990,000 children ([Education Cluster](#) 05/09/2023). Economic strains have led to imposition of school fees, further decreasing enrollment ([Dabanga Sudan](#) 10/08/2023, [ACAPS](#) 11/08/2023). Analyzing the REACH 2022 data, clear disparities emerge: non-displaced children in North Kordofan exhibit the highest attendance, approximately 87%, while South Kordofan's IDPs and West Kordofan's refugees display the lowest, around 49% and 29% respectively ([REACH](#) 2022).

Methodology

DFS Analysts and Information Management Officers collate and structure available information in the [DEEP](#) platform daily. Each piece of information is tagged based on the pillars and sub-pillars of the DFS/iMMAP Sudan Crisis Framework which was based on the JIAF and developed in line with successful models used across previous projects. The framework is shown in **Figure 28** and comprises the humanitarian conditions (by sector) and the operational environment. All the captured information receives additional tags to allow examination of different categories of interest (such as affected group, geographic location, demographic profile etc.).

The analysis provided is a synthesis of the information that was collected and tagged from publicly available sources and supplemented by assessment data provided by humanitarian partners working in Sudan and neighbouring countries. Maps and visuals have been created by iMMAP Inc. For this report, **1,051 documents** (collected between 01 May – 25 October 2023) were reviewed, sourced from **109 authors or organizations**, resulting in a total of **9,985 entries** being tagged. The distribution of excerpts per sector is shown in **Figure 27**.

An interactive [DEEP Dashboard](#) can be accessed publicly to evaluate and check the distribution of data and gaps within the project.

Figure 27: Distribution of excerpts by sector using the DEEP Analytical Framework








Figure 28: Analytical Framework – Operational Environment and Humanitarian Conditions

0. Context				
Political	Peace and Security	Socio cultural	Demographic	
Legal and Policy	Economics	Environment		
1. Conflict				
Drivers & Aggravating factors	Conflict Events	Area change of control	Parties to the conflict	
Peacekeeping efforts/Interventions	Possible Future Scenarios			
2. Other Events/Shock				
Type and Characteristics	Drivers and Aggravating factors	Mitigating factors	Hazard and Threats	
3. Displacement				
Type, # Movement	Push factors	Pull factors	Intentions	Local Integration
4. Casualties				
Dead	Injured	Missing		
5. Humanitarian Access				
Access of affected population to assistance	Access of relief actors to the affected population	Security / physical constraints	People facing humanitarian access constraints	
6. Communication and Information				
Info channels and means	Info challenges and barriers	Knowledge and Information		

		Cross sector	Food Sec	Livelihood	Health	Protection	Education	WASH	Shelter	Logistics
6. Impact	Drivers & Aggravating factors									
	Impact on people									
	Impact on services and systems									
7. Humanitarian Conditions	Living standards									
	Coping mechanisms									
	Physical / mental wellbeing									
8. At Risk	People at risk/vulnerable									
9. Priorities	Priority needs (pop)									
	Priority needs (Hum.)									

Disclaimer: The boundaries, names and designations used in this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by iMMAP Inc.



	Priority interventions (pop)									
10. Capacities / Response	Government & local authorities									
	International actors									
	National/local actors									

Acronyms

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
CCCM	Camp coordination and camp management
CP	Child Protection
CRSV	Conflict related sexual violence
CSM	Collective site monitoring
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FSLC	Food Security and Livelihood Cluster
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDP	Gross domestic product
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IED	Improvised explosive device
IDP	Internally displaced person
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISW	Institute for the Study of War
KI	Key informant
KII	Key Informant Interview
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
MHPSS	Mental health and psychosocial support services
MC	Mercy Corps
MSNA	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
NFI	Non-food item
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PIN	People in need
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PwD	People with Disability
REACH	REACH Initiative
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SCI	Save the Children
SRH	Sexual and reproductive health
SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse
TDH	Terre des Hommes
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
UNW	UN Women
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Annex 1: SUMMARY OF THE KEY CONFLICT EVENTS

Month	April	May	June	July	August	September
Battle Between SAF and RSF	<p>15 April, Armed clashes erupted between SAF and RSF in the southern part of Khartoum and escalated to other parts of the country.</p> <p>17 April, RSF clashed with SAF in Zalingei (Zalingi, Central Darfur)</p> <p>20 April, SAF and RSF clashed in Kadugli (South Kordofan)</p>	<p>5 May, SAF and RSF clashed in Al Fasher (North Darfur)</p> <p>31 May, SAF and RSF clashed, with artillery shelling and airstrikes being reported in Omdurman, Bahri, Sharg An Neel, Khartoum (Khartoum)</p>	<p>13 June, SAF and RSF clashed, with artillery shelling and airstrikes in Ad Duayn (East Darfur)</p> <p>14 June, SAF and RSF clashed, with artillery shelling and airstrikes being reported in Nyala (East Darfur)</p>	<p>19 July, SAF and RSF clashed in Nyala (South Darfur), with artillery shelling and airstrikes being reported</p> <p>22 July, SAF and RSF clashed in Um Rawada (North Kordofan)</p> <p>31 July, SAF and RSF clashed in Sheikan (North Kordofan)</p>	<p>26 August, SAF and RSF clashed near Al Shagayeg Bargo village (Al Jazirah)</p> <p>13 August, SAF and RSF clashed around Armored Corps SAF base in Al Oshara neighborhood (Khartoum), with airstrikes and artillery shelling being reported</p> <p>13 August, clashes between SAF and RSF continued in Karari (Khartoum)</p> <p>16 August, SAF and RSF clashed in western Omdurman (Khartoum)</p> <p>20 August, SAF and RSF clashed around Presidential Palac and Sport City RSF base in Khartoum (Khartoum), with shelling and airstrikes reported.</p>	<p>3 September, clashes between SAF and RSF continued in Engineers Corps SAF base in Al Fitahab (Omdurman, Khartoum), with airstrikes and artillery shelling being reported</p> <p>4 September, clashes between SAF and RSF continued in Wad Nubawi (Omdurman, Khartoum)</p> <p>5 September, clashes between SAF and RSF continued in Khartoum - Al Sahafa (Khartoum, Khartoum), with airstrikes and artillery shelling being reported</p> <p>6 September, clashes between SAF and RSF continued in Karari (Khartoum)</p> <p>9 September, clashes between SAF and RSF continued in Al Salam and Nifasha IDPs Camp, Deim Slik neighborhood in (Al Fasher, North Darfur)</p>

Month	April	May	June	July	August	September
Violence Against Civilians	<p>22 April, unidentified individuals attacked NGO-run health facility hospital and killed 3 people (including 2 medical workers) in Kereneik locality (West Darfur).</p> <p>25 April, unidentified armed individuals shot and killed three civilians in Nyala (Nyala Janoub, South Darfur).</p>	<p>1 May, RSF shot and killed a civilian riding a motorcycle in Ombada Karoor street in Ombada (Um Bada, Khartoum)</p> <p>4 May, unidentified armed individuals (snipers) wounded 50 civilians in El Geneina (West Darfur)</p> <p>8 May, RSF attacked three civilians in Al Fasher, North Darfur).</p>	<p>12 June, Several civilians killed and injured, including the relative of Masalit Sultan in Geneina (West Darfur)</p> <p>8 June, RSF abducted a civilian in Al Salama Al Bagala (Khartoum)</p> <p>9 June, RSF killed 2 civilians and injured 2 others in Khartoum - West, Khartoum)</p>	<p>3 July, armed militias on motorbikes and camels killed 2 civilians and injured 1 other while they were fleeing Tawila (Tawila, North Darfur),2 civilians</p> <p>4 July, armed militias killed a civilian and tortured a woman in Tina (North Darfur)</p>	<p>1 August, RSF soldiers abducted a civilian from Al Mohandessin in Al Fitahab (Omdurman, Khartoum)</p> <p>2 August, RSF abducted and tortured a journalist in Khartoum North (Khartoum)</p> <p>3 August, RSF shot and killed two pastoralists in Rawaba (North Kordofan)</p> <p>8 August, RSF soldiers shot and killed a civilian in Al Zariba market in El Obeid (Sheikan, North Kordofan)</p> <p>11 August, Military Intelligence Service personnel beat up 4 civilians and subsequently arrested in Kadugli (South Kordofan)</p>	<p>1 September, RSF intercepted a truck and abducted 107 Dar Hamid miners in Al Jamama (North Kordofan)</p> <p>2 September, RSF abducted 8 civilians, including three doctors at an RSF-manned checkpoint near Tayba Military Base (Jebel Awlia, Khartoum)</p> <p>3 September, RSF attacked civilians in Gorni village (West Darfur)</p> <p>6 September, RSF shot and killed a civilian in Al Omda East, Omdurman (Khartoum)</p> <p>12 September, SAF attacked and looted civilians in Al Omda (Omdurman, Khartoum).</p>

Month	April	May	June	July	August	September
Mediation Attempts	<p>20 April, AU acknowledges Tripartite Mechanism as mediator</p> <p>25 April, US and Saudi Arabia mediated 24 hours truce</p>	<p>6 May, Jeddah talks start: US-Saudi lead initiatives</p> <p>11 May, Saudi Arabia offered to broker peace. Representatives of SAF and RSF met in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) to sign an agreement called "Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan"</p> <p>20 May, Representatives SAF and RSF signed an agreement for a seven-day ceasefire in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia</p> <p>31 May, SAF announced to have suspended participation in the ceasefire, alleging lack of commitment on the side of RSF</p>	<p>1 June, the UN authority issued a statement, calling on SAF and RSF to fulfil their responsibilities and commitments for the "Jeddah Declaration"</p>	<p>10 July, IGAD calls for peace summit</p> <p>15 July, Jeddah talks revived</p> <p>11 July, SAF rejects peace talks following IGAD request</p>	<p>28 August, The Juba Peace Agreement signatories facilitate a ceasefire between SAF and RSF in Nyala</p>	

Annex 2: Information Sources and Gaps

Overview of the existing data and gaps

The key sources used for each section and critical information gaps are highlighted here to provide an understanding of the information landscape for the Sudan Crisis. In summary:

Sectors:

The information contained in DEEP (see [Methodology section](#)) reveals a prominent focus on the Health, Protection, and Food Security sectors, typical in conflict scenarios. However, a notable shortfall emerges in the representation of Livelihoods and Education data. As the crisis prolongs, understanding the socio-economic challenges and educational barriers becomes crucial. The limited data on these sectors suggests potential oversight, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive data collection approach to capture the diverse impact of the ongoing situation.

Dimensions of the Analytical Framework:

The noticeable absence of data regarding coping mechanisms is concerning (as compared to other categories), especially in the backdrop of a humanitarian and conflict setting. Such mechanisms are critical gauges of how communities adjust and withstand adversities. The sparse data on priority needs and interventions, voiced by those affected, could indicate either limited direct engagement with these communities or their feedback being overshadowed. Additionally, the minimal data entries on the affected populace might suggest that the crisis's magnitude has made detailed counts less relevant, underlining a widespread humanitarian issue.

Affected groups:

The DEEP dashboard reveals a concerning deficiency in data on vulnerable residents and host communities. While displaced populations often dominate humanitarian discussions, the underlying challenges faced by host communities cannot be underestimated. These communities may experience strained resources and socio-economic shifts due to the influx of displaced individuals.

Groups with specific needs:

There is a clear oversight in the representation of specific needs groups. While women and children are inherently more vulnerable in such situations, the surprising lack of data suggests that they are not adequately accounted for. Conflict scenarios are typically accompanied by heightened risks of GBV and a surge in Unaccompanied and Separated Children (UASC), while the data contained in DEEP is extremely scarce. The sparse data on these groups not only underlines potential unmet needs but also emphasises the severe repercussions of not promptly identifying and assisting these populations.

Sources and gaps by report section

The report relies on secondary data review based on both quantitative and qualitative sources. **For political context and economic data**, an overall picture was built using humanitarian reports ([WFP](#), [FAO](#), [FEWSNET](#), [ACAPS](#)), nonprofit organisations' reports ([Insecurity Insight](#), [CRS](#)), think tanks ([IFPRI](#)), international media ([New York Times](#), [Foreign Affairs](#)), national media ([Radio Dabanga](#)). Inputs from academic experts was also provided to better clarify the political intricacies of the information. Sources for the infrastructure and environment section were mainly drawn from INGOs/UN sources ([UNHCR](#), [IRC](#), [ETC](#), [OCHA](#) and [ACAPS](#)) Plus local and international media ([Reuters](#), Radio Dabanga). With the evolving nature of the crises and limited access to information from inside the country the current picture in terms of the level of damage and environmental impact is incomplete.

The conflict section relied mainly on [ACLED](#) reports and conflict data, [UNHCR](#) reports, international ([Washington Post](#), [Al Jazeera](#)), regional ([Al Araby](#), [Arab Weekly](#)), Sudanese national and sub-national media (Radio Dabanga; [Sudan Tribune](#), [Darfur24](#)), tailored and Sudan conflict dedicated information and analysis as the [Sudan conflict monitor](#). However, the picture limited due to the challenge of triangulating and consolidating information and reports on conflict trends rather than providing a list of anecdotal evidence of individual conflict events. For **humanitarian access** local and international news agencies were used including those with a particular focus on humanitarian affairs. along with reports and press releases from aid organisations and data from ACLED. The complex nature of the conflict landscape makes it difficult to track shifts in the security situation at a granular level, while the ad-hoc nature of engagement by authorities with aid actors makes it only possible to identify broad patterns in the bureaucratic impediments. **Displacement** data was primarily take from the [IOM DTM Weekly snapshots](#) and [DTM Sudan - Monthly Displacement Overview Round 1](#) giving a fairly comprehensive understanding of the displacement number and trends at national and state level. It is also possible to give an overview of priority needs across the various population groups (IDPs, refugees in

Sudan, host communities) and an indication on intentions and drivers of displacement/return. More detailed information on the cross-border displacement were gathered from the UNHCR Sudan Data portal ([UNHCR](#)).

Protection sources include quantitative datasets ([UNHCR](#) data portal and [IOM DTM](#)), as well as conflict events from [ACLED](#). Local news was again important ([Sudan Tribune](#), [Radio Dabanga](#)), as were international news sources, and updates from humanitarian partners including the [Protection Cluster](#). The gaps in information are linked to severe humanitarian access constraints, making it difficult to discern protection needs quantitatively and at a granular level, thereby limiting the ability for trend analysis. These gaps include the conditions of displaced populations in the Greater Darfur region, the Greater Kordofan region, and Khartoum. While there are many international news sources on the situation, the gravity of the protection situation can often not be assessed in real time.

Food security and livelihood relied on [August](#) and [September](#) WFP Market Monitoring Report along with the latest [FEWS Net Food Security Outlook Update](#) and the latest [FAO Emergency Livelihood Response Plan](#). Underpinning the analysis on the food security situation of Sudan is based the latest IPC report ([IPC 02/08/2023](#)), complemented with updated information gathered from the minutes of the latest Food Security Sector meetings in Sudan ([FSC 24/09/2023](#); [FSL 06/10/2023](#)).

Nutrition data is limited with plans to undertake a number of nutrition surveys.. Recent figures on the malnutrition trends have been collected from [Global Nutrition Cluster](#) website and [UNICEF Sudan](#) web pages. The current unavailability of post-crisis nutrition assessments for Sudan, made it challenging to conduct a comprehensive analysis at state level so this was piece together as much as possible from UN and INFO sources ([IRC 15/08/2023](#); [UNICEF 20/09/2023](#); [OCHA 26/02/2023](#), [WHO 16/08/2023](#); [UNHCR 19/09/2023](#)), Cluster minutes ([Health Cluster 22/08/2023](#); [Nutrition Sector 09/10/2023](#)), Media articles including INGO press releases ([Dabanga Sudan 15/08/2023](#); [Save the Children 22/08/2023](#); [MSF 07/08/2023](#); [Reuters 19/09/2023](#); [Sudan Tribune 22/08/2023](#)).

Health information is drawn from the WHO and Health Cluster ([WHO 16/10/2023](#)), as well as other UN and INGO sources ([UNICEF 29/08/2023](#), [OCHA 17/08/2023](#), [IOM 26/09/2023](#)). Information was patchy regarding the number and location of operational versus occupied, destroyed, or damaged (non-operational) hospitals and medical centres across Sudan, with information only available for certain areas so providing a comprehensive picture was not possible. There is also a gap in terms of current information on other risk factors (e.g. in Khartoum there were reports in August of corpses decomposing in the streets but not further data has been provided). Some tracking of disease outbreaks is available, but this is not comprehensive as many health centres are unable to report.

Shelter relied heavily IOM including the Displacement Tracking Matrix ([IOM 26/09/2023](#), [IOM 11/10/2023](#)) for information on priority needs of IDPs and IDP households and information on living conditions, along with OCHA's situation reports ([OCHA 17/08/2023](#); [OCHA 19/10/2023](#)). While there is a great deal of information regarding displacement and the shelters used by IDPs, there was significantly less data related to NFIs (what is most needed in which states/localities) and overall living conditions aside from what can be extrapolated by data on other sectors (i.e., lack of electricity, lack of market access, etc.).

WASH sources were similar to those of the health section, but with greater use of IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix ([IOM 26/09/2023](#)), a rapid gender analysis by CARE ([CARE 01/10/2023](#)) and ACAPS Analysis Hub thematic report on WASH cluster needs ([WASH Cluster 24/08/2023](#)). Local media, primarily [Dabanga Sudan](#) (08/08/2023) provided detailed information on water and sanitation access in key areas. Information on WASH related protection risks particularly for women was provided by the Protection Cluster and UN Women ([Protection Cluster 10/08/2023](#), [UN Women 26/09/2023](#)). Again a comprehensive picture of WASH needs is not possible due to difficulties in assessing the current state of WASH infrastructure and the fluidity of the displacement situation.

Education sources were primarily the UN and education cluster ([UNICEF 09/10/2023](#), [Education Cluster 05/09/2023](#), [OCHA 09/08/2023](#)) along with analysis from [ACAPS](#) (11/08/2023) and the IOM DTM along with [REACH](#) reports. Local and international media (e.g: [Asharq-Al-Awsat 10/08/2023](#), [Dabanga Sudan 10/08/2023](#), [BBC 14/09/2023](#)) provided updates on school closures, the impact of displacement and the lack of educational access amidst the conflict. Significant information gaps exist, particularly concerning the current status of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and their access to education, as detailed figures post-conflict resurgence is scarce. Displacement data provides information on schools being used as emergency shelters but information on the condition of schools, which schools (if any) are operational, teacher availability, the quality of education etc. is lacking. It is therefore difficult to provide any sort of comprehensive picture of how operational the education system is and the priority needs.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge and thank all those providing humanitarian reports, data and information on the Sudan crisis without which this report would not be possible. The analysis is based on publicly available information and data. However, the analysis presented, and conclusions drawn are solely those of iMMAP Inc. and DFS.

The report doesn't reflect the official views of iMMAP Inc., DFS, our partners or our donors.

