The airstrikes initiated by the Turkish forces on October 5th have caused considerable damage to various areas in Northeast Syria. On October 6, Turkey announced it considers all infrastructure and superstructure facilities in NES to be valid targets. The next day, this was seen in the manner in which attacks targeted several vital infrastructure facilities including water stations, power plants, as well as oil and gas fields. Map 1 illustrates verified airstrikes targeting crucial facilities, including the Alouk water station in Ras Al Ain sub-district, Oudeh and Saeeda Oil and Gas fields in Quamishli sub-district, and Al Swediya Oil and gas fields in Al Malkeyeh sub-district. While significant damage to these stations has not been reported, the persistence of such attacks is impacting the security conditions, hindering the population’s access to their already limited electricity and fuel requirements in these areas.

The maps segment the North Syria region into three primary buffers: 10km, 20km, and 30km. Various previous Turkish statements note 30 km to be the distance it aspires to remove entities they consider threats from. If these attacks extend into deeper regions, they could have far-reaching consequences. There are two critical sectors in Northeast Syria that could be severely affected by the ongoing conflict and any potential escalation, primarily agriculture and bread production, which are vital sources of livelihoods and food security for the NES population.

The context’s instability threatens agricultural production, primarily due to the unstable security conditions that limit farmers’ access to their lands. This could significantly impact wheat production for the upcoming season, as many farmers typically prepare and cultivate their lands between October and January. The security-related inaccessibility to farmlands will hinder farmers from proceeding with the current agricultural seasons. Moreover, the northern regions of Syria are crucial agricultural areas, as indicated on Map 2 by vegetated land zones within the northern sub-districts of Syria. If the conflict persists or escalates, potential crop losses (across all types of crops) could be substantial and adversely affect the food security situation in Northeast Syria. Based on the crop lands of the 2022-2023 season, and within the 10km buffer, there’s an estimated potential crop loss of 343,182 hectares of both irrigated and rainfed croplands if these areas remain under conflict. In the subsequent 10 km buffer (20km), the potential crop loss would increase by an additional 271,494.15 hectares of croplands. In the worst-case scenario of the 30km buffer, the estimated crop loss will reach approximately 808,100 Hectare of crop lands.

On the other hand, another sector that could be impacted due to the ongoing conflict is the operational capabilities of bread production facilities such as bakeries and mills. Map 2 displays the presence of these facilities in the main affected sub-districts of Ain Al Arab, Al Malkeyeh, Qantaniyyeh, Quamishli, and Sarin. Currently, the productivity of bakeries in these NES sub-districts is less than 50% of their maximum capacity, primarily due to constraints related to flour availability, accessibility, and financial liquidity of bakery owners. Furthermore, in the sub-districts of Ain Al Arab, Quamishli, and Al Malkeyeh, production levels are inadequate, covering only 93%, 72%, and 18% of their respective populations’ bread needs. The ongoing conflict could impose several limitations on these facilities, including potential structural damage that might halt their operation. Even if these facilities aren’t damaged, their access to flour, fuel, and water needed for operation will be compromised, further constraining their functionality, and consequently affecting food security in these areas.