

SUDAN CRISIS

Situational Analysis

18 December 2023





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Acronyms

ACLED	The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AWD	Acute watery diarrhea
CCCM	Camp coordination and camp management
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
CP	Child Protection
CRSV	Conflict related sexual violence
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EmONC	Emergency obstetric and neonatal care
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FEWSNET	The Famine Early Warning Systems Network
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GBV	Gender-based violence
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
ICG	International Coordination Group on Vaccine Provision
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised explosive device
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JPA	The Juba Peace Agreement and the Sudanese Transition
KII	Key Informant Interview
MHPSS	Mental health and psychosocial support services
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
MSNA	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
NDVI	Normalized difference vegetation index (vegetative health)
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCV	Oral cholera vaccines
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OTP	Outpatient therapeutic feeding programs
PIN	People in need
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
PwD	People with Disability
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
SCI	Save the Children
SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse



SLM-AN	Sudan Liberation Movement - (Abdulwahid Nur)
SPLMN-AH	Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (Abdulaziz al Hilu)
SRH	Sexual and reproductive health
SSA	Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNW	UN Women
USAID	United States Agency for Development
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

This report covers developments that occurred between October and November 2023. DFS and iMMAP Inc. follow a rigorous Secondary Data Review (SDR) process where all publicly available data on the humanitarian situation is consolidated into a database using an analytical framework based on the [JIAF](#) (see details on the [DEEP](#) platform in the [Methodology Section](#)). A comprehensive overview of the sources used to produce this report is provided in the Information sources section. An Information Landscape analysis will be released before December 31st, 2023.

Executive Summary

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continue in their hostilities across Sudan, especially intensified in Khartoum and Darfur states, resulting in a cumulative effect on the humanitarian situation in nearby areas where civilians are taking refuge. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded over 3,400 political violence events since the beginning of the conflict and 870 events between October and November ([ACLED](#) 01/12/2023). RSF's territorial expansion, and associated increase in insecurity, particularly in Darfur, has severely limited humanitarian access. This limitation exacerbates the plight of civilians struggling with rising prices, destruction, and looting. The conflict has displaced 5.3 million people within the country and driven 1.3 million people outside Sudan, disrupted education for 12 million children, and triggered an economic downturn, making Sudan a top hunger hotspot. Challenges in humanitarian access - including conflict-related violence and logistical barriers - coupled with banking disruptions, hinder aid delivery and leave essential services inaccessible. Despite these obstacles, humanitarian agencies have reached 4.5 million people through lifesaving assistance, but funding remains a significant challenge, with the humanitarian response plan only 39% funded as of December 7. A commitment to protect civilians and enhance humanitarian access has been made by the parties to the conflict, with the establishment of a Humanitarian Forum led by UN OCHA in early November 2023. However, the situation remains precarious, and the involvement of multiple armed actors raises concerns about the potential escalation of violence, making the ongoing conflict in Sudan a complex and dangerous humanitarian crisis.

Humanitarian Conditions

Food Security and Livelihoods



The conflict is driving unparalleled food insecurity in Sudan, impacting millions and jeopardizing the nation's economic and agricultural stability. Between October 2023- February 2024, 4.9 million people are projected to be in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), more than double the number projected for the same period last year ([IPC 12/12/2023](#)), placing Sudan among the top four food insecurity hotspots globally. The December update identifies 25 localities where food security deteriorated from phase 3 (Acute) to phase 4 (Emergency) since July 2023 ([IPC 12/12/2023](#)). Conflict-affected areas such as Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum face persistent food insecurity due to restricted access to lands and income sources. Between October 2023- February 2024, 17% of the population in Khartoum, 15% in Darfur and 14% in Kordofan are projected to be in Phase 4 ([IPC 12/12/2023](#)). Disruption to the agriculture sector, vital for two-thirds of the population, has led to reduced domestic food production, coupled with below-average rainfall and pests and crop diseases. The conflict has resulted in reduced access to finance, higher costs for farming inputs and disruptions to trade routes with the net effect of below-average harvests ([FEWS.NET 10/2023](#)). The situation is also driving increased use of negative coping strategies, including begging, child labor, and early marriage as households struggle with a loss of income. Many areas report disrupted or barely functioning markets amidst declining households purchasing power, due to escalating food prices and currency depreciation. Humanitarian agencies are flagging the need for urgent and comprehensive interventions to address the immediate and long-term impacts on food security and livelihoods in Sudan.

Nutrition



Sudan faces a severe nutrition crisis, with 4.6 million individuals in critical need of nutrition assistance. Compared to the previous year, the number of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) have increased, leading to treatment centers that are struggling with resource shortages. This situation places half a million children at serious risk of not receiving the required nutrition support and treatment. Of particular concern is the severe lack of nutritional services in Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps, especially in West Darfur, as well as disease outbreaks (such as measles and cholera) that could result in increasing case fatalities amongst children and infants. Khartoum is witnessing surges in malnutrition; Darfur's SAM rates have doubled with widespread displacement a contributing factor and severe supply shortages have been flagged in South Kordofan. The overall scenario remains dire, highlighting the urgent need to increased support and improved nutrition services across the country.

Health



The Sudanese health system is on the edge of collapse, putting the health and well-being of millions of people at risk. Approximately 65% of the population lacks access to health services, compounded by the non-functionality of hospitals in conflict-affected states. Disruption of basic public health services is contributing to an increase in disease outbreaks such as measles, malaria, dengue, and cholera. Where healthcare services are functioning, they are hampered by artillery attacks, widespread insecurity, increased demand due to displacement, an exodus of medical personnel, power and water outages, and limited supplies of medicines and medical equipment. The lack of access to safe drinking water further heightens the risk of waterborne diseases, with the impact on millions of young children of particular concern.

Protection



Four and a half million people face protection risks in areas identified as 'hotspots' due to the acute impact of the conflict. Significant displacement has been caused by the takeover of Nyala, Zalingei, El-Geneina and Ed Daein by RSF in Darfur, resulting in significant displacement, with displaced persons facing heightened protection risks in this volatile area of the country. Mounting RSF clashes with the Sudanese Armed Forces in El Fasher pose a grave threat to civilians, potentially driving cross-border displacement into Chad and neighboring regions. Ethnic violence persists, notably between Beni Halba and Salamat tribes, leading to further casualties and displacement. The situation in the Greater Darfur region is

particularly worrying, with the RSF expansion intensifying protection concerns, particularly for the Masalit tribes facing widespread ethnic cleansing. Reports of mass atrocities, including mass killings, the rise of sexual violence, and forced displacement, highlight the dire situation. The breakdown of governance and the resulting security vacuums contribute to the persistent risks faced by civilians across the region.

Shelter



The shelter crisis intensifies as needs rapidly outstrip those estimated in the revised Humanitarian Response Plan. Shelter and Non-Food Items persist amongst the top priorities for displaced individuals, as internal displacement continues to rise. Significant damage and destruction to homes caused by both the conflict and flooding, rising numbers of displaced and attacks on IDP camps are all contributing factors to increasing shelter needs, with the Darfur region a particular hotspot. This has led to increasing numbers of people seeking shelter in unsuitable public buildings as well as some resorting to sheltering under trees without essential necessities. Displacement from conflict-affected areas has strained host communities, diminishing their ability to support IDPs, forcing displaced persons into makeshift and open shelters, with specific vulnerabilities unmet, particularly for women, children, and older individuals. Core NFIs including bedding, cooking utensils, solar lamps, chargers, and mosquito nets are unavailable due to disrupted supply chains and looting. Without urgent attention and resources aimed at addressing the escalating shelter needs, the health and well-being of many of the most vulnerable will be put at serious risk.

WASH



The WASH situation in Sudan remains critical, with millions of people lacking access to safe drinking water or adequate sanitation facilities. As of October 2023, an estimated 7.4 million children lacked access to safe drinking water, putting them at risk of contracting waterborne diseases, which, alongside poor nutrition, can result in serious illness or death. The main driver of WASH needs continues to be the conflict with recent actions by the RSF impeding access to WASH in conflict zones. The direct targeting of water facilities, illustrated by the firing on the Al Manara water treatment plant, being a case in point. The rainy season with its associated flooding, compounded by overcrowded camps and shelters are also contributing to disease outbreaks, including a spreading cholera outbreak in Gedaref State. Sudan's cholera cases have surpassed 2,500, with OCHA estimating that over 3.1 million people are at risk as of 9 November 2023. Besides damaged infrastructure, fuel scarcity and increased logistical costs are hampering water supply operations. Despite the ongoing emergency support provided by humanitarian organizations, there remains a clear need for extensive infrastructure repairs and longer-term sustainable solutions.

Education



The education sector in Sudan is facing an unprecedented crisis. The impact of increased violence and insecurity is evident, with approximately 6.5 million children losing access to school as a direct result of the conflict, and those in safer areas still waiting to see if schools will be reopened. Many education facilities are being repurposed as gathering sites, further limiting access to education, while the rest remain closed with teachers having gone unpaid for seven months. In response, a national campaign and UNICEF's e-learning platform are aiming to provide temporary spaces and alternative learning opportunities. However, attempts to restart education in some states face challenges, including financial disputes with teachers, resource shortages, and damaged infrastructure. With no de-escalation in conflict, or reduction in displacement numbers, the resumption of schools remains uncertain. This leaves most Sudan's children without access to education and at increased risk of being involved in negative coping mechanisms such as

child labor or early marriage. Urgent action is required to restart education services or else run the risk of a generational catastrophe.

	Primary needs count*	Primary needs											
		Child Protection	Education	Food Security	Gender-Based Violence	Health	Livelihoods	Non-Food Items	Nutrition	Protection	Sanitation	Shelter	Water
South Darfur (n=136 k)	6	6	2	93	1	78	39	95	4	35	72	72	86
East Darfur (n=120 k)	5	4	10	95	4	86	1	77	4	0	71	15	85
Aj Jazirah (n=86 k)	4	0	43	72	4	71	72	72	1	4	27	30	29
Sennar (n=70 k)	4	1	16	70	0	78	71	67	3	4	8	8	12
West Darfur (n=24 k)	4	2	50	99	1	96	2	100	6	13	16	28	98
White Nile (n=85 k)	4	0	39	87	1	87	86	86	2	5	62	45	62
Blue Nile (n=11 k)	3	0	4	95	0	92	43	91	4	4	22	1	61
Central Darfur (n=71 k)	3	1	65	85	1	61	2	79	7	3	52	17	65
Red Sea (n=26 k)	3	4	72	70	5	57	55	53	22	14	47	20	72
Kassala (n=23 k)	2	0	2	89	0	89	2	7	1	0	2	1	44
North Darfur (n=86 k)	2	1	2	85	14	59	5	74	21	8	56	53	60
Gedaref (n=55 k)	1	0	0	99	0	21	11	7	0	0	0	0	11
Khartoum (n=8 k)	1	0	77	56	0	51	53	42	0	13	1	2	2
North Kordofan (n=23 k)	1	13	21	89	21	58	61	30	16	21	23	20	26
South Kordofan (n=20 k)	1	12	26	76	3	52	40	53	19	8	27	36	41
West Kordofan (n=15 k)	1	2	25	84	12	38	50	64	23	5	49	53	28
Northern (n=71 k)	0	1	20	49	1	48	48	47	0	3	5	8	8
River Nile (n=122 k)	0	1	24	52	1	51	49	50	0	3	14	14	15

Figure 1: IDPs priority needs, % of households. (Source: [DTM](#) monthly report, November 2023)

* Number of primary needs reported by at least 65% of the household

Crisis Timeline




Figure 2: Crisis timeline - significant events in October and November 2023

Spotlight: Conflict and humanitarian access

Seven months into the conflict, and at least nine failed ceasefires later, the humanitarian situation in Sudan continues to worsen as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) expands its control across Darfur.

While the JPA (Juba Peace Agreement) signatories convened a meeting in Jeddah at the end of October to seek an end to the war, RSF continued to expand their territorial control by overtaking 4 out of 5 states in

Darfur except for North Darfur where intense clashes loom. Humanitarian access throughout the country has become difficult, even as people struggle to meet essential needs.

Increased prices, on top of continuous destruction and looting of private and public facilities, have severely limited people's access to basic necessities. The World Bank projects a 12% contraction in Sudan's economy in 2023, attributing this downturn to the conflict's adverse effects on production, human capital, and state capacity ([World Bank](#) 04/10/2023). This downward revision in growth forecasts is attributed to damage to the country's industrial base, education, health facilities, and overall economic activity ([OCHA](#) 19/11/2023). Between November 2023 and April 2024, the country is projected to be a hunger hotspot of highest concern ([WFP, FAO](#) 31/10/2023).

Between 28 October and 24 November 2023, Sudan has witnessed a relative decrease in political violence, with a 17% drop in events to 426, and a 33% reduction in reported fatalities compared to the previous four weeks, still totaling an alarming 1,698 deaths. Despite this downturn, the conflict's concentration in urban areas persists, with civilians continuing to face the dire consequences of shelling, targeted attacks on infrastructure, and the ensuing displacement ([ACLED](#) 03/11/2023, [ACLED](#) 01/12/2023). The highest number of fatalities were reported in Khartoum, in line with the trend of the previous months, as heavy fighting over the control of the capital continues. Shelling, burning of homes, and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure lead to killing and forced displacement ([UNHCR](#) 08/11/2023, [ACLED](#) 01/12/2023).

The conflict has driven over 12 million children out of schools, displaced 5.29 million people and forced 1.28 million to cross the border and seek refuge in neighboring countries ([IOM](#) 30/11/2023, [UNHCR](#) 27/11/2023). Blockades imposed by both RSF and SAF in Khartoum, Central Darfur, and South Darfur states limit the movement of civilians and hinder the transportation of essential aid, worsening the already increased humanitarian demands ([USAID](#) 27/10/2023).

The persistent challenges in humanitarian access, encompassing conflict-related violence, logistical barriers, and systemic issues such as banking disruptions, pose significant obstacles to the effective delivery of aid in conflict-affected areas.

Since the beginning of the conflict, there have been 963 incidents impeding humanitarian access, out of which 63% are due to conflict or violence against humanitarian assets or personnel ([OCHA](#) 19/11/2023). Various obstacles, including insecurity, looting, bureaucratic hurdles, inadequate network and phone connectivity, cash shortages, and a shortage of technical and humanitarian staff on-site, have been hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid across multiple regions in the country. Fuel shortages further impact the mobility of humanitarian personnel and supplies, as well as the generation of power crucial for various operations such as maintaining cold chain storage and supplying water ([OCHA](#) 12/11/2023). Continued disruptions in the banking system impede individuals, government entities, and humanitarian bodies alike. This limitation severely impacts organizations' capacity to access and transfer funds, resulting in challenges to make payments for essential services and procure necessary supplies. Limited access to cash remains a recurring problem for numerous aid organizations who are unable to access project funds due to the incomplete functionality of the banking system ([OCHA](#) 19/10/2023). As a result, organizations cannot reach people with humanitarian support and people in need struggle to access services like healthcare, food, clean water etc.

Transportation of humanitarian supplies to Darfur and Kordofan states has been delayed several times due to security concerns. On 10th December, an ICRC convoy supposed to evacuate 100 civilians from Khartoum to Wad Madani, was attacked in Khartoum. Consequently the evacuation operation was cancelled until further notice ([ICRC](#) 10/12/2023). On October 9 and 10, intense clashes in El Obeid, North Kordofan, coupled with challenging road conditions between Tendelti and Wad Ashana led to the postponement of the planned movement of 71 trucks to Darfur and Kordofan. Such delays lead to additional expenses for aid agencies, including payments for the extended detention of trucks. OCHA has been actively monitoring the situation and working with the Darfur Joint Forces to facilitate the convoy's departure from Kosti, in White Nile State, to El Fasher, in North Darfur State, ([OCHA](#) 13/10/2023). However, the ability of the Joint Forces to provide safe

passage to El Fasher has diminished, with some rebel groups forgoing neutrality to join SAF and the growing possibility of an all-out conflict in El Fasher ([Al Jazeera](#) 22/11/2023).

Despite access related challenges, humanitarian agencies have reached 4.5 million people with multisectoral life-saving assistance and 5.5 million people with livelihood support since the start of the conflict. Funding still remains challenging as out of the 2.6 billion proposed, 856.3 million USD have been received till mid-November ([OCHA](#) 19/11/2023).

On 7th of November a statement of commitment was adopted between SAF and RSF to protect civilians and improve humanitarian access, and an agreement was reached to establish a Humanitarian Forum for Sudan led by UN OCHA. The forum is expected to facilitate the implementation of the commitments made in Jeddah, emphasizing areas of protection and access ([OCHA](#) 07/11/2023).

Khartoum




Figure 3: Political Violence events and fatalities in Khartoum from 01 October- 01 December 2023. (Source: [ACLED](#) 01/12/2023)

Amid escalating violence, since October, the RSF intensified military operations in Khartoum, gaining control of strategic locations, causing widespread destruction, and displacing a significant portion of the population.

Since October, RSF intensified their military operations against SAF bases in the Khartoum tri-city metropolitan area, with 108 battles recorded in November by ACLED ([ACLED](#) 01/12/2023). After fighting against SAF, RSF extended their dominance to Sharg al-Nile in southeastern Khartoum. Currently, the RSF holds significant territory within the tri-city area encompassing Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman ([ACLED](#) 03/11/2023).

After the destruction of the Shambat Bridge, RSF took control over Jebel Awlia, leading to further displacements from the area ([Sudan War Monitor](#) 20/11/2023). They also took control of Eilafun, a major town on one of the routes to Madani located in the eastern part of Khartoum ([Reuters](#) 18/10/2023).

In early November, fierce clashes erupted between the SAF and RSF in Omdurman, involving military aviation, artillery shelling, and heavy ground combat. The conflict spread across densely populated neighborhoods,

causing significant damage and casualties. In Khartoum, Sudanese army drones targeted RSF positions with airstrikes, further escalating the conflict ([Sudan Tribune](#) 08/11/2023).

Since April 15, constant clashes have driven many people out of Khartoum. In fact, 64% of all internally displaced people in Sudan are from Khartoum ([IOM](#) 30/11/2023). Clashes in Khartoum have also trapped farmers on Tuti Island for over 6 months due to a security barricade placed by RSF at the bridge's entrance, the sole land outlet, preventing the movement of people, consumer goods, and lifesaving aid ([Ayin](#) 11/10/2023; [Sudan Tribune](#) 02/10/2023).

Greater Kordofan



Figure 4: Political Violence events and fatalities in Greater Kordofan from 01 October- 01 December 2023. (Source: [ACLED](#) 01/12/2023)

Clashes in South Kordofan between SAF and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North AI Hilu Faction (SPLMN-AH) -with the involvement of ethnic militias- challenge ceasefire talks. Ongoing fighting between SAF and RSF worsens humanitarian conditions in North and West Kordofan.

In South Kordofan, clashes erupted between the SAF and the SPLMN-AH faction in October, mainly concentrated in Kadugli and Dilling. Simultaneously, ethnic militias clashed in Dilling city, with the latter backed by the SPLMN-AH faction. The Dilling native administration intervened to release captives, forming a monitoring committee to address the tensions. These ethnic clashes, alongside existing conflicts between the SAF, RSF, and SPLM-N, add complexity to the situation in South Kordofan, posing challenges to ongoing ceasefire talks, which exclude the SPLMN-AH faction ([ACLED](#) 03/11/2023). At the end of November, inter-communal conflicts flared up between Nuba Golfan tribesmen and Arab Hawazma tribespeople in Dilling, resulting in the displacement of 75 households ([IOM](#) 30/11/2023).

In North Kordofan, throughout October, fighting between SAF and RSF continued, primarily around El Obeid Town- a strategically positioned town, situated on the national road linking Khartoum with the Kordofan and Darfur regions. Incidents of shelling targeted various neighborhoods, public buildings, including hospitals and markets. The town currently faces a significant shortage of water and electricity, with no anticipated restoration in the near future. Healthcare facilities are experiencing deficits in medical supplies. Simultaneously, elevated service costs in certain areas have made them unattainable for numerous displaced households ([IOM](#)

02/11/2023). Ongoing conflict in North Kordofan hinders humanitarian efforts, with displacement locations largely inaccessible. Telecommunication issues and costly fuel compound travel challenges. Escalating clashes between RSF and SAF are expected to worsen living conditions for internally displaced people, especially near conflict hotspots like Um Rawaba and Sheikan localities, with the risk of secondary displacement ([IOM](#) 02/11/2023).

In West Kordofan, at the end of October, RSF captured first the Baleela airport, and in early November the Baleela oilfield, one of the most important oil fields in Sudan ([IOM](#) 08/11/2023). The strategic significance of Balila airport for RSF lies in its potential for the delivery of arms and supplies. In addition, the RSF are attacking SAF garrisons in Muglad and Babanusa towns near the border of East Darfur, even as the two sides continue to battle around the Baleela and Heglig Oil fields ([ACLED](#) 17/11/2023, [Radio Dabanga](#) 24/11/2023).

Greater Darfur

Since the RSF gained control of the majority of Darfur, armed clashes have significantly subsided in RSF-controlled areas, as SAF forces withdrew from Darfur region to Kordofan region ([ACLED](#), 1 December 2023).

As state systems crumble, the RSF is transitioning to the de facto ruling authority in Darfur, with the RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, encouraging local communities to form autonomous governing entities. ([ACLED](#) 01/12/2023).




Figure 5: Political Violence events and fatalities in Greater Darfur from 01 October- 01 December 2023. (Source: [ACLED](#) 01/12/2023)

RSF takes control over four out of the five states in Darfur. Armed clashes exacerbate challenges, extending to inter-communal conflicts in South Darfur and escalating violence in Central and West Darfur. Relief efforts are disrupted, forcing thousands to flee, many of whom to safer East Darfur.

In South Darfur, armed clashes erupted between the SAF and RSF in Nyala, capital of South Darfur. Both sides were using drones and airstrikes. Prior to the takeover of Nyala, RSF banned citizens from entering or leaving the city, hindering the water trucks entries into the neighborhoods, while the RSF simultaneously continued their targeting of civilians through armed attacks ([USAID](#) 27/10/2023). On 26th October, RSF

overran the 16th infantry base and seized control of Nyala city ([ACLEED](#) 03/11/2023). Incessant bombing around the 16th infantry base caused damages to markets and neighborhoods of El Jir and El Nahda, worsening the economic situation ([Ayin](#) 31/10/2023). However, the capture of Nyala initially also brought an end to the fight in the city and allowed people to find a break from the incessant bombing preceding the takeover, but it is difficult to presume how long this will persist ([Sudan War Monitor](#) 01/11/2023).

The ongoing damage to communication and internet networks in South Darfur is complicating the residents' attempt to communicate with relief organizations, thereby creating additional obstacles for humanitarian relief efforts ([USAID](#) 27/10/2023).

On October 22nd, inter-communal clashes erupted between the Salamat and Habaniya tribes in As Sunta, where the violence resulted in widespread destruction, including residential, commercial, and agricultural areas. The conflict resumed on October 23 in Buram locality, specifically in Baba, Hineiga, and Soleicha villages, leading to the displacement of many residents to Buram town ([OCHA](#) 02/11/2023). In November, a month later, renewed inter-communal clashes erupted between Salamat and Habaniya tribes in the villages of Alsiwaina and Umm Kradees leading to further displacement of 1880 households to Buram town ([IOM](#) 29/11/2023).

In Central Darfur State, violence increased significantly in October compared to September. Armed clashes between RSF and SAF continued throughout October in Zalingei city. RSF claimed control over Zalingei as well as the 21st infantry division command on October 31. Prior to the takeover, clashes reportedly took place between RSF and SAF at the SAF military headquarters in Zalingei, resulting in the displacement of a significant number of people who had previously sought shelter in the Al Hasahisa IDP Camp. RSF also intensified shelling on the Hamidia and Hasahisa IDP camps ([ACLEED](#) 03/11/2023), blocking supplies to the latter for several weeks, leaving residents with severe shortages of food, water, and other necessities ([Sudan War Monitor](#) 01/11/2023; [Radio Dabanga](#) 24/10/2023). There, RSF entities detained relief actors for attempting to deliver essential aid to the camp ([USAID](#) 27/10/2023).

In West Darfur, at the beginning of November, RSF took over the main army base in El-Geneina. ([Reuters](#) 08/11/2023). Violent gunfire, the deployment of powerful weaponry, and the incineration of residences compelled a total of 6,756 individuals to flee across the border into Chad ([ECHO](#) 06/11/2023).

In East Darfur, in mid-October, RSF captured the Zarga Um Hadid and Shag Omar field oilfields, and a month later they claimed control over the base of the 20th Infantry Division in Ed Daein, capital of East Darfur ([Radio Dabanga](#) 22/11/2023). Since mid-October, RSF had claimed control over East Darfur, despite SAF presence in the area ([ACLEED](#) 03/11/2023). So far there has not been direct military clashes in East Darfur.

In North Darfur, renewed clashes between RSF and SAF in the capital El Fasher, resulted in civilian casualties ([IOM](#) 03/11/2023), destruction of homes and the displacement of at least 100 families ([OCHA](#) 02/11/2023). Heightened tensions prevail as the RSF is anticipated to take control of El Fasher, currently home to over 1.5 million people who may be affected by the violence ([Radio Dabanga](#) 22/11/2023). The multitude of armed actors including non-signatories of the JPA make it a unique and particularly dangerous situation should the fighting escalate.

Displacement

Internal displacement overview

Latest developments

Key Figures

- IOM reports 5,293,622 displaced individuals as of 22 November 2023, marking an increase of 437,328 individuals from 25 October 2023. The largest change in displacement figures is in the Darfur region with 89,210 and 80,985 in North and South Darfur respectively. West Kordofan has seen the largest relative growth in IDP figures at 15,701 new IDPs or a 27% increase between 25 October and 22 November 2023 ([IOM 30/11/2023](#), [IOM 02/11/2023](#)).
- As of 27 November 2023, the number of newly arrived refugees and asylum seekers in neighboring countries totals 943,378, 344,359 newly arrived refugee returnees. This represents an increase of 193,024 since October 2023, primarily to South Sudan (94,464 new arrivals) and Egypt (61,274 new arrivals).




Figure 6: Weekly displacement snapshots ([DTM 21/11/2023](#))

In West Kordofan, escalating conflict between the SAF and RSF around SAF garrisons and oil and gas infrastructure is driving growing displacement in a once relatively stable state.

Clashes between the SAF and the RSF are expanding beyond locations with oil and gas infrastructure that were the flashpoint of fighting in October ([New Arab 31/10/2023](#)). Growing displacement in November culminated in a 27% monthly increase ([IOM 30/11/2023](#), [IOM 07/11/2023](#), [IOM 14/11/2023](#), [IOM 22/11/2023](#)). IOMs Monthly Displacement Overview 03 reports that as of 22 November 2023 all IDPs in West Kordofan had been displaced there from outside the state, representing 1.4% of the national IDP caseload. The escalating conflict means that we are likely to see growing displacements within the state as well as to neighboring states, including the repeated displacements of IDPs who had sought safety within the state. 97% of IDPs in West Kordofan are living within the host community ([IOM 05/12/2023](#)).

High levels of violence against civilians are likely to drive growing displacements from West Darfur towards Central Darfur.

In early November, SAFs 15th division in Ardamata town, West Darfur fell to the RSF after two days of fighting. Since then, there have been concerning reports of targeted violence against civilians, particularly against Masalit populations in the town and nearby Ardamata and Dorti IDP camps ([UN](#) 17/11/2023). IOM preliminary reports indicate a large displacement movement towards surrounding villages, despite restrictions on the movement of populations, with displacement numbers yet to be confirmed ([IOM](#) 06/11/2023, [Radio Dabanga](#) 24/11/2023). A continuation of internal displacement within West Darfur as well as towards Central Darfur is expected. As of late November, West Darfur and Central Darfur account for 60% and 30% of IDPs displaced from West Darfur respectively. ([OCHA](#) 03/11/2023, [IOM](#) 05/12/2023, [MSF](#) 08/11/2023, [Sudan Tribune](#) 19/11/2023). The majority of IDPs are now sheltered within host communities (48.5%) or schools or public buildings (41.7%) with none reported to be in the camps that have been the target of repeated attacks in the state ([IOM](#) 05/12/2023).

Despite stabilization of the SAF/RSF conflict in Central Darfur, growing tensions around Jebel Marrah and high levels of criminality continue to drive displacement within the state. IDPs fleeing targeted violence in West Darfur led to a growing number of IDPs in the state.

The capture by the RSF of the SAF garrison in the state capital of Zalingei and attacks on Hasahisa camp have displaced populations there out of town, into the city or further out into the Hamadiya camp ([Radio Dabanga](#) 23/11/2023, [HRW](#) 13/11/2023). Simultaneously, IOM reports displacement from the Jebel Marrah localities towards Zalingei and other towns fearing confrontation between the Sudan Liberation Movement - Abdulwahid Nur faction (SLM-AN) and the RSF ([IOM](#) 13/11/2023). Additionally reports indicate a large displacement movement to Central Darfur from Western Darfur following violence in and around Ardamata town ([IOM](#) 06/11/2023). Since the capture of Zalingei, there has been a total increase of 54,730 new IDPs between 25 October and 22 November ([IOM](#) 07/11/2023, [IOM](#) 14/11/2023, [IOM](#) 22/11/2023, [IOM](#) 30/11/2023). As of October 30, 92% of IDPs from Central Darfur have remained within the state and 66% intend to remain where they are. The end of heavy fighting between SAF and RSF will likely lead to a stabilization of displacement from within the state, while insecurity in North and West Darfur will drive growing IDP figures ([IOM](#) 30/11/2023). Fluctuations in this trend will occur as IDP communities congregate primarily in open areas, within the host community and in camps, as populations search of safety in the midst of the security vacuum, while others risk returning to homes and camps despite the high levels of criminality plaguing the region ([Radio Dabanga](#) 21/11/2023).

Despite the end of hostilities within the state capital of Nyala, South Darfur is experiencing steadily growing displacements as a result of intercommunal conflicts.

Residents in Nyala, South Darfur have reported a tense calm in the city following the RSF gaining control of the city ([Radio Dabanga](#) 06/11/2023). There has been a noticeable increase in displacement from November, as noted by IOM's Weekly Displacement Snapshots. Snapshot 10 (14 November) and Snapshot 11 (22 November), show increases of 3,674 and 35,065 increase in displaced individuals, respectively. Despite the improved security in the state capital, and the peace deal between the Salamat and Beni Halba tribes, the spike in displacement might be caused by fresh intercommunal clashes between the Salamat and Habbaniya ([Sudan War Monitor](#) 15/11/2023, [IOM](#) 29/11/2023, [IOM](#) 07/11/2023, [IOM](#) 14/11/2023, [IOM](#) 22/11/2023). Given that 74% of IDPs from South Darfur have remained within the state, it is likely that many will risk returning to homes and camps in and around Nyala, to be joined by those fleeing from the volatile intercommunal conflict affecting localities such as Buram, leading to mixed movements. A steadily growing population of IDPs is moving away from informal camps, to schools and public buildings (30% of IDPs) as well as formal camps (18% of IDPs) ([IOM](#) 07/11/2023, [IOM](#) 14/11/2023, [IOM](#) 30/11/2023, [IOM](#) 05/12/2023).




Figure 7: Weekly displacement snapshots (DTM 21/11/2023)

In North Darfur, fears that recurrent clashes will erupt into intense fighting in and around El Fasher, is causing a significant spike in displacement that is expected to grow once clashes escalate.

Expectations of a battle over El Fasher in North Darfur, is driving displacement as populations flee the potential violence (Radio Dabanga 13/11/2023, MEE 22/11/2023). IOMs Weekly Displacement Snapshots show an accelerating trend of displacements leading to an 89,210 increase in IDPs between 22 November 2023 and 25 October 2023, the largest increase in IDP figures of any state. As of 25 October 2023, 86% of IDPs in North Darfur are from within the state, the majority of whom are in Al Fasher (57% of IDPs living in formal camps), Tawila (74% of IDPs living in open areas) and Kutum localities (81% of IDPs living with host communities) (IOM 14/11/2023, IOM 22/11/2023, IOM 30/11/2023, IOM 02/11/2023, IOM 05/12/2023).




Figure 8: Weekly displacement snapshots (DTM 21/11/2023)

Intensification of violence is driving greater displacement out of Khartoum state to neighboring states

In Khartoum, the destruction of strategic crossings across the White Nile has led to an intensification of violence around alternative crossings, such as at the Jebel Awlia Dam, driving displacement ([The Guardian](#) 18/11/2023). Given mounting insecurity across Khartoum state, internally displaced are moving into neighboring states, in particular River Nile and Aj Jazirah ([IOM](#) 14/11/2023, [IOM](#) 22/11/2023, [IOM](#) 02/11/2023, [IOM](#) 30/11/2023, [ACLED](#) 17/11/2023, [IOM](#) 07/11/2023). In Aj Jazirah and River Nile states the majority of IDPs are living with the host community. With no formal camps, the remaining IDPs are primarily staying in schools and other public locations (28% of IDPs in Aj Jazirah) or in rented accommodations (17% of IDPs in River Nile) ([IOM](#) 05/12/2023).

Refugees

Latest developments

Violence against civilians by the RSF and allied militias in West Darfur is driving a surge of displacements into Chad. This may be mitigated by movement restrictions that in turn raise even more protection concerns.

A new wave of violence in West Darfur in November led to additional wave of displacement to Chad following the peak of displacement in July ([VOA](#) 24/09/2023, [UNHCR](#) 22/11/2023, [ACLED](#) 17/11/2023). MSF estimated 7,000 crossed the border with Chad during the first week of November, despite restrictions on population movement towards Chad put in place by the RSF ([UN](#) 17/11/2023, [ACLED](#) 17/11/2023, [MSF](#) 08/11/2023, [Sudan Tribune](#) 19/11/2023). Displacements into Chad is anticipated through to the end of the year. The restrictions on movements are raising significant protection concerns and potentially increase the demand for people smugglers.

Intercommunal conflict and rampant criminality in South Darfur continue driving displacement into The Central African Republic (CAR) despite a tense calm in Nyala city (Source: [UNHCR](#) 22/11/2023)




Figure 9: New refugees' arrival from Sudan to CAR and Chad (Source: [UNHCR](#) 22/11/2023)

Given the intensity of conflict in South Darfur, displacement into the Central African Republic has gone up primarily originating from Nyala or Um Dafuq where RSF soldiers patrolling the border were reported to regularly pillage essential goods ([UNHCR](#) 29/09/2023, [UNHCR](#) 22/11/2023, [Sudan War Monitor](#) 26/10/2023,

[Sudan War Monitor](#) 15/11/2023). Although the situation in Nyala stabilizes, displacement into CAR is expected to decrease, even as intercommunal conflict and the security vacuum continues to drive refugee movements.

Flows of refugees and asylum seekers are likely to stabilize as they adapt to changes in Egyptian entry procedures and backlogs are processed (Source: [UNHCR 06/09/2023](#), [UNHCR 22/11/2023](#))




Figure 10: New refugees' arrival from Sudan to Egypt (source: [UNHCR 22/11/2023](#)).

Changes to visa requirements and entry procedures in July led to a dramatic reduction in the number of new refugee arrivals to Egypt. More Sudanese formally registered as refugees or asylum seekers due to changes in residency requirements, including costly fees and sponsorship ([Reuters 22/07/2023](#), [UNHCR 06/09/2023](#), [UNHCR 22/11/2023](#)). As the dust settles on these bureaucratic changes, monthly refugee flows are likely to stabilize as application backlogs are pushed through the bureaucratic bottlenecks.

Humanitarian Conditions

Protection

Key Figures

- Nearly 12,200 fatalities have been recorded as of late November, an increase of 35 percent compared to the previous ACLED report. October registered 1,270 fatalities, while November reached 1,690 ([ACLED 01/12/2023](#); [USAID 21/11/2023](#); [ACLED 03/11/2023](#)).
- The Protection Cluster estimates 4.5 million people are facing protection risks in so-called 'hotspot' areas, affected by conflict and violence ([Protection Cluster 12/11/2023](#)).

Latest developments

October's RSF offensives in South and Central Darfur triggered mass displacements and violence, with over 30,000 people uprooted and rising civilian casualties.

With the RSF takeover of Nyala and Zalingei in late October and over 30,000 people displaced ([OCHA 02/11/2023](#); [OCHA 12/11/2023](#)), after suffering from direct attacks, the entire population of Hasahisa IDP camp (estimates range from 13,000 or more IDPs), relocated to Hamadiya camp ([HRW 14/11/2023](#); [UNHCR 15/11/2023](#); [OCHA 12/11/2023](#)). In November, RSF and SAF continued to clash in and around El Fasher, capital of North Darfur, killing civilians with shelling and airstrikes and leaving the population at great protection risk. JPA-signatories -whose large number of troops are stationed in the city- renounced their neutrality: should fighting escalate in El Fasher, a likely eruption of violence could lead to the displacement of additional hundreds

of thousands of civilians across the border into Chad and to East Darfur and the Kordofan region ([IOM](#) 27/10/2023; [HRW](#) 14/11/2023). In West Darfur, RSF repeated ethnic cleansing attacks on the Masalit population, including the killing of 700-800 IDPs in Adramata camp, led to 7,000 - 8,000 people fleeing into Chad in the first week of November, more than the entire month of October ([IOM](#) 09/11/2023; [BBC](#) 08/11/2023; [UN](#) 16/11/2023; [BBC](#) 08/11/2023; [CNN](#) 08/11/2023; [Al Jazeera](#) 08/11/2023; [ECHO](#) 06/11/2023).

Ethnic violence between Beni Halba and Salamat tribes continued and spread from South Darfur to Central Darfur, killing and displacing hundreds of people in October and November. Further ethnic violence incidents were reported in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, leading to killing and displacement of civilians ([IOM](#) 20/11/2023; [OCHA](#) 02/11/2023; [IOM](#) 15/11/2023; [ACLED](#) 03/11/2023).

Protection Hotspots in Sudan




Figure 11: Map of Hotspot Areas, (Source: [Protection Cluster](#) 29/10/2023)

Overall Situation

As the conflict endures and security vacuums emerge, civilians persistently face protection risks, ethnic violence is spreading, while GBV peaks within IDP camps.

Displaced women and girls are disproportionately facing sexual violence and forced marriages, with incidents peaking in the turmoil of displacement and within IDP camps. These areas, especially in Darfur, emerge as critical hotspots for such abuses. The situation is further exacerbated by a notable lack of adequate response mechanisms. This gap in services is not just a shortfall in resources but also reflects the complexities of addressing GBV in unstable and resource-strained environments, leaving many survivors without essential support and facing life-threatening protection risks ([UNFPA](#) 29/11/2023).

Greater Darfur presents high protection concerns as the RSF expands its control in the region and civilians are left with little protection. Masalit tribes in West Darfur face an upsurge in ethnic cleansing, while attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure across Greater Darfur continue.

As a result of the fight over control of Nyala, South Darfur state had the second highest number of fatalities in October ([OCHA](#) 02/11/2023; [ACLED](#) 03/11/2023). On 31 October, RSF also took control of Zalingei, in Central Darfur. The RSF is expected to further pursue the takeover of control in all Darfuri states, so as to firmly establish their authorities, base and supply routes. This puts the estimated 445,565 IDPs who have fled the violence in North Darfur at great risk. People are reportedly preemptively relocating, due to fear of a large-scale attack on the capital of El Fasher, as fighting in and around the capital that started in September, intensified between late October and early November with RSF shelling and SAF airstrikes killing civilians ([IOM](#) 30/11/2023; [HRW](#) 14/11/2023; [MSF](#) 07/11/2023; [UNHCR](#) 08/11/2023). Escalating fighting in El Fasher could put over 200,000 civilians at risk ([Sudan War Monitor](#) 16/11/2023). Conflict in the main Darfuri cities leaves thousands displaced (the four Darfuri states mentioned are the top places of origin for IDPs in addition to Khartoum), with many people killed or wounded. Those who survive often see their property destroyed ([UNITAMS](#) 02/11/2023).

Civilians who flee the cities and states under RSF control (West-, South-, East-, and Central Darfur), report mass atrocities committed at the hands of RSF soldiers in October and November ([UN](#) 16/11/2023). For example, in the first week of November alone, an estimated 8,000 people fled West Darfur into Chad, more new arrivals than those recorded in the entire month of October ([UN](#) 16/11/2023; [MSF](#) 07/11/2023). Since the capture of Al Geneina in June, there have been ample reports of mass killing of predominantly non-Arab (in West Darfur, Masalit) civilians, and mass rape of women and girls. After a relatively quiet period noted in the previous situation update, on 4 November, the RSF captured an SAF base in Adramata, Ag Geneina locality. This base was located alongside an IDP camp, where displaced populations were hoping the army could provide protection. RSF members reportedly killed an estimated 700-800 IDPs from the site following the takeover ([IOM](#) 09/11/2023; [BBC](#) 08/11/2023).

Refugees' accounts of large-scale violence against civilians in Ag Geinena include systematic rounding up of non-Arab civilians, and the explicit targeting of Masalit in both killings and sexual violence. Witnesses denote that the Masalit are referred to as 'dogs' and 'slaves' and told that they do not belong in West Darfur. Men are separated from families, people endure whipping, beating, emotional and physical abuse, mass rape and sexual slavery, burning and looting of homes, and civilians were being killed on the spot or as they attempted to flee ([USAID](#) 21/11/2023; [UN](#) 16/11/2023; [BBC](#) 08/11/2023; [CNN](#) 08/11/2023; [Al Jazeera](#) 08/11/2023; [ECHO](#) 06/11/2023).

Meanwhile, activists who fled South Darfur denote that the RSF is accusing civilians of being part of Islamist movements. Individuals accused of specific offenses face asset confiscation, harassment, and in some cases, even death. Additional reports further corroborate ongoing violations of international humanitarian law, including attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as the persistent disregard for the civilian nature of IDP sites.

Food Security and Livelihoods

Key Figures

- Between October 2023 and February 2024, it is projected that 17.7 million people will be facing acute food security (IPC phase 3 and above). Of these, 4.9 million are projected to be in Phase 4 (Emergency), primarily in areas heavily affected by intense conflict, such as Khartoum, Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. This represents an 18% increase from the previous analysis.
- In 2023, food prices are reported to be 29% higher than 2022 (228% higher than the previous 2 years) and 30% of the population reported being unable to afford local food basket ([OCHA](#) 19/11/2023).

- Among IDPs, food security is the most pressing need, with 82% of those surveyed citing it as their primary concern. This is particularly acute in Gedaref (99%), West Darfur (99%) and Blue Nile (94%), where almost all households prioritized food in October 2023 ([IOM](#) 02/11/2023).

Latest developments

Seven months into the conflict Sudan faces concerning levels of food insecurity with 4.9 million people in projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

The devastating impacts of the conflict on livelihoods, the agriculture sector and the economy place Sudan among the top four hotspots¹ of highest concern due to the deterioration of its food security situation ([FAO-WFP](#) 31/10/2023). Persistent intense urban conflict is limiting business operations, interrupting salary payments, diminishing consumer activity, and disrupting food and non-food supply chains, amid soaring prices for food and other essential commodities ([IPC](#) 12/12/2023). Access to food is also hampered by increased prices of both food and non-food items, a decrease in purchasing power, and rising transportation costs due to higher fuel prices. The destruction of the industrial sector in Khartoum, where over 80 percent of factories are located, has led to a severe shortage in the supply of goods to other regions of Sudan. Importing is no longer an option, as the high costs of food items from neighboring countries Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda through South Sudan, become unaffordable for the majority of the population in Sudan. This issue is compounded by the limitation of purchasing power due to a lack of income and income sources ([IPC](#) 12/12/2023).

Between October 2023 and February 2024, due to SAF-RSF conflict and other organized violence, around 17.7 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) levels of acute food insecurity, including more than 4.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) ([IPC](#) 12/12/2023). In Khartoum state, 3,9 million people (55 percent of the population) face high level of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), while in Greater Darfur about 5,3 million people (that represent 46 percent of the total population in Darfur region) are likely to be in Phase 3 or above. In Greater Kordofan, about 2,7 million (44 percent of the total population in Kordofan states) are in Phase 3 or above. These are the highest ever recorded figures during the harvesting season in Sudan.

Going forward, due to limited availability and distribution of seeds, inputs and agricultural finance as well as restricted access to land for cultivation, livestock movement and seasonal activities, the production of staple crops is endangered ([IPC](#) 12/12/2023).

Confirming a trend already observed in the previous situation analysis report, the Figure 12 shows the concentration of highest levels of severity and prevalence of food insecurity in areas where the conflict is more intense. West Darfur (22%), Central Darfur (17%) Khartoum (17%), and West (16%) and South Kordofan (15%) are the states projecting the largest proportion of population experiencing IPC 4 by February 2024 ([FAO-WFP](#) 31/10/2023, [IPC](#) 12/12/2023).

¹ Islamic Relief's study interviewed 384 households in 20 villages in Jabal Marra, a mountainous region which has seen a large influx of people fleeing fighting in other parts of Darfur. Around 1.6 million people in Darfur have been displaced within the region since the conflict began ([Islamic Relief](#) 13/10/2023).

households' food stocks. About 55 percent of the total population are in Phase 3 or above, including 17 percent Phase 4 and 38 percent in Phase 3. ([IPC](#) 12/12/2023).

Particularly Omdurman, where the food security deterioration is due to the persistent bombardment in this densely populated area with heavy dependence on casual wage labor, is assessed to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In other surrounding localities, the population have moved to peripheral areas with slightly improved access to food and income sources, although still poor given major disruptions to typical income sources and very high food prices ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023).

Most areas in the Northern and River Nile states are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as wheat stocks have depleted faster than normal in advance of this year's winter wheat cultivation season under the added strain of high levels of displacement ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023). Winter wheat planting was expected to start in November with harvests to begin in March and is anticipated to be negatively impacted by the forecasted above-average temperatures and high costs of inputs, as well as labor shortages ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023, [OCHA](#) 02/11/2023). In parts of Blue Nile and White Nile states, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist due to insecurity and high levels of displacement that have reduced crop production and disrupted trade flows ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023).

On the contrary, during the pre-harvest season in October, a slight improvement of the food security outcomes (now in IPC Phase 2) was registered in parts of El Gadarif, Sonar, Al Jazirah, and Kassala State, relative to the peak of the lean season. This is the consequence of improved access to green harvest, to in kind payments from agricultural labor and to animal products (milk and meat) from agricultural and agro-pastoral households ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023).

Overall Situation

Since the eruption of the conflict, the number of food insecure people has increased from 16.2 to 17.7million people amidst ongoing economic deterioration, while access to food becomes increasingly difficult, and the population resorts to harmful coping strategies.

Prior to the conflict, 16.2 million people, or 34% of the population, were already experiencing food insecurity. This represented a worsening trend as compared to the previous four years, when IPC identified over 15% of the population in Phase 3 or above. The pre-conflict deterioration in food security is explained by the compounding shocks of increasing food and non-food inflation, intercommunal localized violence, dry spells, flooding, and disease outbreaks, amidst one of the lowest agricultural productivities worldwide ([FSL](#) 17/08/2023).

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) see their access to food especially constrained ([REACH](#) 20/11/2023). The situation is similarly severe for host communities in this region: in West Darfur, both host populations and IDPs resort to harmful coping mechanisms amidst a shared food crisis. Both communities suffer from a lack of money, the most reported challenge for IDPs (74%), which also afflicts the host population, of whom 86% struggle to meet basic needs. Moreover, the destruction and inaccessibility of crops and livestock due to insecurity, as well as scarcity of food stocks and market shortages complicates sustenance for these populations ([Islamic Relief](#) 13/10/2023, [REACH](#) 20/11/2023).

The already fragile agricultural sector is on the edge of collapse due to the direct and indirect impacts of the conflict, reducing households' ability to meet their basic food and to afford basic non-food needs.

As reported in the previous Situational Analysis Report, Sudan's agriculture sector ([iMMAP Inc. and DFS](#) 31/10/2023), contributing nearly half of the country's GDP, demonstrates a compounding trend of challenges intensified by the ongoing conflict. Prior to the conflict, the sector was already struggling with overdependence on rainfed production systems, inadequate rural infrastructure, weak market linkages, and limited access to credit ([FAO](#) 11/09/2023, [Ayin](#) 17/09/2023). Ongoing hostilities worsened these issues, disrupting income and food sources, with insecure trade routes causing high prices. The government's inability to pay salaries and

reduced revenue from disrupted exports further led to a decline in consumer activity and economic setbacks nationwide ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023).

The conflict, as well as erratic rainfall, have created highly unfavorable prospects for the forthcoming summer crop harvest and the winter wheat harvest in March 2024.

While no national-level assessment is yet available on the agricultural season's progresses, key informant reports and analysis of available satellite imagery confirm the risk of below average harvests, with localized areas proximate to areas of heavy fighting experiencing significantly below-average harvests ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023). Available data confirms that reduced access to financing from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan due to service interruption, the high costs and limited access to labor and fuel, inadequate access to irrigation, as well as lack of access to fields in areas closer to heavy fighting are hampered by unfavorable weather conditions, ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023) with El Niño conditions forecast to continue until at least early 2024, are driving dramatic level of food insecurity ([Sudan Tribune](#) 02/11/2023).

In flood-prone areas, increased rainfall and fighting could negatively impact the upcoming harvest ([Mercy Corps](#) 30/10/2023). Rural areas close to heavily affected urban centers across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, as well as parts of the semi-mechanized and irrigated sectors, have reported variably below-normal cultivation and crop production through the duration of the season, and often the inability to harvest due to the conflict ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023; [FAO-WFP](#) 31/10/2023). In the Jabal Marra, the breadbasket region of Darfur, the percentage of people involved in agricultural livelihoods has dropped from 84% before the crisis to 52%, while the proportion of people relying on charity has risen from 45% to 77% ([Islamic Relief](#) 13/10/2023). Consequently, farmers expect a reduction in their November-December harvest ([Islamic Relief](#) 13/10/2023). Additionally, the timing of the violence and displacement in El Geneina locality of West Darfur during peak land preparation and cultivation periods is expected to significantly disrupt planting and thus likely to result in little to no harvests ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023).

Additionally, in the main cereal-producing areas of the east and southeast, disruptions to the banking system barred farmers from accessing financial resources and forcing them to shift from semi-mechanized to traditional rainfed systems ([FAO-WFP](#) 31/10/2023; [FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023). As a result, the cultivated area under cereals (sorghum and millet) is expected to be below average. Across most of the traditional rain-fed sector spanning from White Nile across Greater Kordofan and through Greater Darfur, available field information suggests that the season has also been significantly impacted by the fighting during cultivation, crop production, and harvesting ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023).

The price trends for key staple foods continue to vary across the main markets in Sudan as the conflict disrupts trade and market functionality, as well as declining household purchasing power.

As shown in the table below, sorghum, goat, and groundnut prices experienced a slight decrease compared to September 2023, while the cost of the WFP local food basket saw a modest increase raising to SDG 665.25 in October, compared to SDG 661.9 in September ([WFP](#) 20/11/2023). The exchange rate exhibited a rapid increase for the third consecutive month while commercial banks' average rate rose to around 740 SDG/1US\$, attributed to heightened demand for foreign currency from travelers and traders importing inputs and goods ([WFP](#) 20/11/2023). As mentioned in the previous situation analysis report, inflation rates have not been reported since February 2023, but given the steep rise in prices for goods and services, it is anticipated to remain above 300 per cent by the year's end.

Compared to the previous year, the price of wheat flour registered a 50% increase. This can be explained with the projected deficit of 3.5 million tons of wheat for 2023, up from 2.7 million tons imported in 2022 due to a reduction in domestic wheat production last agricultural season. According to available data, monthly wheat imports through Port Sudan have declined considerably since the start of the conflict in April ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023). Informal imports are expected to be arriving across the borders with Egypt and Ethiopia, but quantities are typically low, and no data is available on the current volumes. Despite the effect of the conflict on production and importations, no major wheat and wheat flour shortages have been reported in the country, most likely due to increase in supply from domestic carry-over stocks and a decline in demand, particularly

given the impact of the conflict on Khartoum, a major consumer of wheat products ([FEWS.NET](#) 10/2023). However, the increase in wheat flour prices poses an elevated risk of food insecurity for many Sudanese people, especially for those heavily dependent on wheat as a primary cereal source ([WFP](#) 20/11/2023).

	Units	Current	Previous Month		Before Current Conflict (Q1, 2023)		1 Year Before	
		SDG	SDG	% Change	SDG	% Change	SDG	% Change
Sorghum	KG	436.6	443.27	↓ 1.50%	349.2	↑ 25.0%	452.7	↓ -3.6%
Wheat flour	KG	1,146.0	1,204.00	↓ 4.82%	739.2	↑ 55.0%	763	↑ 50.2%
Goat	Head	36,197	36,352	↓ 0.43%	26,368	↑ 37.3%	21,961	↑ 64.8%
Groundnut	Sack (45 KG)	26,925	27,198	↓ 1.00%	16,630	↑ 61.9%	14,630	↑ 84.0%
Local Food Basket	Unit	665.25	661.93	↑ 0.50%	439.50	↑ 51.4%	568	↑ 17.1%

Figure 13: Prices of Basic Food Items and WFP Local Food Basket Cost (Source: [WFP](#) 20/11/2023)

With the rise of food prices and deterioration of income opportunities, Sudanese continue to face a decline in their purchasing power, thereby negatively affecting their access to food at a time when reliance on market purchases is typically high ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023; [RT](#) 10/11/2023; [WFP](#) 24/11/2023). In many conflict-affected areas, markets are disrupted, while in others, such as El Fasher and Kadugli, are barely functioning and supplies are reported running out ([Radiotamazuj](#) 25/11/2023). Two of the main terminal markets, El Obeid in North Kordofan and Mowelih in Omdurman, are also not operating due to conflict ([FEWS NET](#) 19/09/2023). Particularly in Khartoum, prices are reported to be stable and a committee has been established to monitor the markets and control prices, leading to price stabilizing and abundance of various products ([Dabanga Sudan](#) 21/11/2023).

Nutrition

Key Figures

- 4.6 million people need nutrition services, including 3.4 million severely malnourished children under five. OCHA's Humanitarian Response Plan, targeting 2.5 million out of 4.6 million in need, is only 19% funded by the end of September, showing a striking trend as the funding receded compared to 21% by 31 August, while the percentage of reached population increased from 7.5% to 9.4% of its target, still far from its objective ([OCHA](#) 17/05/2023, [OCHA](#) 08/10/2023, [OCHA](#) 05/11/2023).
- 700,000 children under 5 years old suffer severe acute malnutrition (SAM), with 100,000 requiring urgent treatment for acute malnutrition with medical complications ([UNICEF, WHO](#) 18/10/2023).

Latest developments

In October 2023, Sudan's escalating malnutrition crisis already affects 700,000 severely malnourished children, with treatment centers overwhelmed and many non-operational, potentially leaving half a million children without treatment.

As of October 2023, Sudan's severe malnutrition crisis continues to escalate, with around 700,000 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and 3.4 million children under 5 years old acutely malnourished, including 100,000 needing urgent treatment for malnutrition with medical complications. Notably, states such as Al Jazirah, Blue Nile, East Darfur, Gedaref, Kassala, Northern, River Nile, Sennar, and White Nile, home to many displaced people, have seen a dramatic increase in SAM admissions, some areas reporting rises as high as 290% compared to the previous year. Despite these admissions, resource availability remains a critical issue, with only 76% of the 1,962 outpatient therapeutic feeding programs (OTP) in operation from mid-April to mid-August. Similarly, in September 2023, only 500 out of 1,482 Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme (TSFP) sites were reported as operational. Compounding this issue, UNICEF reports that about 500,000 children with SAM are at risk of missing essential treatment, placing them at an 11 times higher risk of mortality than for their normally nourished counterparts ([UNICEF, WHO](#) 18/10/2023; [OCHA](#) 26/10/2023; [USAID](#) 27/10/2023; [UNICEF](#) 20/10/2023).

Nearly half of Sudan's IDP camps or settlements report inadequate nutritional services, while preventable and contagious diseases disproportionately affect malnourished children.

Additionally, nutritional service provision in IDP camps and camp-like sites is severely lacking, with 45% of IDP camps and 48% of camp-like sites reporting inadequate nutritional services. Latest REACH data reveals even more critical access issues to nutrition services in West Darfur settlements, with only 3% offering feeding programs. Furthermore, access to nutrition centers in approximately 80% of these settlements has either deteriorated or remained stagnant. The nutrition crisis is further aggravated by disease outbreaks, including a measles outbreak in the White Nile State that resulted in the deaths of over 1,200 malnourished children under five. The spread of diseases such as cholera, dengue, and malaria pose additional severe risks, especially to children weakened by malnutrition. These factors highlight the urgent need for increased support and improved nutrition services to address the health and nutrition crisis in Sudan effectively ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023; [UNICEF, WHO](#) 18/10/2023; [OCHA](#) 08/10/2023, [REACH](#) 20/11/2023).

Overall Situation

Since October, Sudan's subnational nutrition situation remains unchanged yet critical, with Khartoum experiencing surges in malnutrition, Darfur's SAM rates doubling due to displacement, and South Kordofan facing severe supply shortages.

There are no significant nutritional updates at a subnational level since the last Situation Report published in late October ([iMAP](#) Inc. and DFS 31/10/2023). The main takeaways from that previous report are the following: In Khartoum, there was a significant increase in severe malnutrition cases, leading to numerous hospital admissions and the deaths of over 50 children, including infants, from starvation and related illnesses in an orphanage ([Save the Children](#) 22/08/2023). In Greater Darfur, acute malnutrition was anticipated to be high, especially during the rainy season, due to limited access to safe drinking water, increased flooding risks, and scarce health and nutrition services. In children screened across Central and West Darfur, UNICEF reported a SAM rate of 3% ([UNICEF](#) 03/08/2023). However, this rate notably doubled among newly displaced children in North and Central Darfur's Shamal Jabal Marrah locality, reaching 6%, highlighting the significant exacerbation of SAM rates due to new displacement in these areas ([OCHA](#) 14/09/2023, [UNICEF](#) 29/08/2023). In South Kordofan, a dire shortage of food and nutrition supplies was reported, with no distributions since May ([Sudan Tribune](#) 22/08/2023, [OCHA](#) 23/08/2023).

The nutrition crisis aggravates an already dire pre-conflict situation, with children severely malnourished due to conflict dynamics, service inadequacies, and insufficient response and supply efforts.

Sudan's nutrition crisis, worsened by ongoing conflict, continues to be alarmingly critical as of October 2023. The situation was already severe before the latest violence outbreak in April 2023, with around four million children under five and pregnant and lactating women acutely malnourished, and 611,000 of those children facing severe acute malnutrition (SAM) ([OCHA](#) 26/02/2023; [UNICEF](#) accessed 01/10/2023). The global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence was 13.6%, with 64 localities exceeding the critical 15% threshold ([IPC](#) 15/04/2019). Since April, the conflict has led to a further deterioration, especially in areas like Khartoum, White Nile, and Darfur, where acute malnutrition cases have increased by 30% ([Health Cluster](#) 22/08/2023).

In West Darfur, the influx of IDPs strains resources with less than half of the camps or settlements offering nutrition services, exacerbating food insecurity and the risk of disease outbreaks, like the deadly measles outbreak in White Nile refugee camps ([IPC](#) 02/08/2023; [WHO](#) 19/09/2023, [UNICEF, WHO](#) 18/10/2023).

Despite these challenges, the overall situation remains largely unchanged compared to the month of September, underlining the persistent and urgent need for enhanced support and nutrition services in Sudan.²

Health

Key Figures

- 65% of the population lack access to health services, while hospitals in conflict-affected states are not operational, with 70%-80% out of service ([OCHA 01/11/2023](#)).
- The few functioning hospitals and clinics in non-conflict-affected states are overwhelmed due to increased demand for their services and are also grappling with severe shortages of vital medical supplies and healthcare professionals ([Protection Cluster 31/10/2023](#); [OCHA 30/10/2023](#))
- The health and wellbeing of Sudan's 24 million children is at risk ([UNICEF 20/10/2023](#)).
- More than 4,300 suspected measles cases, including 108 deaths; more than 813,000 clinical malaria cases, including 27 deaths; more than 4,000 suspected dengue cases, including 49 deaths ([OCHA 01/11/2023](#)); at least 5,178 suspected cases of acute watery diarrhoea/cholera, including 161 associated deaths, have been reported from 46 localities in Gedaref, South Kordofan, Kassala, Khartoum, Aj Jazirah and Sennar states ([OCHA 23/11/2023](#); [WHO](#) last access 28/11/2023; [OCHA 4/12/2023](#)) and Viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) cases are increasing across the country with 5,077 cases and 25 associated deaths reported across three states of Khartoum, Gedaref and Aj Jazirah ([OCHA 23/11/2023](#); [WHO](#) last access 28/11/2023).
- An estimated 109,000 women are currently pregnant and in need of timely access to lifesaving and essential reproductive health services. Nearly 15,000 women are likely to experience pregnancy and birth related complications including the need for Caesarean section. Moreover, by the end of 2023, around 36,000 displaced women are expected to give birth ([UNFPA 29/10/2023](#)).

Latest developments

Amid the ongoing fighting in Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan, and the strained health system, the rainy season has spread water- and vector-borne diseases ([UNICEF 18/10/2023](#); [UNFPA 29/10/2023](#); [UNICEF 18/10/2023](#)).

Recent disease outbreaks increase health concerns across Sudan as conflict persists into its seventh month ([USAID 13/10/2023](#)). Between October and November, almost 3,000 suspected cases of cholera and cholera-related deaths are reported in Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Khartoum, and South Kordofan states ([USAID 27/10/2023](#); [OCHA 01/11/2023](#); [OCHA 14/11/2023](#)). According to a risk analysis conducted in 2022, and updated in 2023, 3.2 million people are at risk of getting acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) or cholera between July and December 2023. The national vaccine sub-committee has estimated and submitted a request for around 7 million people to be vaccinated by Oral Cholera Vaccine in eight high risk states, specifically Blue Nile, Gedaref, Gezira, Khartoum, River Nile, Sennar, South Kordofan and White Nile ([OCHA 14/11/2023](#), [UNICEF 20/10/2023](#)). Following the cholera outbreak in Gedaref State in late September, WHO, the State Ministry of Health (SMoH), and health partners are on high alert in Blue Nile State, where systems are already in place, including a preparedness plan, after the acute watery diarrhea (AWD) outbreak experienced in 2019 ([OCHA 13/10/2023](#)).

Additionally, State health authorities have already reported 4,300 suspected cases of measles and 108 deaths, 4,000 suspected dengue cases and 49 deaths, and over 710,000 clinical malaria cases with 27 deaths. These cases add to the measles cases identified in refugee camps in White Nile, as reported in the previous report of this series. According to the latest data, there were 1,700 child deaths due to this disease by the end of September. Limited access to affected localities and difficulties with transporting samples to the only functional public health laboratory in Port Sudan, upgraded to provide a national referencing service through WHO support, make it difficult to confirm outbreaks ([UNHCR 19/09/2023](#), [UNICEF 18/10/2023](#), [OCHA 01/11/2023](#)).

² For further in-depth analysis, refer to the previous Situational Analysis report ([iMMAP](#) Inc. and DFS 31/10/2023).

The Ministry of Health reported Gedaref as the most affected state for dengue fever due to the high density of mosquitoes and the lack of herd immunity. Meanwhile, the Gedaref Teaching Hospital lacks capacity to test all the suspected cases that arrive per day, according to local media ([USAID](#) 13/10/2023).

223 violence incidents against health care in 2023




Figure 14: Attacks on health care workers and facilities (Source: [Insecurity Insight](#) 26/10/2023)

New violent attacks and looting against healthcare infrastructures and personnel are reported.

Between October and November, 4 new attacks against health infrastructures have been recorded by the WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA), bringing the total number of attacks since the start of the conflict to 60 (accessed 09/11/2023 [WHO](#)).

On 9 October, RSF conducted three different attacks against health facilities in Omburdam, Jebel Awlia and El Obeid. The Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)-supported Al Nao hospital in Omdurman (one of the last functioning hospitals in the area) was hit during shelling, killing two patient caretakers and injuring five people ([OCHA](#) 13/10/2023). The dialysis department and the laboratory of Jebel Awlia Hospital was also damaged and consequently closed, with kidney patients transferred to the military hospital ([Sudan War Monitor](#) 9/10/2023). The attack against the Kuwaiti Children’s Hospital caused a child’s death and injuries to 17 individuals, including health professionals, as reported by the Health Ministry in North Kordofan ([Radio Dabanga](#) 9/10/2023).

In Nyala, the NGO Emergency announced on 30 October the suspension of activities at the Paediatric Centre until further notice after the centre was looted, with the premises and equipment damaged ([OCHA](#) 02/11/2023).

Overall Situation

Seven months into the conflict, the Sudanese health system is on the edge of collapse due to insecurity, lack of financial resources and access to medicines, medical supplies, electricity, and water.

Across Sudan, the already fragile health system still struggles with 70%-80% of hospitals out of service, causing overcrowding in emergency rooms and leaving 65% of the overall population without access to necessary health services, including specialized HIV care ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023, [MSF](#) 12/10/2023, [OCHA](#) 19/10/2023, [OCHA](#) 01/11/2023, [OCHA](#) 19/11/2023, [Sudan Tribune](#) 22/11/2023). The situation is more severe for internally displaced persons (IDPs), as reported by IOM and iMAP and DFS in the previous report of this series, with only 3% having uncomplicated access to healthcare ([IOM](#) 2/11/2023, [iMAP Inc.](#) and DFS 31/10/2023). This is compounded in areas like West Darfur, where just 30% of IDPs can access health services, hindered by staff shortages, dysfunctional facilities, and insecurity ([REACH](#) 20/11/2023). Host communities, particularly in Central Darfur, are deeply impacted by the arrival of IDPs. Islamic Relief's study indicates that 84% of these residents have experienced increased difficulty in accessing healthcare since the conflict intensified. Among them, 65% cannot afford medications, leading to financial strains such as taking loans or selling assets. Additionally, 57% avoid health facilities due to fear of attacks, and 32% find their main clinics non-operational ([Islamic Relief](#) 13/10/2023).

The conflict-affected states of Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum are of particular concern as they remain inaccessible to health partners, and all health facilities in these areas report stock shortages ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023, [REACH](#) 20/11/2023). As an example, since September, SAF actors have been preventing the transportation of surgical supplies to hospitals in RSF-controlled areas of Sudan's capital city of Khartoum, resulting in Turkish Hospital in southern Khartoum becoming at risk of running out of supplies and causing the suspension of surgery services by the end of November ([USAID](#) 21/11/2023; [MSF](#) 14/11/2023). As noted in the previous situation analysis report, economic challenges, strikes, violence, and unpaid salaries continue driving healthcare providers to emigrate, increasing staffing shortages and absenteeism ([DFS](#) 31/10/2023). Fragile public services constitute a great risk for further public health deterioration ([UNFPA](#) 29/10/2023). In the Red Sea and North Kordofan states, healthcare workers went on strike over the failure of the authorities to pay salaries for over four months ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023).

Sudan's healthcare system exhibits large coverage deficiencies, with the most severe service gaps in mental and reproductive health, and acute medical supply shortages, notably in the Red Sea and North Kordofan, where coverage is particularly limited.

The latest data from the Health Cluster in Sudan reveals that outpatient consultations, though reaching 1.5 million people, failed to cover 42% of localities. This shortfall highlights a widespread deficit in basic healthcare access across the country ([Health Cluster, WHO](#) 06/12/2023c). Mental health services are severely lacking, offered in a mere 8% of localities, which points to a dire need for psychological support, especially in areas affected by conflict ([Health Cluster, WHO](#) 06/12/2023d). The situation in reproductive health is similarly concerning, with some regions entirely devoid of essential maternal and child health services ([Health Cluster, WHO](#) 06/12/2023). Moreover, the distribution of medicines and medical supplies, although reaching 2.4 million beneficiaries, missed 49% of localities ([Health Cluster, WHO](#) 06/12/2023b).

The disruption of the health system in Sudan increases the risk of preventable deaths among children and vulnerable groups in the coming months as vaccination campaigns are interrupted and malnutrition aggravates the impact of these diseases.

The risk of death due to birth complications, reduced vaccination due to halted vaccination campaigns, disease outbreaks and malnutrition is rapidly rising among children. UNICEF estimates that by the end of 2023, about 333,000 children, in need of skilled delivery care to save their lives, will be born in Sudan ([MSF](#) 12/10/202, [UNICEF](#) 18/10/2023). Access to lifesaving emergency obstetric and neonatal care (EmONC) remains challenging due to electricity blackouts, shortages of clean water and a limited number of care providers able to operate in and reach health facilities ([UNFPA](#) 29/10/2023).

The disruption of health services is also impacting the survival of more than 9,000 dialysis patients – including 240 children. Before the conflict broke out, these patients were getting services in 107 government-run dialysis centers. As of October, only 77 centers are functional and overwhelmed due to patient load and lack of dialysis supplies ([OCHA](#) 13/10/2023).

Shelter

Key Figures

- Shelter and NFI needs gap at 95% as of October 2023 ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023).
- Shelter/NFI listed among the top three needs for IDPs due to continuing internal displacement ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023).

Latest developments

Clashes in Greater Darfur led to increased displacement and shelter needs, while in areas deemed safer, schools reopen, impacting IDPs sheltering in them.

The recent increase in fighting in the Darfur region has caused further displacement, with just under 600,000 individuals displaced within South Darfur, and people are reportedly sleeping and sheltering under trees by the roadside, without access to food, NFIs and water and sanitation ([UNHCR](#) 07/11/2023). On 5 November, the RSF took over the SAF's Division headquarters in Ardamata, and attacked residential neighborhoods in the region, most of which are camps for displaced people ([Ayin](#) 23/11/2023). In Nyala, heavy fighting has resulted in significant damage and destruction of homes, increasing the number of people in need of shelter support and causing further displacement within Darfur ([Protection Sector](#) 13/11/2023).

Across safer areas of Sudan such as Northern State and Al Jazirah, decisions have been made to re-open schools where IDPs are sheltering, impacting 23.9% of the IDPs' caseload sheltering in schools in Al Jazirah, which is the highest across Sudan ([IOM](#) 02/11/2023). On average, 8% of schools are being used by IDPs as shelters in non-conflict states ([UNICEF](#) 21/11/2023).

Overall Situation

The effects of the rainy season and subsequent flooding as well as ongoing clashes have led to the continued damage and destruction of housing, including homes, IDP camps, and makeshift shelters, causing further displacement. Simultaneously, this increased displacement from conflict-affected areas such as Khartoum and Central, and South Darfur has put severe strain on host communities across River Nile, Al Jazirah and parts of Darfur sheltering displaced persons, leading to a decrease in support for IDPs as host community needs are no longer being met.

Host community solidarity with IDPs dwindles, causing displaced persons to resort to makeshift and open shelters, amidst widespread conflict and flood-related damage to shelters and rising requests for shelter in public buildings, including schools.

States such as River Nile, Al Jazirah and parts of Darfur have seen significant and still-rising numbers of IDPs seeking refuge from Khartoum and South Darfur. While previously the majority of IDPs were taken in by host community families, the strain on resources and worsened living conditions this has caused have led to a reported dwindling of host community solidarity as the conflict continues, leading IDPs to seek shelter elsewhere. The total percent of IDPs seeking accommodation with host communities has now fallen from 77% to 69%, yet only 11% of IDPs can afford to rent accommodations on their own ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023). The number of people seeking shelter in public buildings have risen significantly, with UNICEF now reporting over 1000 schools being used as shelters for IDPs across Sudan, while previous data stated just 171 schools

([OCHA 01/11/2023](#); [OCHA 08/10/2023](#)). The number of IDPs living in open and makeshift shelters has also risen from 0.1 to 5%, with the remaining 9% sheltering in IDP camps, with poor living conditions caused in particular by a lack of adequate WASH services ([OCHA 08/10/2023](#)).

Proportion of IDP with Host Community Population

Date: 25 November, 2023




Figure 15: Proportion of IDPs sheltering with Host Community population (source: [DTM 05/12/2023](#))

In overcrowded shelters, the specific needs of women, children, and older people are unmet, such as separate latrines for women, and safety and accessibility for older people, people with disabilities, women and children, causing many to sleep outdoors or rotate between living in makeshift shelters and open areas where they are exposed to severe weather conditions and protection risks including GBV ([OCHA 08/10/2023](#)).

In the latest data from West Darfur, 46% of key informants reported that access to adequate shelter had worsened in the month prior (September 2023), and 68% of these same informants reported that shelters in their settlement had been completely destroyed by conflict, whereas 25% reported their shelters as severely damaged and 24% as moderately damaged ([REACH 20/11/2023](#)). Many informants also noted that shelter is inaccessible due to those shelters being occupied by armed groups and due to restrictions of movement within their settlements. The most common shelters reported by key informants were semi-permanent mud-brick or adobe shelters (33% of respondents), finished house or apartment (25%), a makeshift or improvised shelter (24%), and emergency shelters such as tents (11%) ([REACH 20/11/2023](#)).





Figure 16: Percentage and number of settlements where KIs reported that access to adequate shelter had worsened in the month prior to data collection. Source: Assessment by CRS and REACH initiative in Sept. 2023. Due to the purposive sampling approach, the findings are only indicative (see [Terms of Reference](#) and factsheets for [West Darfur](#) and [East Darfur](#))

Percentage of Shelter type by state



Percentage of Shelter type change by state (consider DTM Snapshot 08 to DTM Monthly Displacement 03)




Figure 17: Percentage of Shelter types by state (source: [DTM](#) 03/12/2023)

Non-food Item (NFI) needs vary across localities but disrupted supply chains and looting have resulted in low availability of NFIs and unaffordability of basic necessities. Humanitarian partners have identified core NFI needs in IDP camps and other makeshift shelters as bedding, cooking utensils, solar lamps for safety and security after dark, solar chargers for maintaining connectivity, and mosquito nets to prevent malaria ([OCHA](#))

08/10/2023). The core needs of families in Central and North Darfur are reportedly water containers, blankets and emergency shelter materials ([UNHCR](#) 23/11/2023). In West Darfur, 40% of REACH assessment key informants listed NFIs as a priority need, making it the third-highest priority need overall after food and healthcare ([REACH](#) 20/11/2023).

Active conflict and the rainy season aftermath continue to drive displacement and destroy homes and shelters for existing IDPs.

The rainy season and subsequent flooding continued to damage and destroy homes and other shelters since October. As of November 5th, the number of people affected by flooding had risen to 89,000 people across Sudan, up from an estimated 72,000 at the end of September. This includes 8,000 houses destroyed and another 8,000 damaged ([OCHA](#) 05/11/2023). As of early November, the most affected areas include the Northern State (34,000), River Nile (19,000), South Darfur (16,000) and North Darfur (13,000) states ([IOM](#) 06/10/2023).

Ongoing clashes including shelling and air raids in urban areas have continued to destroy homes and settlements and contribute to continued displacement as civilians seek shelter in other parts of Sudan. Residential neighborhoods across all seven localities in Khartoum are still impacted, and across Darfur, entire neighborhoods and settlements, including IDP camps, have been burned, including at least 13 locations in West Darfur, nine in South Darfur, five in North Darfur and two in Central Darfur in October ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023).

WASH

Key Figures

- 7.4 million children lack access to safe drinking water, a decrease down from 9.4 million reported on August 31st). These children are at risk of waterborne diseases, and there are 3.4 million children under five years are at high risk of diarrheal diseases and cholera ([OCHA](#) 26/10/2023).
- 8 million people are practicing open defecation ([OCHA](#) 19/10/2023).
- 14.9M (down from 17 million) need basic Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) assistance.

Latest developments

While emergency humanitarian responses have contributed to a reduction of people in need of access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation and hygiene assistance, overall WASH needs remain high as a result of ongoing access disruptions due to conflict and disease outbreaks.

Many of the WASH services provided have been emergency provisions (for example, distribution of bottled water) rather than long-term, sustainable solutions to WASH challenges.

In South Darfur, since the RSF takeover, cluster partners could not access and assess WASH needs or provide support. RSF also prevented water trucks from entering many neighborhoods in Nyala ([USAID](#) 27/10/2023). In late November, in Al-Daein, East Darfur the RSF withheld water access by shutting off water pipes supplying the military and stating that the army must surrender and join the RSF or withdraw from the town ([RT](#) 20/11/2023).

On 21 October, the Al Manara water treatment plant in Omdurman, which produces 200,000 m3 of drinking water per day, was open-fired on, which led to the water being cut off for several days ([OCHA](#) 25/10/2023). This is only the most recent of several similar incidents where WASH facilities were either directly targeted or have become collateral damage during clashes. In the context of ongoing disease outbreaks, even short-term water disruptions can significantly increase risks.

The cholera outbreak in Gedaref State (announced on 26 September) continues to spread. The National Cholera Taskforce that was established in September assessed a number of WASH-related risk factors present in the affected areas, identifying the need for emergency WASH interventions and hygiene awareness campaigns ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023).

Overall Situation

Unrepaired damaged infrastructure and high fuel prices lead to a decline in water trucking, contributing to lack of access to safe drinking water across Sudan.

In conflict-affected areas of Khartoum and Darfur, large water treatment plants and water supply systems that normally serve up to one million people are no longer functioning due to conflict-related damage and a lack of staff. In IDP camps and smaller localities affected by conflict, hostilities have also damaged water pumps, causing temporary or longer-term water cuts ([USAID](#) 13/10/2023).

Fuel is often unavailable, leading to volatile and high costs. Since April, there has been a 300-400% increase in the cost of operating water systems and water trucks, ultimately leading to a decline in the operation of fuel-dependent water supply systems and water pumping stations, as well as water trucking. This impacts people living in remote communities in particular ([Islamic Relief](#) 13/10/2023).

The rainy season and flooding, combined with overcrowded IDP shelters with unsafe drinking water, a lack of sanitation facilities, and unhygienic practices lead to cholera and acute watery diarrhea (AWD) outbreaks.

As noted in the previous situation analysis report, urban areas, and areas with high numbers of IDPs have been unable to accommodate the growing number of people with adequate WASH services ([iMMAP Inc. and DFS](#) 31/10/2023). Overcrowding in these areas results in significant pressure on limited water supply and sanitation facilities ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023), leading to increased unhygienic practices such as open defecation and increased protection risks as people are required to travel far distances to access water ([USAID](#) 27/10/2023). At the national level, 38% of surveyed IDP households stated that water was available but not affordable and 22% said it was available but not good quality, while 36% said it was available with no complication ([DTM](#) 02/11/2023). Despite 36% of respondents facing no challenges in accessing water, over two million IDPs rely on WASH partners daily across Sudan ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023). REACH data shows that in West Darfur, 59% of the key informants reported that their main drinking water sources were unprotected, and 26% reported that most people were not using any sanitation facilities and were instead practicing open defecation ([REACH](#) 20/11/2023). Key WASH needs for IDPs and host communities include sustainable water supply, as well as access to latrines ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023).

Between August and October, the rainy season and severe flooding further escalated the risk of disease outbreaks, including water-borne illnesses. To address the issue of flooding, an emergency flood preparedness and response plan was developed, which included pre-positioning emergency supplies in hard-to-reach areas ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023). Despite these plans, the risk of water-borne illness is exacerbated by a lack of humanitarian access, a lack of waste disposal services in conflict-affected areas, compromised water safety, and poor hygiene practices such as open defecation given the lack of operating sanitation facilities and latrines for overcrowded host and IDP communities ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023).

As a result of these factors, Sudan declared a cholera outbreak in Gedaref State on 26 September, and as of 9 November, there have been over 2,500 suspected cases, a new 1000 cases since mid-October, including 78 deaths, up from 52 in mid-October, reported from 27 localities in Gedaref, South Kordofan, Kassala, Khartoum, Aj Jazirah and Sennar states. More than 3.1 million people are estimated to be at risk of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) and cholera in eight states between July and December 2023 ([OCHA](#) 14/11/2023).

The National Cholera Taskforce ([OCHA 19/10/2023](#)) conducted active case surveillance in affected and high-risk areas. Their assessment focuses on key risk factors including lack of latrines, cases of open defecation, unchlorinated water, poor awareness of personal hygiene practices. These factors have been identified as significant across all affected areas ([Health Cluster 04/10/2023](#)). In regions with high rates of Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD), there is an urgent need for emergency WASH supplies to improve water quality and sanitation. Additionally, awareness campaigns are crucial to promote good hygiene practices ([OCHA 08/10/2023](#)).

	IDP priority needs			
	Percentage (number) of IDP households			
		Water		Sanitation
Overall	48% (510,190)		39% (408,876)	
Khartoum	2% (155)		1% (78)	
Greater Darfur	78% (339,527)		62% (272,830)	
Central Darfur	65% (45,816)		52% (37,221)	
East Darfur	85% (101,950)		71% (85,243)	
North Darfur	60% (51,573)		56% (48,041)	
South Darfur	86% (116,475)		72% (98,347)	
West Darfur	98% (23,713)		16% (3,978)	
Greater Kordofan	31% (18,200)		31% (18,066)	
North Kordofan	26% (6,054)		23% (5,420)	
South Kordofan	41% (8,068)		27% (5,444)	
West Kordofan	28% (4,078)		49% (7,202)	
Other states	28% (152,308)		21% (117,902)	

Figure 18: Number and percentage of IDPs surveyed with sanitation and water needs, by state (Source: [DTM 02/11/2023](#)).

Education

Key Figures

- One in every three children in the country have lost access to education. About 6.5 million children have lost access to school due to violence and insecurity ([Education Cluster 10/11/2023](#)). At least 10,400 schools are now closed in conflict-affected areas ([OCHA 20/11/2023](#)).
- Of the 526 gathering sites currently mapped, at least 82% are schools located in Aj Jazirah, Kassala, Gedaref, White Nile, Red Sea and Northern States ([UNHCR 10/10/2023](#)). An estimated 1,000 schools are being used as shelters in low-conflict areas ([OCHA 02/11/2023](#)).
- Following the directives by the authority to reopen schools at the end of October, the Kassala Teachers' Committee announced its categorical rejection of the decision to resume classes under the prevailing circumstances. The committee emphasized that teacher's salary had remained unpaid for over six months ([Dabanga 10/10/2023](#)).

Latest developments

As an effort to curtail the lack of safe spaces for children's education, a national campaign has been launched to establish more temporary spaces for school children. The campaign was initiated due to continued use of schools as gathering sites for displaced populations which reduced access to education ([UNHCR 10/10/2023](#)).

Similarly, UNICEF relaunched its e-learning platform, available online and offline, to support newly displaced children. It was estimated that the platform enabled 22,300 newly displaced children, youth, and teachers to access quality education, enabling them to continue learning even as the education system was disrupted ([OCHA](#) 08/10/2023).

Separately, attempts by state authorities to restart education in mid-November in some states continue to face hitches. For example, local authorities in Gedaref state directed teachers' committees to resume education services, but they reportedly refused, citing non-receipt of their financial dues as the reason ([IOM](#) 02/11/2023). While the authorities continue to engage in dialogue with the teachers' committee in order to reach an agreement to re-open schools, several challenges remain, including payment to teachers, shortage of teachers, expected overcrowding due to displacements and many classrooms and schools in need of repairs due to conflict and extensive use as shelters ([UNICEF](#) 21/11/2023).

Overall situation

Similar to the month of September, the educational sector continues to face challenges due to the deteriorating security environment.

The security situation continues to drive humanitarian needs, including education, with children being forced to flee from their homes, overwhelming the educational infrastructure in the states they have moved to ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023).

The use of educational facilities such as schools for shelter persisted as more displacements were recorded. Indeed, the use of schools as gathering sites in many states continues to hamper their effective use as educational facilities. Reports indicated that at least 82% of the currently mapped 526 gathering sites are schools (in Aj Jazirah, Kassala, Gedaref, White Nile, Red Sea and Northern States) ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023) while, the number of schools being used as shelters across the country has been estimated at over one thousand ([OCHA](#) 02/11/2023). This suggests that even low-conflict areas face difficulty in providing educational facilities.

1286 schools occupied (estimation)




Figure 19: Estimation of schools occupied/used as shelters ([IOM](#) 16/11/2023)

The destruction of infrastructure, including educational facilities, is one of the obvious impacts of violent conflict and the collapse of government provisions of services, including schools, due to ongoing conflict and instability.

The disruption of schools and teaching is compounded in greater Darfur due to the intensification of conflict in the last two months with the displacement of several communities. Almost all schools in the refugee settlements and camps as well as in urban areas have been closed due to the ongoing conflict in greater Darfur ([UNHCR](#) 10/10/2023).

In Khartoum, the impact has been particularly severe, where all higher education institutions have been affected. Across the country, six public universities and their associated facilities have suffered from theft, destruction, and arson ([ACAPS](#) 17/11/2023). With no sign of de-escalation in conflict activities, the prospects of school resumption remain limited, and there is no indication that schools will reopen while the conflict continues ([OCHA](#) 26/10/2023). More than 7 million children were already out of school before the conflict and now another 12 million children are affected by school closures—of whom 5 million children remain in conflict states.

Methodology

DFS Analysts and Information Management Officers collate and structure available information in the [DEEP](#) platform daily. Each piece of information is tagged based on the pillars and sub-pillars of the DFS/iMMAP Inc. Sudan Crisis Framework which was based on the JIAF and developed in line with successful models used across previous projects. The framework is shown in **Figure 21** and comprises the humanitarian conditions (by sector) and the operational environment. All the captured information receives additional tags to allow examination of different categories of interest (such as affected group, geographic location, demographic profile etc.). An [interactive Situation Overview Dashboard](#) developed by iMMAP Inc. was used to support in analyzing and visualizing available data.

The analysis provided is a synthesis of the information that was collected and tagged from publicly available sources and supplemented by assessment data provided by humanitarian partners working in Sudan and neighboring countries. Maps and visuals have been created by iMMAP Inc. For this report, 667 **documents** (collected between October 1 and November 30, 2023) were reviewed, sourced from 82 **authors or organizations**, resulting in a total of **5637** being tagged. The distribution of excerpts per sector is shown in **Figure 20**.

An interactive [DEEP Dashboard](#) can be accessed publicly to evaluate and check the distribution of data and gaps within the project. Data used to generate this report is available on the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX) webpage and can be accessed at this link: [DEEP extracts related to the Sudan 2023 Situational Analyses - Humanitarian Data Exchange](#).




Figure 20: Distribution of excerpts by sector using the DEEP Analytical Framework



0. Context			
Political	Peace and Security	Socio cultural	Demographic
Legal and Policy	Economics	Environment	
1. Conflict			
Drivers & Aggravating factors	Conflict Events	Area change of control	Parties to the conflict
Peacekeeping efforts/Interventions	Possible Future Scenarios		
2. Other Events/Shock			
Type and Characteristics	Drivers and Aggravating factors	Mitigating factors	Hazard and Threats
3. Displacement			
Type, # Movement	Push factors	Pull factors	Intentions
			Local Integration
4. Casualties			
Dead	Injured	Missing	
5. Humanitarian Access			
Access of affected population to assistance	Access of relief actors to the affected population	Security / physical constraints	People facing humanitarian access constraints
6. Communication and Information			
Info channels and means	Info challenges and barriers	Knowledge and Information	

		Cross sector	Food Sec	Livelihood	Health	Protection	Education	WASH	Shelter	Logistics
6. Impact	Drivers & Aggravating factors									
	Impact on people									
	Impact on services and systems									
7. Humanitarian Conditions	Living standards									
	Coping mechanisms									
	Physical / mental wellbeing									
8. At Risk	People at risk/vulnerable									
9. Priorities	Priority needs (pop)									
	Priority needs (Hum.)									
	Priority interventions (pop)									
10. Capacities / Response	Government & local authorities									
	International actors									
	National/local actors									

Figure 21: Analytical Framework – Operational Environment and Humanitarian Conditions

Annex: Information Sources and Gaps

Overview of the existing data and gaps

The key sources used for each section and critical information gaps are highlighted here to provide an understanding of the information landscape for the Sudan Crisis. In summary:

Sectors:

The information contained in DEEP (see [Methodology section](#)), shows how the health sector continues to be the most documented, reflecting the urgency and prevalence of health needs in the crisis. Protection and Food Security follow, indicating a prioritization of immediate survival needs. Livelihoods and Education data are notably scarce, which could point to an oversight in the collection process or the prioritization of more immediate life-saving sectors.

Dimensions of the Analytical Framework:

Information on coping mechanisms and priority needs is very limited, suggesting that the complexities of how communities are managing the crisis may be underreported. The data reflects an acute need for detailed insights into the interventions and the affected population's responses, a gap that mirrors the challenges noted in the previous month's report.

Affected groups:

The DEEP dashboard emphasizes internally displaced persons (IDPs) and affected groups, consistent with humanitarian focus areas. However, there is a continuing deficiency in data regarding host communities, who often face secondary impacts of the crisis, such as resource depletion and social tension.

Groups with specific needs:

The data underrepresents vulnerable groups such as GBV survivors and persons with disabilities. This lack may result in these groups' needs not being fully addressed in the crisis response. The representation of women and children in the data is present but not proportionate to their increased vulnerability in conflict settings.

Sources and gaps by report section

Unlike the previous situation report where Context, Conflict, and Humanitarian Access had their own sections and subsections, in this update, they are compiled under the title **Spotlight: Conflict and humanitarian access**. In this section, the report primarily draws from [ACLED](#) for detailed conflict data, [UNHCR](#) for displacement and access issues, and international media like [Al Jazeera](#) and [Reuters](#) for major event updates, while [Sudan War Monitor](#) remained as a trustworthy source to inform about conflict developments. Local Sudanese media provide ground-level perspectives. Compared to the previous report, there's a narrower focus on conflict specifics, with less emphasis on broader contexts, and humanitarian access, yet briefly covered through [ICRC](#), [OCHA](#), or indirectly through [UNHCR](#), has been challenging to address. Data gaps include limited detail on the security situation's granular shifts and challenges in real-time information gathering due to access constraints, impacting the accuracy of conflict and humanitarian access assessments.

Updates on **displacement** have been written based on updates and data available from humanitarian partners including UN agencies and INGOs. [IOM](#) through its Monthly Displacement Overview ([October](#) and [November](#)) and its [Weekly Snapshots](#) (5th to 12th) represents the primary data source for IDP figures while [UNHCR](#) represents the primary data source for figures on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Returnees. It is also possible to give an overview of priority needs across the various population groups (IDPs, refugees in Sudan, host communities) and an indication on intentions and drivers of displacement/return. News reports from verified international and national media sources were used, triangulated to ensure validity and account for biases. Incident data from [ACLED](#) was used to strengthen analysis on displacement trends and complement reporting from news agencies.

Protection sources keep relying on the same periodically updated quantitative datasets ([UNHCR](#) data portal and [IOM DTM](#)), as well as conflict events from [ACLED](#). The description and immediate impacts of these clashes and surges of violence are covered by OCHA through its several situation reports and operational updates ([OCHA 02/11/2023](#); [OCHA 12/11/2023](#)), [HRW](#) or national and international media portals (i.e. [BBC 08/11/2023](#); [CNN 08/11/2023](#); [Al Jazeera 08/11/2023](#), or [Darfur 24 05/10/2023](#)), while IOM and UNHCR track displacement and needs linked to these events, and [UNFPA](#) provides a gender approach to the protection analysis. However, the extremely limited access to these conflict-affected areas keeps hindering an accurate and in-depth and timely understanding of protection needs, leaving many needs, risks and populations affected unidentified, at least the days after the violence occurs.

In the October-November analysis of Sudan's **Food security and livelihoods sector**, sources like [WFP-FAO](#), [FEWS.NET](#), and [IPC](#) reports were again used similar to the previous report. However, a critical gap persisted in reliable data on non-agricultural livelihoods and income-generating activities. Access limitations in regions like Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan continued to impede comprehensive data collection. The analysis also integrated assessments by [REACH](#) and [Islamic Relief](#), providing critical insights into the conditions and humanitarian needs of IDPs and Host Communities in Darfur respectively. Despite these sources, the need for more localized, updated information, particularly qualitative data for community-level understanding, was more pronounced. Challenges of limited access and reliance on specific sources were consistent with those in September.

Nutrition data for this report was primarily sourced from [OCHA](#), [UNICEF](#), [WHO](#), and an assessment focused on IDP settlements in West Darfur carried out by [REACH](#). Despite expanded data from these key agencies, gaps persisted due to the lack of comprehensive, in-depth real-time assessments, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Analysis revealed critical issues, such as inadequate nutritional services in IDP camps and dramatic increases in SAM admissions, underscoring the need for more detailed and localized data to accurately assess and address the escalating nutrition crisis, yet this data has not been made public, and the [Global Nutrition Cluster](#) has not made any further updates.

In the **Health** sector, information for this report largely mirrors the sources used in previous analyses. WHO and the Health Cluster are pivotal in providing broad-scale insights into Sudan's health sector, compensating for the Sudanese Government's lack of monitoring and resources. Their operational updates are crucial for monitoring aspects such as [mental health](#), [maternal and child health](#), and [medical supply](#) distribution, though significant gaps remain in [epidemiological tracking](#) and registration, largely due to minimal government engagement. Sporadic non-health-focused assessments like those published by [REACH](#) and [Islamic Relief](#) provide specific insights that prove the need for further data collection. WHO, together with Insecurity Insight, keeps providing data on [attacks on healthcare facilities and personnel](#). The country's health sector monitoring is further hampered by budgetary constraints, non-payment of healthcare workers, and the non-functionality of numerous health centers, particularly in conflict-affected areas, impeding effective assessment of the population's health status.

Shelter relied heavily on the IOM including the Displacement Tracking Matrix ([IOM 05/12/2023](#)) for information on priority needs of IDPs and IDP households and information on living conditions, along with OCHA's humanitarian response dashboards ([OCHA 08/10/2023](#)), the latest REACH assessment on West Darfur ([REACH 20/11/2023](#)) which provided status information on shelters and information on access issues. Information from UNICEF ([UNICEF 21/11/2023](#)) spoke to the number of schools being used as IDP shelters. While there is a great deal of information regarding displacement and the shelters used by IDPs, there was significantly less data related to NFIs (what is most needed in which states/localities).

Overall, the **WASH** situation remained mostly the same as was reported in the previous Situational Analysis report published in October, with few new data sources identified during the current reporting period. New WASH sources used included OCHA factsheets and statements ([OCHA 19/10/2023](#); [OCHA 25/10/2023](#)), USAID factsheets ([USAID 27/10/2023](#)), with a few updated statistics on water and sanitation access, and survey data from Islamic Relief ([Islamic Relief 13/10/2023](#)) and REACH ([REACH 20/11/2023](#)) specific to the Darfur region.



In Sudan's current **Education** analysis, the [Education Cluster](#) provides key data on children's loss of educational access and school closures due to conflict, while [UNICEF](#) occasionally offers insights specifically on educational initiatives, such as e-learning platforms. OCHA contributes broader contextual information about the use of schools as shelters and general school closure statistics. [IOM DTM](#) and [REACH](#), mainly focusing on displacement, also shed light on the use of educational facilities as gathering sites. Media outlets supplement this with updates on the impact of displacement on education. Compared to the previous report, these sources continue to be used, but gaps in detailed information about the operational status of schools and the quality of education, especially in conflict-affected areas, persist. The challenge of assessing the educational needs of internally displaced children remains underrepresented in both current and previous analyses.



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